Janet Leiper

This criminal trial concerned four counts of sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation against the accused, R.T.L., involving the complainant, A., his former stepdaughter.

The alleged offences occurred between 2004 and 2007, when the complainant was between 13 and 16 years old.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility based on alleged contradictions, generalities, a history of lying (due to prior non-disclosure to authorities), and a motive to lie.

The court meticulously analyzed each defence submission, finding the complainant's explanations for non-disclosure and inconsistencies credible given her age, dependence, and the manipulative nature of the relationship.

The Applicant father sought to reduce longstanding s.7 expense arrears owed for his two adult children.

The Respondent mother brought a cross-motion to update and fix the arrears based on actual expenses, including post-secondary studies, and for costs.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion, finding he had not diligently pursued variation in Canada despite being aware of his obligations.

The court granted the Respondent's cross-motion, fixing the s.7 arrears at $83,432.08 plus interest, and ordered payment of previously awarded costs with interest, all collectible as child support.

The applicant sought an uncontested trial on parenting, support, section 7 expenses, division of property, and divorce.

The respondent failed to file an answer or comply with previous court orders.

The court granted the applicant sole decision-making authority and primary residence for the children, imputed income to the respondent for child and spousal support, and ordered the respondent to be solely responsible for a joint line of credit and to pay full indemnity costs due to his bad faith conduct and non-participation.

The court declined to make a final equalization payment order due to insufficient financial disclosure from the respondent, requiring further information from the applicant to finalize certain financial orders.

This is an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the appellant, SBJ, incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether gaps in the hearing transcript prevented effective appellate review and whether the Board applied the correct test for capacity.

The court found that despite transcript gaps, no prejudice to appeal rights occurred as the core issue on appeal was a legal error in applying the capacity test, not a misapprehension of facts.

The court also found that while the Board's language regarding "gamesmanship" and "red herring" for side effects might suggest a "best interests" approach, the Board ultimately applied the correct legal test by focusing on SBJ's inability to appreciate the depth of his disorder and its manifestations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs (Securitas) brought a motion seeking a Mareva injunction, a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL), and a Norwich Order against the defendants, alleging fraud related to sham alarm system accounts.

The court dismissed the Mareva injunction against all defendants and the CPL against the Eagle Defendants, finding that Securitas had not established a strong prima facie case of fraud against the Eagle Defendants, nor sufficient evidence of assets or dissipation risk for the other defendants (Rahman and Philip).

However, the court granted a Norwich Order against Rahman and Philip for financial disclosure and, by consent, ordered the Eagle Defendants to provide similar financial information.

The applicants, Patrick Agpoon and Shea Flemmings, sought a stay of proceedings due to an alleged breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating total delay, deducting defence-caused delay, and assessing the impact of the global pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

While significant defence delays were attributed to both applicants, the Crown failed to adequately explain a 12-month delay in preferring a direct indictment, particularly given its earlier contemplation of this route and its successful use in a similar case during the pandemic.

The court found that even after reasonable adjustments for defence delay and a limited period for the pandemic, the net delay for both applicants exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling for superior courts.

Consequently, the court found an infringement of their s. 11(b) rights and stayed the charges.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21 to strike portions of the plaintiff's Amended Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim (AFAC), particularly a claim for negligent investigation against the employer.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion under Rule 26 to further amend the AFAC, including adding claims for intentional infliction of mental distress and defamation with malice.

The court granted the defendants' motion to strike the negligent investigation claim, affirming that the tort does not extend to employers conducting internal investigations, even with recent OHSA amendments.

The court partially granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, allowing amendments for intentional infliction of mental distress and certain defamation particulars, and for rephrasing reputation paragraphs, but denied other proposed amendments due to late filing and procedural fairness concerns.

The plaintiff, Jack Oliveira, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, Mario Oliveira, for defamation.

The defendant made telephone statements to a third party and sent emails to a reporter and a political office, alleging the plaintiff was a convicted pedophile in Portugal and involved in union corruption.

The court found the statements defamatory, with no available defences.

General damages of $20,000 and aggravated damages of $10,000 were awarded, and a permanent injunction was granted to prevent further dissemination.

Punitive damages were not awarded due to the limited dissemination and the defendant's compliance with interim injunctions.

The plaintiff, Kenaidan Contracting Ltd., brought a defamation claim against Lancaster Group Inc. and its officers for statements made in an open letter to the City of Hamilton and subsequent media interviews regarding alleged mismanagement of a Pan Am Games construction project and unpaid invoices.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the defamation claim.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to a matter of public interest.

While the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit, the defendants successfully demonstrated valid defences of justification and fair comment regarding the alleged mismanagement and outstanding payments.

The court also found that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression, especially considering the plaintiff's prior self-inflicted reputational damage and the nature of the allegations.

The motion to dismiss the defamation proceedings was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to determine the division of profits from a joint venture selling automotive parts.

The court addressed two main issues: the accounting for unsold/consigned goods and a claim for discounted shocks.

The court found that unsold goods should not be deducted from net profit, but uncollected accounts receivable should.

The court also found in favor of the plaintiff regarding the discounted shocks due to lack of explanation from the defendant.

A final amount owing in USD was converted to CAD using an average exchange rate.

The applicants, vendors of a property, sought a declaration that the respondent purchaser breached an agreement of purchase and sale by failing to close.

The purchaser argued the contract was frustrated due to substantial property damage and sought relief from forfeiture of her $72,500 deposit.

The court found that the purchaser breached the agreement, that there was no frustration of contract, and that the purchaser failed to act in good faith.

The vendors were entitled to the deposit, and the purchaser was not granted relief from forfeiture, as the deposit was not disproportionate and forfeiture was not unconscionable given the parties' sophistication and the purchaser's conduct.

The defendant insurer, Sun Life, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's long-term disability claim as statute-barred.

Sun Life argued the two-year limitation period began in February 2014 when it sent a letter closing the file but inviting further medical information.

The plaintiff, Ms. Clarke, provided additional information three years later, and Sun Life issued a final denial in June 2017, explicitly referencing the Limitations Act.

The court dismissed Sun Life's motion, finding that the February 2014 letter was equivocal and that the parties were engaged in an ongoing internal appeal process.

Therefore, a legal proceeding was not an "appropriate means to seek a remedy" until the clear and final denial in June 2017, which is when the limitation period commenced.