Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-00661048
MOTION HEARD: 20210429
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Gignac et al., Plaintiffs
AND:
Move Me Again Transportation Inc. et al, Defendants
BEFORE: Master Josefo
COUNSEL: R. Scocco, counsel for plaintiff/moving parties: rocco@scoccolaw.ca
M. Birkas, accounting manager for corporate defendants/respondents, Move Me Again Transportation Inc, & Safe Bound Moving & Storage Inc.: accounting@movemeagain.ca
C. Oz turk, defendant/respondent in person: info@movemeagain.ca
Endorsement of Master Josefo dated April 30, 2021
(Motion argued April 29, 2021)
Endorsement
The Issue, The Parties, and The Process leading up to and at the Motion:
[1] This urgent motion arises out of a household move gone wrong. Plaintiffs Nicolas and Jessica Gignac seek an Order pursuant to Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) for the return of their personal property held since April 6, 2021 by the corporate defendants Move Me Again Transportation Inc, and Safe Bound Moving & Storage Inc., (“corporate defendants”). Subsequent to the plaintiffs’ urgent request for a motion, a notice of action was issued.
[2] Mr. Scocco represents the plaintiffs. Leading up to this motion, the corporate defendants were originally represented by a para-legal. It was confirmed to the para-legal that she could not appear in Superior Court. At the motion today, the accounting manager of the corporate defendants, Ms. Birkas, was given leave under Rule 15.01(2) to represent the corporate defendants for this motion. Ms. Birkas confirmed that the corporate defendants operated interchangeably. Mr. Ozturk, a principle of the corporate defendants, appeared in person. Mr. Ozturk in the main deferred to Ms. Birkas to make submissions.
[3] Ms. Birkas had the affidavit of Nicolas Gignac sworn April 27, 2021 (with exhibits) (“Gignac affidavit”), as she referred to this material during the hearing. Pursuant to emails sent by counsel for plaintiffs, it appears that all the plaintiffs’ material (notice of motion, the affidavit, factum, and book of authorities) was received. Thus, despite difficulties making proper service pursuant to the April 28, 2021 affidavit of attempted service of process server P. Kaur, nobody disputed that the materials were received. Thus, I order that service on all defendants is validated.
[4] Mr. Scocco correctly copied the para-legal on his correspondence to the Motions Office, starting with his of April 21, 2021 seeking an urgent motion date. Despite knowing of this pending motion for some time, none of the defendants submitted material. Nevertheless, I gave Ms. Birkas much latitude to discuss the household moving process involving these plaintiffs. I only stopped her when Mr. Scocco appropriately objected as Ms. Birkas clearly strayed into giving evidence of what the movers had said to and done with the plaintiffs. Not only was that testifying, it was hear-say. The defendants had time to submit an affidavit of the movers or one of them, or to seek an adjournment. Indeed, in my April 26, 2021 message which I had the Assistant Trial Coordinator send to the representatives that day, I observed as follows:
If there is to be requested an adjournment by the respondents/defendants, it likely would be on terms. Thus, I urge the parties to begin or carry on their substantive discussions with respect to those terms. Any Order I may make would likely include terms in any event, as discussed within Rule 44 of the Rules and in the case-law which applies that Rule.
[5] Yet no request for an adjournment was made. The parties were also not able to settle this within motion either leading up to this motion or when it was argued, albeit time for such efforts was allocated shortly after we commenced on the morning of April 29th. After those efforts failed, we recommenced. After hearing submissions, I now have come to, so herein set out, my conclusions in this endorsement.
Relevant Facts:
[6] It is helpful for context to review the relevant facts which underpin this motion. The plaintiffs, given Mr. Gignac’s offer of new employment as a Chef in the Maritimes, planned a move from Sudbury, Ontario to Dieppe, New Brunswick. On March 2, 2021, plaintiffs obtained a quote from “Michael”, a reservations agent at Safe Bound Moving & Storage Inc, one of the corporate defendants, for a move from a two-bedroom house in Sudbury. The quote (exhibit “B” to the Gignac affidavit) was based on 3,000 pounds for an estimated subtotal of $2,025.00 plus tax. For an estimated additional 2,000 pounds the cost was $900., plus tax. The total estimated cost for two movers, a 26-foot truck and 53-foot trailer, loading and unloading, was thus $2,925, plus 13% tax. Adding the tax amount of $380, the amount is $3,305.25. On March 12, 2021, Mr. Gignac accepted the quote and provided Michael with his credit card number for a $200 deposit to confirm the move.
[7] Ms. Birkas submitted that the plaintiffs also used one wardrobe box, for $45., plus four mattress covers at $30 each, for a total of $120. $165.00 plus HST would equal $186.45. Adding that amount to the $3,305.25 figure leads to a revised total of $3,491.65. This is a tad less than what I roughly calculated was, during the submissions (in reality, the testimony, taken with latitude) of Ms. Birkas, as being about $3,700 as an “all in” figure for the estimated cost. Ms. Birkas essentially agreed with that figure of $3,700., remarking that such would take into account a surcharge for, inter alia, stairs. Thus, for purposes of analyzing this matter, I accept a figure of $3,700.00 as the total estimated cost for the move. Presumably, the already paid deposit would be deducted from that figure.
[8] Returning to the evidence properly before me, Exhibit B sets out that, for a typical two-bedroom home, the weight is between 4,000 and 6,000 pounds. The plaintiffs, using the above-referenced 5,000 pounds for which the estimated cost was based, thus fell squarely within the middle of that range. Yet plaintiffs were, I find, diligent in not just relying on the estimated weight in the quote of the defendants. They also used the Inventory Spreadsheet of the defendants. Exhibit C to the Gignac affidavit shows that the defendants state, regarding the running tally of weight, that “we deliberately overestimate each piece of furniture on our spreadsheet reflecting solid oak material.”
[9] The running tally (Exhibit D to the Gignac affidavit) provides a weight estimate of 11,526 pounds. Yet, considering the photos of the moving truck on the April 6, 2021 day of move (Exhibit E to the Gignac affidavit), I would be surprised if these approximately 213 items weigh anything close to 11,000 pounds. Referencing the chart provided by the defendants of the typical weight (Exhibit B), a four-bedroom house has weight ranging from 10,000 to 12,000 pounds. Accordingly, while I need not, and indeed do not at this preliminary stage make any definitive finding, it is in my view less likely that the weight was much more than 5,000-6,000 pounds.
[10] In any event, after submitting the completed spreadsheet, the uncontroverted evidence is that nobody from the defendants contacted the plaintiffs. It was not suggested by defendants to plaintiffs, for example, that, based on the spreadsheet and weight calculated therefrom, the estimated price was too low and needed to be re-visited. Yet the defendants are the purported experts in a household move. It is in my view for those with the asserted expertise in this area to ensure that the estimates it provides are at least generally reliable within a reasonable range. I will return to what that range should be subsequently in these reasons.
[11] Mr. Gignac swears in his affidavit (Paragraph 8) that, after the truck was loaded on April 6th, he was told to sign a moving contract that was “…just all of the stuff you already discussed with Michael”. Mr. Gignac swears that he accepted that assurance and took a photo of the contract (Exhibit F to the Gignac affidavit).
[12] On April 9, 2021, pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Gignac affidavit, Mr. Gignac received an invoice from the corporate defendants (or one of them, as Ms. Birkas confirmed that they operate interchangeably) for $9,677.25 based on a “flat rate” weight charge of 15,000 pounds. It was asserted by the defendants, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Gignac affidavit, that Gignac had agreed to the 15,000 pound flat rate option pursuant to the contract that he signed on moving day.
[13] As discussed at paragraph 10 and following of his affidavit, the corporate defendants insisted that the plaintiffs pay that $9,677.25 amount in full, by e-transfer, not by credit card. Ms. Birkas acknowledged during the hearing that not accepting payment by credit card avoids a customer utilizing the “dispute option” available from some credit-card issuers, thus avoiding the risk of a “charge-back”. I observe that this prohibition on payment by credit card is notwithstanding the defendants’ quote at Exhibit B stating that payment by certain credit cards was acceptable.
[14] In any event, the defendants’ position was that, if payment was not to be made, then the defendants would not move the plaintiff’s household items, including the chef-tools belonging to Mr. Gignac, thus essential to his work, from an undisclosed storage location in, presumably, the Greater Toronto Area (“GTA”) to the new family home of the plaintiffs in Dieppe, New Brunswick.
[15] Paragraphs 15 and following of the Gignac affidavit explains the urgency for the plaintiffs: the husband, wife, and infant child are “living in an empty house in Dieppe, New Brunswick”, in a community new to them, with no family nor friends from whom to seek assistance. The furniture held by the defendants, moreover, includes the baby furniture, crib, playthings, and baby care supplies. Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek the assistance of the Court. They no longer want the defendants to move their household items (a list of which is part of this record) to their new home in Dieppe. Rather, they seek an Order that another company can attend at the defendants’ location to take the plaintiffs’ items and complete the move.
[16] Mr. Scocco submitted that the plaintiffs should not have to pay anything in that regard. He made submissions that the contract, formed when the deposit was made, was breached when the defendants failed to deliver the goods. Ms. Birkas submitted that the defendants will release the goods if the plaintiffs pay $4,000 into court or, alternatively, into the trust account of counsel for the plaintiff.
Overview of the Law—and the Legal Test for an Order of Replevin Applied to these Facts:
[17] What used to be described as Replevin is now codified in Rule 44, and in Section 104 of the Courts of Justice Act. Relevant portions of these are excerpted as follows:
104 .- (1) In an action in which the recovery of possession of personal property is claimed and it is alleged that the property,
(a) was unlawfully taken from the possession of the plaintiff; or
(b) is unlawfully detained by the defendant,
the court, on motion, may make an interim order for recovery of possession of the property.
(2) A person who obtains possession of personal property by obtaining or setting aside an interim order under subsection (1) is liable for any loss suffered by the person ultimately found to be entitled to possession of the property.
Rule 44.01(1) An interim order under section 104 of the Courts of Justice Act for recovery of possession of personal property may be obtained on motion by the plaintiff, supported by an affidavit setting out,
(a) a description of the property sufficient to make it readily identifiable;
(b) the value of the property;
(c) that the plaintiff is the owner or lawfully entitled to possession of the property;
(d) that the property was unlawfully taken from the possession of the plaintiff or is unlawfully detained by the defendant; and
(e) the facts and circumstances giving rise to the unlawful taking or detention.
44.03(1) On a motion for an interim order for recovery of possession of personal property made on notice to the defendant, the court may,
(a) order the plaintiff to pay into court as security twice the value of the property as stated in the order, or such other amount as the court directs, or to give the appropriate sheriff security in such form and amount as the court approves, and direct the sheriff to take the property from the defendant and give it to the plaintiff;
(b) order the defendant to pay into court as security twice the value of the property as stated in the order, or such other amount as the court directs, or to give the plaintiff security in such form and amount as the court approves, and direct that the property remain in the possession of the defendant; or
(c) make such other order as is just.
[18] Prior to the motion, counsel for plaintiff speculated that this matter might need to be before a Judge, rather than before a Master. In my view, however, counsel for plaintiff was ultimately correct to proceed before me. The language of Section 104 and Rule 44.03(1) note that the jurisdiction is to “the court”, not necessarily to a Judge. Many of the cases referenced by Mr. Scocco were decided by Masters. Thus, in those jurisdictions where Masters sit, the motion is correctly brought to a Master.
[19] In this matter, as I noted earlier, the functional requisites established by Rule 44.01(1) are met by plaintiffs. The motion record contains a detailed description of the property so to make such readily identifiable. The value of the goods is also set out. Moreover, the evidence is uncontroverted that the property belongs to plaintiffs (it is not disputed, nor could it be, that these are the plaintiffs’ household goods and possessions that were to be moved by defendants).
[20] A thorough discussion of the legal test which the moving party must meet is found in the 1996 decision of Clark Door of Canada Ltd v. Inline Fiberglass Ltd., 45 C.P.C (3d) 244. In that decision, Justice Molloy reviews the “substantial grounds” hurdle which the plaintiffs must overcome. Paragraph nine reads as follows:
The classic and oft quoted statement of the test to be applied before making an interim recovery order is that propounded by the Senior Master in Ryder Truck Rental Ltd. v. Walker (1959), [1960] O.W.N. 70 (H.C.), a case involving the disputed ownership of 20 trucks under the Replevin Act R.S.O. 1950, c. 339, s. 2 and Rules 359 and 360 (the precursors of the current legislation and Rules set out above). The Senior Master ruled:
The first matter for consideration is the scope of the enquiry under Rules 359-60. Having regard to the nature of the relief obtainable in a replevin action, which allows a preliminary taking of possession before trial, in my view it is not contemplated that the Court at this stage should embark upon a trial of the issues raised but only require the plaintiff to show the facts upon which it bases its claim, and if these facts afford substantial grounds for the plaintiff's claim, then the order should be granted. ... Therefore, in my opinion the enquiry is limited to determining whether there are substantial grounds for the plaintiff's allegations, which if proved, bring the case within the statute [emphasis added].
[21] Thus, as I alluded earlier in these reasons, it is not for me to make definitive findings of fact. If the parties continue their dispute, it will then be the appropriate time for such final fact-finding. At this juncture, what I need to determine is if there are “substantial grounds” for the plaintiffs’ allegations. To do so, however, I cannot avoid coming to certain conclusions, which I do on the evidence which is presently before me.
[22] What does “substantial grounds” mean, more precisely? What are “substantial grounds for the plaintiffs’ claim”? Similar to other somewhat elusive concepts, it is not easy to define. Justice Molloy, however, helpfully articulated the following in that regard:
[paragraphs 18 & 23, Clark Door] It is not easy to articulate precisely the degree of proof which is required to meet the "substantial grounds" test. While the case law consistently identifies "substantial grounds" as the proper test, it is not immediately obvious where that test fits into the broad spectrum. Obviously since the order is only for interim recovery pending trial, the degree of proof is less than would be required on a motion for summary judgment. No final disposition of rights is being made. That is not to say, however, that the rights of the parties are not significantly affected even on an interim basis. In many cases, losing possession of goods for the time it takes to bring an action to trial may have serious, and perhaps irreversible consequences. Accordingly, I believe the plaintiff must show more than a probability of success at trial or simply that the plaintiff is more likely to succeed than the defendant. The test is "substantial" grounds, not reasonable grounds or probable grounds…
Clearly, the test for whether a replevin order should be made is not going to be exactly the same as the test for any type of injunction. However, the term "substantial grounds" is somewhat vague and it helps, in my opinion, to put it in a contextual framework. As I have said carlier, it is obvious that the substantial grounds test is a lesser standard than the test for summary judgment. Similarly, I consider the Mareva injunction "strong prima facie case" requirement to be too high a standard for replevin orders which are much less draconian and far reaching. On the other hand, the "substantial issue" test (not frivolous or vexatious) applied generally in prohibitive injunction cases is, in my view, too low a standard for a replevin order which requires one party to actually deliver up possession of property to the other. It must be remembered that before obtaining a prohibitive injunction, a party must satisfy other requirements not imposed on applicants for replevin (eg. the requirement of demonstrating irreparable harm which damages cannot remedy). As the replevin order is more in the nature of a mandatory injunction and is a greater interference with responding parties' rights than a prohibitive injunction, a stronger standard is required. Accordingly, I am of the view that the "substantial grounds" test for interim recovery of property requires a high degree of assurance that the plaintiff will be successful at trial [emphasis added].
[23] As I apply this law to the facts before me, I believe there are substantial grounds to grant the plaintiffs the relief sought. In my view, there is a substantial argument that the contract between the parties was formed not after all the possessions of the plaintiffs had been loaded onto the truck and when one of the movers handed Mr. Gignac a piece of paper, telling him to sign it as it, as Gignac swore to in his affidavit, confirmed his already made arrangements with Michael. Rather, the contract was in my view most probably formed when, subsequent to reviewing the quote received, the plaintiffs provided a deposit to book the move. The deposit was accepted. This to me seems equivalent to “offer”, “acceptance”, and “consideration”, thus leading to the formation of a consumer contract. The contract accordingly was based on the quote and formed at that time.
[24] It would seem counter-intuitive to modern consumer protection principles and legislation, such as the Consumer Protection Act in Ontario, to hold that only after four hours of loading the moving truck, once all the possessions of the plaintiffs were out of their control, could a contract be formed. Perhaps if there never had been any quotation or assurances given, as well as a deposit (consideration) earlier provided; yet such circumstances would likely be factually rare.
[25] In this matter, the plaintiffs also acted, as I noted earlier, diligently. They completed the Inventory Spreadsheet. They listed all their items. There is no evidence before me that the defendants responded to that. Ms. Birkas had no idea if Michael or if anyone from the defendants contacted the plaintiffs once the spreadsheet was received. Yet again, the defendants, the professional movers, are the experts in these matters. They thus are expected to know, when reviewing what a customer provides in response to their suggestion, if the quote may no longer be accurate. In this case, I find that the silence by the defendants supports the plaintiffs that the estimated amount could be relied upon.
[26] In his affidavit, Mr. Gignac makes clear that he never agreed to a flat-rate for 15,000 pounds. When considering this matter logically, his sworn testimony makes eminent sense. After all, if the weight is to be between 5,000-6,000 pounds, why would anyone accept a flat-rate for almost three times that amount? That is especially the case if one is moving two adults and an infant, from a two-bedroom home. Reviewing the photos of the truck as part of the Exhibits, I would be quite surprised if the total weight was close to 15,000 pounds, or even much more than 6,000 pounds, as I stated earlier in these reasons. The defendants could have stopped at a weigh-scale somewhere between Sudbury and Toronto. Yet they did not do so. Again, the defendants had opportunity, on receipt of the spreadsheet, to seek to revise the quote upon which they knew their customers, the plaintiffs, were relying. Yet they did not.
[27] Rather, defendants have attempted to claim more than two and a half times the estimated amount that I used, after I had increased that estimate to $3,700. They, moreover, refused to let the plaintiffs pay their invoiced amount by credit card, seeking to unfairly insulate themselves from and prevent any legitimate investigation conducted by the plaintiffs’ credit card issuer. The only options that the plaintiffs had was to submit to these unilateral demands, or to seek the assistance of the Court.
[28] This approach of the defendants I find best described as “hardball”. The payment sought is an unjust departure well and beyond the estimated amount. The payment sought renders the estimate which defendants provided meaningless in the circumstances. The payment sought is in my view excessive and not justifiable in all the circumstances based on the evidence presently before me. After all, what is the point of seeking and obtaining an estimate if it is fully unreliable with essentially no relation to the final number and payment sought?
[29] Above in these reasons I wrote that estimates which the defendants provide should be at least generally reliable within a reasonable range. While coming right on the estimated price would be ideal, such pinpoint accuracy is not always possible. In my view, most consumers would not be vexed by a limited and reasonable differential. Earlier, I promised to return to address what should be that differential range. In that regard, section 10 of the Consumer Protection Act sets the ceiling. That section reads as follows:
10 (1) If a consumer agreement includes an estimate, the supplier shall not charge the consumer an amount that exceeds the estimate by more than 10 per cent.
(2) If a supplier charges an amount that exceeds the estimate by more than 10 per cent, the consumer may require that the supplier provide the goods or services at the estimated price.
(3) Nothing in this section prevents a consumer and a supplier from agreeing to amend the estimate or price in a consumer agreement, if the consumer requires additional or different goods or services.
[30] I can visualize circumstances where something legitimately unexpected and unable to be known occurs, which leads to an increase in price. Yet, ten percent is what the legislature sets out as the limit in those circumstances. In my view, this is just. It compels suppliers to carefully quote, considering the relevant circumstances and available information, or seeking out further information, rather than just throwing out a low-ball number devoid from reality and unreliable. If suppliers do still carelessly or recklessly throw out low-ball and unreliable quotes, then they may well be held to them, pursuant to the relevant Act.
[31] Of all the cases referenced by Mr. Scocco, what I believe was most on point, factually, to this within matter is Mitchell v. 2156645 Ontario Inc, 2011 CarswellOnt 15935. This 2011 decision of Deputy Judge Winny involved Ms. Mitchell, who engaged a moving company (the numbered company) to move her for two related moves: one taking her possessions from her home in one city to temporary storage, and then to move these goods to her new residence. The main problems arose with the second part of the move. The price quote of $500 was exceeded, with a final amount of $889. Yet Ms. Mitchell, on a tight budget, only had the agreed-upon amount of $500 in cash. As she could not pay the differential, the movers re-loaded her goods onto their truck, and left her high and dry.
[32] The Deputy Judge, at paragraphs 30 and 31 of his decision, came to the following conclusions:
30 There was nothing in the contract between the parties which required cash as the form of payment. More to the point, there was nothing in the contract between the parties which entitled the defendant to refuse to complete the delivery and retain any part of its customer's property. In law the defendant had no security interest in Ms. Mitchell's property. In closing submissions I asked defence counsel what possible argument there could be for his client's taking of possession of any of Ms. Mitchell's items. He could suggest none and there is none.
31 In law, the defendant's refusal to complete the delivery was a breach of contract. In law, the defendant's retention of the property was theft, and what is referred to as conversion and detinue in more traditional common law terms.
[33] When considering the equities of this within matter, I am hard-pressed to find any points which distinguish my above conclusions, and findings as these in this within matter presently appear to be before me, from the facts in Mitchell. In this within matter, a young family is left without its possessions, in a new home, in a new place, and essentially was held to ransom. The message of the defendants was essentially, ‘pay us what we say you owe or else you do not get your possessions’. The equities very much favour the plaintiffs in this matter.
[34] There are in my view thus substantial grounds to grant the plaintiffs the relief they seek. In my view, there is a high degree of assurance that, if this case must continue, plaintiffs will succeed at trial. Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to collect their property from the defendants. I thus sign the draft Order which counsel for plaintiff provided to me, with some edits and changes that I have inputted. For example, an incarceration order is beyond my jurisdiction.
[35] I also consider that the defendants did take the goods part of the way, from Sudbury to the GTA. Should they be paid something for their efforts in that regard, incomplete as those efforts were? In my view, the answer is “yes”. Fairness dictates that the plaintiff pay something for that partial effort. After all, it is less expensive, presumably, to move from the GTA to Dieppe then it would be from Sudbury. As the plaintiffs have that benefit, they should pay something to the defendants for it. I thus direct that the plaintiffs pay the defendants $1,850.00 as representing half of the $3,700 total estimated amount I arrived at above in these reasons.
Costs:
[36] The final issue is that of costs. I invited both parties to make submissions on costs. Mr. Scocco tendered his Costs Outline. Ms. Birkas stated at the hearing that she would not be making submissions on costs
[37] Of course, “costs follow the event”. In this case, the plaintiffs succeeded in the main in obtaining the relief which they sought from the Court. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to at least some of their costs.
[38] Fixing the quantum of costs is something of a balancing act. Applying the well-known Rule 57 factors, when dealing with the costs of a motion, a key goal is to fix an amount which is perceived as fair and reasonable by the unsuccessful party. See, in that regard, Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier, 2002 CanLII 25577 (ON CA), [2002] OJ No. 4495 (CA) at paragraph 4 and Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON CA), [2004] OJ No. 2634 (CA) at paragraph 26.
[39] In Davies v. Clarington (Municipality), 2009 ONCA 722 the Court of Appeal stated as follows at paragraph 52:
As can be seen, the overriding principle is reasonableness. If the judge fails to consider the reasonableness of the costs award, then the result can be contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice. Rather than engage in a purely mathematical exercise, the judge awarding costs should reflect on what the court views as a reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful party rather than any exact measure of the actual costs of the successful litigant. In Boucher, this court emphasized the importance of fixing costs in an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular proceeding, at para. 37, where Armstrong J.A. said "[t]he failure to refer, in assessing costs, to the overriding principle of reasonableness, can produce a result that is contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice"[emphasis added].
[40] Guided by this holding from the Court of Appeal, and by the other Appeal decisions referenced above, I take all the above factors into account in this matter. Considering the Costs Outline of the plaintiff, it strikes me as, in the main, reasonable. The total submitted of $3,026 is perhaps a tad high, when applying my discretion as stated in Davies, above, yet is certainly not untoward or unreasonable. The plaintiffs obtained almost, but not quite, all that it sought. In the end, I found that plaintiffs should pay something to defendants for the partial transport of their goods. Partial success leads to partial costs.
[41] Overall, I find that the defendants owe the plaintiffs the amount of $1,850 in costs, payable forthwith.
[42] That cost amount, accordingly, sets off the amount which I held the plaintiffs to owe defendants for moving their goods part of the way. Thus, applying these reasons, neither party owes the other anything. The defendants simply have to comply with my Order and allow the plaintiffs to reclaim all of their possessions. Then, unless the parties each have a burning desire to carry on this litigation, this entire matter will be at an end.
Master J. Josefo