Isabel Blanchard

Criminal trial involving historical allegations of sexual assault and sexual interference against two child complainants within a family setting, subject to a publication ban.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework, rejected the accused’s evidence as neither credible nor reliable, and found one complainant’s account sufficiently detailed, internally consistent, and externally supported to prove certain counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the other complainant’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt because of material inconsistencies, a prior signed statement denying abuse, and contradictory defence evidence.

The Crown’s application to use each complainant’s allegations as other discreditable conduct was dismissed because one complainant’s evidence was not reasonably capable of belief for that purpose.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm following a single-vehicle accident.

The investigating officer obtained a production order for the applicant's hospital medical records, including blood alcohol analysis, based on a sworn information.

The applicant brought a Charter motion arguing the search violated his s. 8 rights because the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the information contained significant omissions and relied on the officer's unsupported assumptions rather than objective facts.

The court concluded the search violated s. 8 and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the high expectation of privacy in medical records.

Following the ruling, the Crown stayed the proceedings.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior convictions for sexual assault from 1990 as similar fact evidence.

The accused is charged with sexual offences against a complainant with cognitive disabilities.

The Crown sought to adduce evidence that the prior victims also had mental disabilities.

The court found that the Crown failed to provide sufficient cogent detail about the circumstances of the prior offences, rendering the evidence merely indicative of general propensity.

The application was dismissed as the evidence lacked probative value and its admission would be highly prejudicial.

The accused was charged with attempted murder after stabbing a neighbour with a kitchen knife.

The defence raised the mental disorder exemption under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing the accused lacked the capacity to know his actions were wrong due to schizoaffective disorder and active psychosis.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from chronic mental illness involving hallucinations and delusions, was non‑compliant with medication prior to the offence, and likely experienced auditory hallucinations at the time of the attack.

Applying the analytical framework for NCR determinations, the court accepted that the mental disorder rendered the accused incapable of rationally appreciating the moral wrongfulness of the act.

The court therefore found the accused not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and referred the matter to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, brought a motion to exclude a statement made to police.

Due to a technical error, the audio of the video-recorded interview was mostly unrecorded, and the interviewing officer's notes were sparse.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the recording failure did not breach the accused's Charter rights.

However, the court excluded the audio component because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, while allowing the silent video and the officer's testimony regarding the gist of the interview.

A young person pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was to be sentenced under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The principal issue was the appropriate credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The Crown sought reduced credit prior to the guilty plea while the defence sought one‑for‑one credit for all time served.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances youth courts should not reduce credit below one‑for‑one and found none present in the case.

The court imposed the statutory maximum youth sentence for second degree murder, with one‑for‑one credit for pre‑sentence custody, followed by conditional supervision.

The Crown applied for certiorari seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry decision discharging the accused on charges of breaching a prohibition order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code and breaching probation under s. 733.1(1).

The preliminary inquiry judge had concluded there was no evidence establishing the mens rea required for the offences and discharged the accused.

On review, the Superior Court considered whether the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error or merely assessed the sufficiency of the evidence.

Applying the principles governing review of committal decisions, the court held that the judge’s determination concerned the sufficiency of the evidence and did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

The certiorari application was therefore dismissed.

The accused was convicted after trial of indecent assault of a female and gross indecency for sexually abusing a child over a four‑year period while acting in a parental role.

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of parental trust, the complainant’s young age, and the persistent and degrading nature of the abuse.

Mitigating considerations included the offender’s advanced age, poor health, otherwise good character, and the long passage of time without further offending.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount and that a conditional sentence would not meet the objectives of sentencing under the Criminal Code.

A custodial sentence was therefore imposed.

The accused applied under ss. 7, 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude a surreptitious audio recording made by a complainant during a private conversation in the accused’s home.

The defence argued the recording constituted an unreasonable warrantless search and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court held that the complainant was not acting as a state agent because she recorded the conversation before contacting police and for mixed personal reasons rather than primarily to gather evidence.

As a result, the Charter was not engaged.

The court further found the recording had significant probative value as an apparent admission and minimal prejudice, and admitted it into evidence.

The accused brought a similar fact application concerning whether allegations made by two complainants could be used across counts in a multi-count indictment for sexual offences.

The Crown argued the evidence should be assessed together to establish propensity and the improbability of coincidence, while the defence argued that significant dissimilarities and evidence of collaboration between the complainants undermined admissibility.

The court reviewed the governing principles from leading authorities on similar fact evidence, including the balancing of probative value against moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court found evidence suggesting inadvertent collaboration between the complainants and identified credibility concerns that diminished the probative value of cross-count use.

The court ruled that the allegations must be evaluated separately and could not be used to bolster one another through similar fact reasoning.