CITATION: Aggarwal v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2025 ONSC 989
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Manojkumar Aggarwal
AND:
TD Asset Management Inc.
BEFORE: J. Leiper J.
COUNSEL: Paul Guy and Serge Kalloghlian, counsel to Manojkumar Aggarwal
Shane D’Souza and Agatha Wong, counsel to TD Asset Management Inc.
HEARD: January 31, 2025
Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992
ENDORSEMENT
Introduction
1The plaintiff moves for an order approving the settlement of this class action, dismissing the action, approving counsel’s fees, and approving an honorarium for the representative plaintiff. Later, a related motion will be heard for a sealing order over portions of the materials filed in support.
2This action (the “Aggarwal action”) is one of seven class actions against different mutual fund managers and trustees, brought by mutual fund unitholders who were allegedly affected by the payment of trailing commissions to discount brokers. The stated purpose of the commissions was to compensate brokers for advice provided to purchasers of the mutual funds. Discount brokers do not, and may not, provide investment advice to their customers.
3The theory of the Aggarwal action was that the defendant TDAM, in its capacity as mutual fund trustee and manager, breached its fiduciary and trust duties by improperly paying trailing commissions to discount brokers for services and advice that were never provided to class members. It alleged that the payments diminished the assets in the mutual funds, which affected unitholders; here, it impacted those who purchased their mutual funds through full service brokerages.
4A group of earlier actions, known as the “2018 actions,” sought relief related to trailing commissions paid relative to discount brokerage sales, but with different case theories and representing groups of investors who only used discount brokers. This led to procedural and substantive complexity in the Aggarwal action.
5The Aggarwal action was commenced on December 7, 2022. Since then, class counsel have responded to stay motions brought by the 2018 actions, prepared for summary judgment motions brought by the defendants, engaged in extensive negotiations and mediation, and ultimately settled this claim on behalf of the class. The summary judgment motions were scheduled and all materials were filed, when the 2018 action plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to intervene. This step led to an adjournment of the summary judgment motion.
6In the background to the motions, ongoing settlement negotiations were underway in this action and several of the related actions. In July 2024, TDAM agreed to the monetary terms of settlement in the Aggarwal action and the related 2018 “Westwood” action. Further negotiations led to an agreement on terms in August 2024, and a consent certification before Akbarali, J. on October 4, 2024. A plan was approved for distributing notice of certification, the opt-out process, and the process for objecting. On December 10, 2024, Akbarali, J. released her reasons for approving the Westwood settlement: Westwood v. TD Asset Management Inc., 2024 ONSC 6872.
7On January 13, 2025, I ordered a revised notice and adjourned this hearing to accommodate its distribution and provide time for any objections. The revised notice contained new information about the contingency fees payable to counsel. No objections were received during either notice period; the first occurring after the October 4, 2024 approval of notice, and the second being the revised and extended notice period leading up to the hearing of the settlement and fee approval motions heard on January 31, 2025.
8During the settlement and fee approval motions, I heard submissions from counsel to the plaintiff. There were no objections to the proposed orders, and I advised counsel that I would approve the settlement plan and the payment of fees, disbursements, and honorarium as requested with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
Issues
8The motion raises the following issues:
a. Has the plaintiff established that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class?
b. Should class counsel’s requested fees and disbursements, including the third-party funder fees, be approved?
c. Should an honorarium of $500 for the representative plaintiff be approved?
The Settlement Agreement
9The settlement agreement provides for the payment of an all-inclusive, non-reversionary amount of $8,500,000. From this sum, the following will be paid: (i) compensation estimated to be $38.50 to eligible class members according to the proposed plan of allocation described in greater detail below; (ii) class counsel fees and disbursements; (iii) the litigation funding levy to the Class Proceedings Fund as prescribed by Regulation; and (v) an honorarium of $500 to the representative plaintiff.
10In addition, the settlement agreement stipulates that TDAM will direct deposit a portion of the net settlement fund into the TDAM mutual fund trusts. For investors who no longer hold units in TD mutual funds, there is a streamlined claims process that is overseen by Verita Global, an experienced class action administrator.
11The certification order defines the class as:
All persons, wherever they may reside or be domiciled, who held or hold, at any time on or prior to September 11, 2024, units of a TD Mutual Fund, other than through a Discount Broker, except for the Excluded Persons.
Excluded persons means:
the Defendant; the past and present parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, senior employees, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors and assigns of the Defendant, the past and present members of the independent review committee of each TD Mutual Fund; or any Person who would otherwise be a Class Member but who validly excluded themselves from the Action.
The Principles Governing Settlement Approval
14A settlement of a proceeding brought under the CPA must be approved by the court: Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 27.1(1) (“CPA”).
15The court shall not approve a settlement unless it determines that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, taking into account the statutory factors: CPA, s. 27.1(5); Dufault v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONSC 961, at para. 14.
16While the burden lies on the party seeking to approve a settlement that relinquishes the class’s litigation rights against the defendant, courts will presume fairness in an arms’-length negotiated settlement that is recommended by experienced class proceedings counsel: Loewenthal v. Sirius XM Holdings, Inc. et al., 2021 ONSC 4482, at para. 11; Robinson v. Medtronic, Inc., 2020 ONSC 1688, 150 O.R. (3d) 328, at para. 64; Nunes v. Air Transat A.T. Inc., 2005 CanLII 21681 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 7.
17The moving party is required to make full and frank disclosure of the party’s best information that relates to the 10 enumerated factors that the court is required to consider: CPA, s. 27.1(7)
Part I. Has the plaintiff established that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class?
18Applying the legal framework, I find that the information provided meets the requirements of full and frank disclosure. It establishes that this is a reasonable settlement that is in the best interests of the class. I will discuss the evidence under each of the s. 27.1 (7) matters.
Evidence as to how the settlement meets the requirements of subsection (5).
19The evidence filed includes affidavit evidence from class counsel. I find that the settlement is reasonable because it is evidence-based, the product of lengthy arms-length negotiation involving six law-firms, accounts for real litigation risks, and informed by the approval of the Westwood litigation. The settlement has a methodology for sharing in the settlement amount that is supported by expert evidence.
20There are other elements of this settlement agreement which support the finding that it is reasonable. Importantly, TDAM has agreed to directly deposit into each mutual fund, without need of claim, the funds allocated to current account holders. This means reduced costs of administration and 100% take-up of the settlement for that group. The class does not need to wait until a later, uncertain date, nor does it need to bear further expenses that could reduce the amounts available for recovery.
21For the former unit holders, the Aggarwal action proposes a simplified claims process which is fair, reduces administrative costs, and is supported by the expert report of Dr. S. Surana.
22Although this settlement was reached before certification and discovery, which could bear on the information available to counsel in advising a settlement, here class counsel had significant discovery of documents produced by TDAM in the Westwood litigation. They also had the benefit of data produced during mediation about the amount of trailing commissions paid to discount brokers. The Aggarwal action retained three experts who analyzed the theory of liability and damages, informed by public reports, TDAM’s expert report filed at mediation, industry documents, TD’s public disclosure, and reports to securities regulators.
23The Aggarwal action also had the benefit of argument and reasons given respectively by Belobaba J. and Glustein J. in certification motions involving Bank of Montreal and TDAM, and the evidence, submissions, and reasons in Belobaba J.’s dismissal of the related action in Frayce v. BMO Investor Line Inc. et al, 2023 ONSC 16.
24My findings on this first matter are informed by the list of factors that continue in s. 27.1(7)(2-10). I discuss each of those briefly.
The risks associated with continuation of the litigation
25Class counsel have described several risks the Aggarwal action faced, even after the Westwood action was certified. This is due to differences in its theory of liability, but also because the Aggarwal action was commenced after the CPA was amended. This meant that it faced two new factors on certification: superiority and predominance.
26TDAM asserted various defences in the Aggarwal action that, if accepted, would have prevented the Aggarwal action from establishing liability, damages, or being the subject of summary judgment based on TDAM’s limitation period defences. Further, there were risks to members of the class whose claims became “stale” and could not be expected to have records to prove their claims, due to the timing of the claim which predates the widespread use of electronic records. Overall, class counsel estimated that the most significant risk to establishing a claim in damages was presented by the limitation period defences TDAM raised.
Range of possible recoveries
27Counsel’s materials estimate that had TDAM established the class had constructive knowledge of the claim, and Mr. Aggarwal had established that rolling limitation periods apply to the members of the class, the damages would have been approximately $13.8 million based on a two-year lookback from the start of the claim. I infer from this, that the amounts obtained could have fluctuated above or below that number, depending on the outcome of the summary judgment motion and the findings relative to knowledge. I conclude that the range of recovery while not necessarily narrow, was subject to uncertainty posed by the limitation period defences.
The method used for valuation of the settlement
28Class counsel evaluated the settlement using expert input to calculate the potential recovery at trial using the expert advice of Prem Lobo, an experienced specialist in business valuations, quantification of damages and forensic accounting. Mr. Lobo was provided with TDAM’s trailing commission data and expert report so that he could verify TDAM’s analysis and estimate the trailing commissions TDAM paid to discount brokers.
29Based on the data and analysis, and in consultation with Mr. Lobo, class counsel estimated that the total amount of trailing commissions TDAM paid to discount brokers since 2002, was in the range of $602 to $622 million. This was the starting point of the “maximum theoretically recoverable damages.”
30The next stage of the analysis was to weigh this theoretical figure against the risks to the claims if the matter proceeded to trial. In addition to the list of risk factors developed in the affidavit of Garth Myers, the limitations defence served as a significant consideration.
31Class counsel concluded that based on the data provided, if TDAM established its two-year lookback limitation defence, the maximum recoverable damages would have been $13.8 million. The $8.5 million payable under this proposed settlement represents about 62% of that figure. Class counsel compares this recovered percentage to the settlement in the Westwood action. There, TDAM paid approximately $171 million to discount brokers after April 2016, which was the comparative two-year lookback limitation period date for that Action. The $70.25 million recovered in the Westwood Action represents about 41% of $171 million.
32Counsel’s estimates and application of the known risks to the potential outcomes are logical, reasonable, and informed by their expert consultations.
The total number of class members
33Given the class description, which includes former unit holders of TD mutual funds, counsel does not have an estimate of the size of the class. Given the size of the mutual fund industry, the number of mutual funds, and the open ended availability of claims, it is fair to say that the number of potential claimants is in the thousands.
The plan for allocating and distributing the settlement funds, including any proposal respecting the appointment of an administrator under subsection (14), and the anticipated costs associated with the distribution.
34After accounting for fees and disbursements, the plan is to allocate an amount from the remaining total to the group of current unitholders by way of direct deposit, and to prior unitholders through a simplified claims process.
35The plan of allocation provides for a maximum payment of $38.50 to each former unitholder. The $38.50 figure is class counsel’s estimate of the damages suffered by the average class member. This figure was derived from: (1) the estimated average per class member investment in TDAM mutual funds ($25,000); (2) the estimated average length of investment (five years); and (3) the estimated average annual decline in value of a TDAM mutual fund unit from payment of trailing commissions to discount brokers (0.038%). The affidavit of Garth Myers explains that these estimates were based on evidence available to class counsel.
36Dr. Sunita Surana advised counsel on the process for the allocation between former and present unitholders. Dr. Surana estimated that 17% of all TDAM mutual fund units are still held by class members, and the remaining 83% were redeemed. Class counsel relied on these figures as a proxy for the proportion of overall damages sustained by each group.
37The amount to be allocated to former unitholders was discounted based on an analysis of the risks that group faced. These risks include:
(1) the risk associated with TDAM’s release defense, which applies exclusively to former holders who have redeemed their mutual fund units;
(2) the risk associated with TDAM’s limitation defense, which applies disproportionately to former holders; and
(3) the risk associated with stale claims, which applies disproportionately to former holders.
In class counsel’s view, the combined level of risk associated with the three above factors reduced the expected value of the former holders’ claims to about equal with the current holders.
38The individual damages claims are expected to be low, with the damages attributed to most investors in the range of $5.00-$10.00. As a result, the allocation methodology is intended to minimize administration costs and to maximize the amounts available to each class member.
39For current TDAM unitholders, they will not need to file a claim. The settlement plan provides that TDAM will directly deposit a portion of the net settlement fund into the TDAM mutual fund trusts. This will increase the value of all TDAM mutual fund units for current mutual fund unit holders. This allows current unitholders to be compensated without the need to participate in a traditional claims process. Where the individual claim is low, this often means there is a low take-up rate. The proposed method of settling the claims by current unitholders means a 100% notional take up rate. This method saves thousands of dollars in administration costs to current unitholders.1
40Counsel acknowledge that this method will also benefit unitholders who are not part of the class, because they purchased their units after June 2022. Nevertheless, the advantages to the proposed distribution method avoid depleting the amounts available to claimants through administration fees, and ultimately outweighs this drawback. Given the goals of class proceedings, not only does this benefit the class, but it ensures that a greater proportion of the settlement is used for the benefit of the class and is not consumed by administration costs.
41Unlike the current unitholders, TDAM is not able to directly compensate former TD mutual fund unit holders. For this reason, class counsel proposes a traditional claims process where former unitholders submit claims for compensation. Under the plan of allocation, each former holder that submits a valid claim will be entitled to a pro-rated amount of the portion of the net settlement fund allocated to former holders, up to a maximum of $38.50. Any funds remaining after claims have been paid will be deposited directly into the TDAM mutual funds for the benefit of current holders.
42The claim form requires claimants to provide basic information and allows a wide variety of documentation to establish ownership of a TDAM mutual fund. Claimants who no longer have access to documentation can explain the reason, and if found acceptable to the administrator, will have their claims accepted.
43The administration will be managed by Verita Global, an experienced claims administrator. Verita provided Class Counsel with an estimate for the cost of administration of $151,072 (if only 5,000 claims are received) at approximately $30 per claim, to as high as $646,270 (if 100,000 claims are received) at approximately $6.50 per claim.
44The plan is reasonable, the methodology is supported by the expert report of Dr. Surana, and class counsel have established that an experienced claims administrator is required for the number of former unitholders who may request payment.
The number of class or subclass members expected to make a claim under the settlement and, of them, the numbers of class or subclass members who are and who are not expected to receive settlement funds.
45Class counsel is not able to estimate the number of former unit holders who may make a claim under the settlement. The potential number of unitholders who are motivated to make a claim, and have the necessary documents (or willingness to use the alternative methods to establish entitlement) may number in the thousands.
46Given that all current unitholders will receive the benefit of the payment into the funds they hold, there will be a 100% take up rate among these members of the class.
The number of class or subclass members who have objected or are expected to object to the settlement, and the nature or anticipated nature of the objections.
47There have been no objections filed to the settlement, under both the original notice plan and the amended and extended notice plan.
A plan for giving notice of the settlement to class or subclass members in the event of an order under section 19, and the number of class or subclass members who are expected to obtain the notice.
48A proposed notice plan has been filed which includes publication of the short form notice on class counsel’s webpage, by email to those who requested notice, a bilingual news release across Canada, publication in a weekend edition of the Globe and Mail, and filing the notice as a news release on SEDAR. The long form notice will be posted on class counsel’s webpage. Class counsel will publish a Google banner ad for 700,000 impressions across Canada for 30-35 days and as a 12-day news link on Stockhouse. The estimated cost of this plan is $24,325.51.
49I find that the settlement is fair and reasonable, and I will approve it.
Part II. Approval of Class Counsel Fees
50Having approved the settlement agreement, the next step is to consider the proposed remuneration to class counsel for its work on behalf of the class. The court’s overriding concern is whether the arrangement for funding fees and disbursements is “fair and reasonable.” This decision requires a court to consider the defined statutory factors: CPA, s. 32(2.1).
51As a starting point, any agreement between a solicitor and representative party must be in writing, state the terms under which fees and disbursements shall be paid; give an estimate of the expected fee, whether contingent on success in the class proceeding or not; and state the method by which payment is to be made, whether by lump sum, salary or otherwise: CPA, s. 32(1).
52The court shall not approve an agreement respecting fees and disbursements unless it determines that the amounts payable under the agreement are fair and reasonable. This assessment takes the following considerations into account:
a. the results achieved for the class members, including the number of class or subclass members expected to make a claim for monetary relief or settlement funds and, of them, the number of class or subclass members who are and who are not expected to receive monetary relief or settlement funds;
b. the degree of risk assumed by the solicitor in providing representation;
c. the proportionality of the fees and disbursements in relation to the amount of any monetary award or settlement funds;
d. any prescribed matter; and
e. any other matter the court considers relevant.
36Additionally, subsection 32(2.2) directs the court to consider the factors below as part of the risk calculation under s. 32(2.1)(b):
a. the likelihood that the court would refuse to certify the proceeding as a class proceeding;
b. the likelihood that the class proceeding would not be successful;
c. the existence of any other factor, including any report, investigation, litigation, initiative or funding arrangement, that affected the degree of risk assumed by the solicitor in providing representation; and
d. any other prescribed matter
37Here, class counsel had a retainer agreement in place with the representative plaintiff for a 33% contingency fee to be paid if the class succeeded in obtaining an award of damages.
38Further, Class Counsel obtained a funding commitment from the Class Proceedings Fund in January 2023. Prior to obtaining funding, Class Counsel indemnified the representative plaintiff for disbursements and adverse cost awards. Class Counsel is responsible for funding the disbursements in the first instance and is reimbursed by the Fund on a periodic basis.
39This is a suitable arrangement. Contingency fee arrangements align the interests of counsel and class members because they incentivize counsel to maximize recovery for the class. These interests can risk being misaligned when class counsel personally bears the risk of adverse costs awards or may not be able to recover disbursements they have funded.
40Contingency fee arrangements permit class action litigation to be financed, reward success and reflect the risks and costs undertaken by class counsel. Quite simply, contingent fees make class actions possible: Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc., 2010 ONSC 2752, 97 C.P.C. (6th) 169, at paras. 19-22.
41I turn to the legislated factors that apply to the question of the approval of fees.
CPA s. 32(1): form and content of retainer agreement
42The retainer agreement complies with section 32(1) because it: (i) states the terms under which fees and disbursements shall be paid (para 5); (ii) gives an estimate of the expected fee (Schedule “A”); and (iii) it states the method by which payment is to be made (para 14).
43Class counsel’s retainer agreement is relevant to the analysis: Austin v. Bell Canada, 2021 ONSC 5068, at para. 10; MacDonald et al. v. BMO Trust Company, 2021 ONSC 3726, at para. 21.
CPA s. 32(2.1)(a): results achieved
44As discussed above, the cash settlement achieved, and its method of distribution, represent a satisfactory result for the class members. It was negotiated between arms’ length parties, with the assistance of an experienced mediator and is evidence-based. It accounts for the risks of litigation. It is also an expeditious recovery for class members, which could affect the take-up rate from the former unitholders.
45As Akbarali J. noted in Dufault, a case that also involved a settlement with a direct distribution component, the direct deposit negotiated here means that 100% of current unitholders will benefit from the settlement.
CPA s. 32(2.1)(b): degree of risk assumed by Class Counsel
46As a starting point, every class action occupies time and skills from counsel’s practice. There is always a risk that there will be no settlement, and no payment to counsel, even in matters that appear to have merit.
47In addition, here there were case-specific risks arising from certification. These included the possibility that the action would not be certified given its unique case theory, which distinguished it from the Westwood action. The Westwood plaintiffs argued that the Aggarwal action unitholders did not suffer damages because only discount broker unitholders suffered damages. In essence, the Aggarwal action faced multiple adversaries: the defendant and the competing claims in the Westwood and Frayce actions, which pursued conflicting theories of damages.
48There were other impediments to liability, including the defence assertion that TDAM’s payment of trailing commissions to discount brokers was common practice, known by regulators and legal advisors. Payment of trailing commissions was permitted by the declarations of trust. Under the trust instruments, unitholders could have been found to lack standing to enforce any duty of care under the trust instruments. TDAM had no direct relationship with the class members, and the trust instruments superseded any claims under s. 23.1 of the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23.
49The limitations period issues were also an impediment. TDAM argued that class members had constructive knowledge of the improper payment of trailing commissions. For claim members who did not retain documents, there was a risk that their claims would be “stale”.
50In considering the factors that must be applied to the question of risk, I conclude there were some risks that this action would not be certified or succeed at trial. The reports, investigations, litigation or initiatives in this proceeding increased risk. By way of example, no regulator took timely steps to end trailing commissions paid to discount brokers, nor were there any findings that these were unlawful commissions or breaches of duties to investors.
51In parallel litigation, the Westwood and Frayce actions presented additional complications. Further, the Frayce action did not obtain certification based on TDAM’s “no illegality” argument. Having succeeded in fending off certification in the Frayce action, TDAM had a greater probability of successfully arguing the “no illegality” defence at the certification stage in this action.
CPA s. 32(2.1)(c): The proportionality of the fees in relation to the settlement
52I find that the fees requested are proportionate to the amount of the settlement. The contingency fee is set at a percentage that has been approved in the past. This is not a “mega-fund” settlement which raises a concern that Class Counsel will obtain an undeserved or disproportionate windfall.
53As a further measure of proportionality, the fees represents a 2.7 multiplier on Class Counsel’s work in progress. This is at the low end of the accepted range: Pace Securities Corp. et al. v. First Hamilton Holdings Inc. et. al, 2021 ONSC 6956, at para. 28.
CPA s. 32(2.1)(d): Any prescribed matter
54There are no other considerations that have been prescribed.
CPA s. 32(2.1)(e): Any other matter the court considers relevant
55Class Counsel submits several additional matters are relevant and support the order sought. One consideration is the class’s expectations regarding fees: the fees sought were provided for under the contingency fee retainer agreement and are supported by the representative plaintiff. Class Counsel also submits that the court should consider that there was no objection to the proposed fee. I agree.
56I agree with Class Counsel’s submission that the factors below are also relevant:
a. the factual and legal complexity of the action
b. the applied skill demonstrated by Class Counsel to obtain a timely, beneficial result for the class;
c. the class members have not been required to fund the litigation, nor would any individual class member have been able to do so given the average individual damages;
d. Class Counsel’s “opportunity” cost by virtue of devoting $1 million in work in progress to the action.
CPA s. 32(2.3): Different ways fees could be structured
57There is no practical alternative to a contingency fee retainer agreement in this action.
58Having assessed the proposed fee arrangements against the statutory factors, I conclude that the fee proposal is fair and reasonable. I approve it.
Part III Honorarium for the Representative Plaintiff
59Class counsel seek an honorarium in the amount of $500 to be paid to the representative plaintiff to recognize his contribution to the proceedings.
60A comprehensive review of the jurisprudence on the role of honorariums for representative plaintiffs can be found in Doucet v. The Royal Winnipeg Ballet, 2023 ONSC 2323 (Div. Ct.). The Divisional Court found that such payments ought to be exceptional and subject to a list of factors: Doucet, at para. 92.
61The policy against ordering routine honorarium payments to representative plaintiffs reflects the expectation that they are “committed to fulfilling their responsibilities, including active involvement in every step of the litigation including settlement, without seeking added compensation”: Westwood v. TD Asset Management Inc., 2024 ONSC 6872, at para 95.
62I conclude that an honorarium to the representative plaintiff of $500 should be ordered. The action was successfully settled in the presence of real litigation risks. The outcome means a small monetary remedy for each individual class member. The take-up rate by the class will be high. The honorarium sought is modest in proportion to the results obtained, and does not risk creating the appearance of a conflict of interest. The representative plaintiff was active and engaged: his instructions were key to the final, significant aspect of the settlement, which ensures direct deposit into the current unitholders’ mutual funds and accomplishes a 100% take up by that group of class members. In my view, these are sufficiently exceptional circumstances to grant the requested payment.
Conclusion
52In summary, I conclude that the settlement, the terms proposed, the notice of the settlement, and counsel’s requested fees and disbursements, are fair and reasonable. I make the following orders:
a. The settlement is approved;
b. Class counsel fees of $2,805,000 and $364,650.00 for taxes on legal fees are approved;
c. Payment of disbursements, inclusive of taxes, are approved and shall be distributed as follows:
i. $50,145.92 to class counsel;
ii. $57,380.96 to the class proceedings fund;
d. In addition to the disbursements payable to the class proceedings fund and approved at para. (c) above, the payment to the third-party funder of $259,899.88 is approved;
e. The notices of settlement approval are approved;
f. Verita Global is appointed as the administrator of the settlement claims by former unitholders;
g. Cohen Hamilton Steger & Co. shall be appointed to finalize the direction to TDAM to deposit the Current Holder Fund;
h. Payment of a $500 honorarium to the representative plaintiff is approved.
53Counsel has provided me with three draft orders: one dealing with the settlement approval, one for appointment of the administrator, and one dealing with the fee and honorarium approval. I have signed the orders, and they shall issue in that form.
J. Leiper J.
Date: February 12, 2025