James Clark

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a seized charge against the defendants' property.

The defendants acknowledged the debt but sought relief from accrued interest under the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, arguing they could not make payments after the original lender's principal was arrested.

The court found the 13% interest rate was not excessive given the risk, and the transaction was not unconscionable as the defendants freely entered into it and failed to utilize the Mortgages Act to pay the debt into court when the lender could not be found.

Summary judgment was granted for the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence related to his involvement in two marijuana grow operations.

He argued there was insufficient evidence of his participation and that he was treated unfairly at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample circumstantial evidence that he was a significant participant, including his presence at the locations, delivery of plants, and possession of grow-op paraphernalia.

The court also found the trial was fair and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

Several accused brought Garofoli applications seeking exclusion of evidence obtained through multiple Part VI wiretap authorizations in a large drug trafficking investigation.

They argued the affidavits failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds and improperly named them as known parties under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that one authorization related to a homicide investigation lacked sufficient grounds on the edited record and therefore violated s. 8 of the Charter; intercepted room‑probe communications from a residence were excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court found that the principal drug trafficking wiretap authorizations were supported by reasonable grounds based on confidential informant information, surveillance, phone records, and associations among targets.

Applications to exclude evidence obtained under those authorizations were dismissed.

Following earlier rulings on motions involving Mareva injunctions, fraudulent conveyance allegations, and summary judgment on promissory notes, the court determined the appropriate costs awards among multiple parties across two related actions.

Certain defendants who were unsuccessful targets of fraud allegations sought substantial indemnity costs after the claims against them were dismissed.

The court held that allegations of fraud justified substantial indemnity costs where the plaintiffs failed to establish the claims.

In the Klein action, the court balanced mixed success by awarding costs to both sides and setting them off.

In the Finkelstein action, substantial indemnity costs were awarded to certain defendants in the cause.

The applicants brought a preliminary motion in advance of a Garofoli application seeking excision of all references to a vehicle stop and resulting seizures that had previously been found to violate Charter rights.

The impugned events were relied upon in affidavits supporting Part VI wiretap authorizations, a production order for subscriber records, and search warrants for cellular phone contents.

The Crown argued that the applicants lacked standing to seek excision of evidence obtained in violation of third parties’ Charter rights.

The court held that where illegally obtained evidence forms part of the grounds for authorizations affecting the applicants’ privacy interests, the applicants are entitled to challenge the legality of that evidence and seek its removal from the supporting materials.

All references to the unlawful vehicle stop, arrests, and seizures were ordered excised from the affidavits and informations to obtain.

The applicants, charged with drug-related offences, brought a Section 8 Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from Dialled Number Recorder and tracking warrants.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was deficient due to unconfirmed confidential informant tips, tainted informant pools from police misconduct, and material non-disclosure by the affiant.

The court strongly condemned the egregious conduct of one officer and the sloppiness of the affiant in failing to disclose relevant police reports.

However, after excising inaccuracies and reading in omissions, the court found the remaining reliable information still provided reasonable grounds to suspect the applicant was trafficking drugs.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought motions arising from an ATM business dispute, unpaid unsecured promissory notes, and allegations that mortgages granted on a matrimonial home were fraudulent conveyances.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on the promissory note claim or the fraudulent conveyance claim.

The court dissolved Mareva injunctions in both actions, finding the record did not satisfy the stringent test for pre-judgment asset-freezing relief.

The court granted summary judgment for $710,000 plus interest on the promissory notes against the business partners and their business entities, dismissed the fraudulent conveyance claims, and refused a certificate of pending litigation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach regarding the search warrant, and that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and held that the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant being the only man living in the apartment where the drugs were found in men's pants, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal for trial.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge lost jurisdiction by failing to strictly comply with s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code when taking his election for mode of trial while he was unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding of substantial compliance, noting the appellant had prior legal representation and co-accused who elected.

The Court also found no loss of jurisdiction due to s. 536(4.2), which mandates a preliminary inquiry for all co-accused if one requests it.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that a 27.5‑month delay between charge and anticipated trial violated the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The case involved multiple sexual offence allegations by three complainants and was largely a credibility-based trial expected to last less than a week.

The court found that most of the delay resulted from Crown disclosure failures, including late disclosure of a key video statement and defective recordings of two complainant interviews.

Applying the Morin framework and guidance from cases such as R. v. Godin, the court held that the delay significantly exceeded acceptable guidelines and caused prejudice to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence.

The accused’s Charter rights were therefore breached and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The accused, charged with terrorism offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter was breached because an undercover officer deleted text messages and the police failed to retrieve data from the officer's phone.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the police conduct did not amount to unacceptable negligence and that the accused suffered no actual prejudice, as the text messages were innocuous and fully transcribed in the officer's notes.

The court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not warranted as there was no irreparable harm to the justice system or the accused's rights.

After a jury conviction for terrorism offences related to attempting to participate in and counselling participation in the activities of Al‑Shabaab, the accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

The accused alleged entrapment by an undercover officer, improper prolongation of the police investigation, and police misconduct in creating a credibility contest through delayed wiretap authorization and deletion or loss of text messages.

Applying the entrapment framework from R. v. Mack, the court held that police merely opened dialogue and did not provide an opportunity to commit an offence until after reasonable suspicion existed.

The court rejected arguments that the investigation was improperly prolonged or that police deliberately engineered evidentiary prejudice.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

During an ongoing criminal terrorism trial, a media organization requested access to an audio exhibit consisting of recorded conversations between the accused and an undercover police officer obtained under a consent wiretap authorization.

The court had previously issued a non-publication order protecting the identity of the undercover officer to preserve his ability to continue working undercover.

The court held that the order extended to the officer’s voice because broadcasting it could reveal his identity.

The media organization was permitted to obtain a copy of the audio recording subject to signing an undertaking and complying with the prohibition on broadcasting or transmitting the officer’s voice.

The accused, charged with terrorism offences for attempting to participate in and counselling participation in the terrorist group Al‑Shabaab, brought a motion under s. 587 of the Criminal Code seeking further particulars regarding the alleged mode and means of participation.

The court considered whether the indictment and disclosure provided sufficient information to permit full answer and defence.

The court held that the counts already specified the relevant time period, location, statutory provisions, and the terrorist group involved, and that defined statutory terms and extensive disclosure further clarified the allegations.

The Crown was not required to particularize the precise mode of participation or disclose its theory of the case.

The motion for further particulars was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to exclude documents and internet search evidence recovered from a laptop seized at the time of his arrest on terrorism charges relating to alleged attempts to join the group Al‑Shabaab and counselling another person to do so.

The court conducted a voir dire addressing the relevance and admissibility of ideological, military, and internet‑search material found on the computer.

Applying the principles governing relevance, bad character evidence, and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect, the court held that documents found in an accused’s possession may be admissible circumstantial evidence of knowledge or intent even without proof the accused read or adopted their contents.

The court admitted certain materials and internet search terms relevant to motive, knowledge, and intent, while excluding or limiting others whose prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court also rejected the argument that admission of the evidence violated the accused’s Charter freedoms of religion or expression.

In a terrorism prosecution, the accused sought to exclude evidence that he had expressed sympathy for individuals associated with terrorism, including Omar Khadr, members of the Toronto 18, and persons detained under security certificates.

The court assessed the admissibility of the statements by balancing probative value against moral and reasoning prejudice.

Evidence relating to the accused’s comments about Khadr and the Toronto 18 was excluded because it carried significant risk of prejudice and would require lengthy contextual evidence that could confuse the jury.

However, a brief conversation concerning security certificates was admitted because it was relevant to the accused’s fear of surveillance and was not unduly prejudicial.

The court also declined to permit an additional challenge for cause question relating to the accused’s views on the security certificate process.

The accused applied to exclude recorded conversations obtained through a consent wiretap authorization under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code in a terrorism prosecution alleging attempted participation in, and counselling participation in, a terrorist organization.

The accused argued the supporting affidavit failed to establish reasonable grounds and improperly relied on Islamophobic assumptions.

The court held that the affidavit, read as a whole, provided ample grounds to believe offences under s. 83.18 had been or would be committed and that relevant information would be obtained through interception.

The judge also rejected the claim that investigative conclusions were improperly influenced by discriminatory assumptions.

The application to exclude the intercepted communications was dismissed.

In a terrorism prosecution, the accused sought to introduce expert evidence from a sociologist regarding the prevalence of Islamophobia and the tendency to associate Muslims with terrorism.

The defence argued the evidence would assist the jury in interpreting conversations with an undercover officer and in assessing evidence of the accused’s online searches relating to terrorism.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence under R. v. Mohan and the two‑stage analysis described in R. v. Abbey, the court found the proposed testimony unnecessary and highly speculative.

The expert had no knowledge of the accused or the undercover officer and could not meaningfully link general social attitudes to the facts of the case.

The court concluded the evidence would provide little probative value and risk confusing the jury, and therefore excluded it.

In a terrorism prosecution alleging attempted participation in and counselling participation in the activities of Al‑Shabaab, the Crown sought to call an expert on Somalia and the organization’s history, structure, ideology, and recruitment practices.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence from Mohan and the two‑step analysis in Abbey.

The court found the proposed testimony concerned subject matter beyond the knowledge of a typical Canadian jury and was logically relevant to issues of knowledge, intent, and interpretation of internet activity and recorded conversations.

The expert was held to be properly qualified and not shown to be biased, and the probative value of the contextual evidence outweighed any potential prejudice.

The court therefore permitted the expert evidence, with caution against using “consistent with” language suggesting ultimate issue conclusions.

The accused brought a constitutional motion challenging the validity of several anti‑terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code, including the definitions of “terrorist group” and “terrorist activity” in s. 83.01 and the participation offence in s. 83.18.

The accused argued the provisions were overbroad, vague, and violated the presumption of innocence and Charter freedoms by criminalizing attempts and counselling related to participation in terrorist groups.

The court held that s. 83.18 creates a substantive offence requiring proof of both participation and a specific intent to enhance a terrorist group’s ability to carry out terrorist activity.

Relying on appellate authority including Khawaja and Nadarajah, the court found the provisions neither vague nor overbroad and concluded that the mens rea requirements significantly limit the reach of the offence.

The constitutional application was dismissed in its entirety.