Jane Poproski

The appellant insurer appealed the trial judge's findings that the respondent qualified for non-earner benefits following a motor vehicle accident and that the benefits were payable for four years.

The respondent cross-appealed, claiming ongoing entitlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of entitlement, noting that post-accident employment does not disqualify a claimant but serves as a point of comparison under the Heath test.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the duration of benefits, reducing the payment period to approximately two years and three months based on medical assessments showing significant improvement.

The appellant was rendered a paraplegic during a soccer game organized by the Ontario Soccer Association (OSA).

He sued the OSA's corporate sponsors, alleging they had a duty to ensure adequate insurance coverage for players.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no relationship of sufficient proximity between the appellant and the corporate sponsors to ground a duty of care.

The appellant sued his insurance broker in negligence for failing to offer optional income replacement benefits.

The trial judge found the broker breached its duty of care but dismissed the action because the appellant failed to prove causation, specifically that he would have purchased the coverage if offered.

On appeal, the appellant argued that in cases of insurance broker negligence, the insured does not need to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the normal rules of negligence apply and causation remains a question of fact.

Finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently applied for non-earner benefits after initially returning to work.

The motion judge dismissed her action on summary judgment, concluding that because she was employed at the time of the accident, she could not qualify for non-earner benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, a claimant's employment status at the time of the accident does not automatically render them ineligible for non-earner benefits.

The court found that a claimant who is able to work may still suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life, and remitted the matter to the trial court.

Following the dismissal of a motion seeking leave to appeal an earlier order to the Divisional Court, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant claimed $4,470.10 on a partial indemnity basis, including fees and disbursements, while the plaintiff proposed an award of $2,000.

Applying the relevant factors under the Rules governing costs, the court found that the docketed hours appeared somewhat excessive and noted that certain claimed disbursements, including a car rental, were inappropriate.

The court exercised its discretion to fix costs in a reduced lump sum amount.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict that found him 25% liable for a motor vehicle accident and awarded him $25,000 in general damages, which was barred from recovery by the statutory deductible.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that defence counsel made inflammatory remarks to the jury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was open to them based on the evidence and credibility issues, and that defence counsel's remarks did not warrant setting aside the verdict.

The appellant settled her claims against her insurer in 2003 and signed a final release.

After a 2004 action to set aside the settlement was dismissed on consent, she commenced a second action in 2009 alleging conspiracy to cause economic harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the 2009 action, finding that the six-year limitation period had expired based on the appellant's own pleadings, and that she had led no evidence to support the conspiracy claim.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent insured statutory accident benefits and $25,000 in damages for mental distress following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer had terminated housekeeping and transportation benefits based on a superficial independent medical examination, ignoring its own occupational therapist's recommendations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the awards for housekeeping benefits, s. 24 assessments, and mental distress, finding that peace of mind is a reasonably contemplated object of an automobile insurance contract.

The court allowed the appeal only to reduce the quantum of transportation benefits from $7,500 to $2,280 due to a lack of evidence supporting the higher amount.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order regarding the admissibility of proposed expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge, rather than a motion judge, should determine the admissibility of expert evidence to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, ensure full context, and prevent tactical preliminary steps.

The court noted that even if a motion judge has such jurisdiction, it should only be exercised in the rarest of cases.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a claim of civil conspiracy against a respondent solicitor.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the pleaded facts provided no foundation for the claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to exclude the medical report and evidence of a defence expert, Dr. Bednar, prior to trial.

The motions judge had declined to rule on the admissibility, holding that such a determination should be reserved for the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, with the majority finding that it would be extremely rare for a motions judge to be in an equal or better position than the trial judge to rule on the exclusion of expert evidence.

Matlow J. dissented, arguing the motions judge had jurisdiction under Rule 37.02(1) and should have considered the merits.