G. Roberts

In a prosecution for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the accused brought pre-trial motions challenging the search warrants for a residence and cell phones under s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown brought a motion to adduce extrinsic misconduct evidence, including rap lyrics and videos of firearms found on the accused's phones.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter motions, finding the ITOs sufficient and admitting the evidence despite technical breaches regarding the timing of Reports to Justice.

The court partially granted the Crown's motion, admitting the rap lyrics and firearm videos as highly probative of animus and means, while excluding certain photographs due to prejudicial effect.

The offender was found guilty of trafficking fentanyl and cocaine in association with a criminal organization.

The offender directed lower-level members, including youth, to transport and sell drugs in a vulnerable northern community.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of targeting a vulnerable population and involving youth against mitigating factors including harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and the offender's background.

The court imposed a total sentence of 13 years imprisonment, with an order that half the sentence on the criminal organization count be served before parole eligibility.

The offender was convicted by a jury of one count of dangerous driving causing death and five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after speeding through a downtown intersection and colliding with a vehicle making an illegal left turn, causing his vehicle to strike a crowd of pedestrians.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence sought three years.

The court weighed the devastating impact on the victims, the offender's prior record, and the aggravating factors of multiple victims and driving for remuneration against mitigating factors including the offender's tragic background, the impact of anti-Black racism, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of four years in custody, reduced by three years of pre-sentence custody credit, leaving one year to serve, along with a ten-year driving prohibition.

The accused were passengers in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

During the stop, police observed a cannabis grinder and suspected a firearm was under the passenger seat, leading to a search that uncovered two loaded handguns.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing violations of their ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) rights, including complaints about police muting their body-worn cameras and delays in providing the right to counsel.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) due to delays in the informational and implementational components of the right to counsel, but dismissed the other Charter claims.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the firearms should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the evidence was highly reliable, the offences were serious, and exclusion would damage public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was charged with multiple drug trafficking offences and criminal organization offences related to his activities in Thunder Bay in the spring of 2020.

The Crown alleged that the accused, a member of the Eglinton West Crips (EWC), trafficked cocaine and fentanyl with the assistance of other gang members.

The court found that the EWC met the definition of a criminal organization and that the accused was a member.

Relying on extensive circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications and surveillance, the court concluded the accused was in constructive possession of drugs found on a co-conspirator, trafficked in fentanyl, and committed these offences for the benefit of and in association with the EWC.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown brought an application to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following his convictions for aggravated assault and uttering a death threat.

The offender had a lengthy history of violent offences, an antisocial personality structure, and a major mental illness.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, as his violent conduct was substantially intractable and he posed a high likelihood of harmful recidivism.

Concluding that the risk could not be adequately managed in the community with a determinate sentence and a long-term supervision order, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused brought a lost evidence application arguing his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence was violated when police lost surveillance video footage from a covert camera.

The footage was properly bookmarked by the investigating officer but failed to save due to a software glitch in the police Genetec system.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown established the loss was not due to unacceptable negligence, as police were unaware of the specific software issue at the time.

Furthermore, the accused failed to show the lost video would have played an important role in his defence, as the view was obstructed and the issue of joint possession rendered the specific location of the bag insignificant.

The accused, an OPP officer, pleaded guilty to breach of trust for showing preferential treatment to a specific tow truck operator when dispatching tows for stunt driving impounds.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence, while the accused sought a conditional discharge.

The court emphasized the need for general deterrence and denunciation given the accused's position of trust and the deliberate nature of the offence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with one year of probation, finding that a discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

Prior to a jury trial for sexual assault, the defence brought several evidentiary motions.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of the accused's prior sexual communications with a complainant, renew an application for severance of counts, and exclude a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Crown's expert witness on the neurobiology of trauma.

The court admitted the communications evidence, finding it essential to the narrative and the Crown's similar fact application.

The court dismissed the renewed severance application, concluding the accused's intention to testify did not undermine the viability of the similar fact evidence.

The court permitted the expert to use the PowerPoint presentation with specific modifications to prevent prejudice.

Finally, the court expanded the opening jury instructions to address nonconscious bias and false assumptions regarding consent.

During a jury trial for drug and proceeds of crime offences, the accused testified that the $605 found on him upon arrest was from cashing a welfare cheque.

The Crown sought to cross-examine him and call reply evidence based on social assistance records indicating he did not receive payments by cheque.

The court dismissed the accused's section 8 Charter application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the manner and timing of social assistance payments obtained by police under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The court also permitted the Crown to call reply evidence, as the accused's testimony was new, unforeseeable, and relevant to an essential issue.

The appellant, a police officer, pleaded guilty to assaulting a handcuffed suspect and falsifying his notes and use of force report.

He was sentenced to 30 days intermittent custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by treating the use of a taser and the false reports as aggravating factors, and by failing to adequately consider the collateral consequence of his inevitable job loss.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable given the serious breach of trust.

The accused was charged with first degree murder following the discovery of the victim's body, which had been severely beaten and bound with coaxial cable.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance video showing the accused as the last person with the victim, DNA evidence on the bindings, a bloody palm print, and after-the-fact conduct.

The accused provided an exculpatory statement to police, which the court rejected as fabricated.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator, that he had the requisite intent for murder despite evidence of intoxication, and that the murder occurred during an unlawful confinement.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

In a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual interference, the court ruled on several pre-trial applications.

The court permitted a challenge for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The court excluded proposed evidence from a former bandmate regarding a masturbation video and a statement about degradation, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence from a prior sexual partner regarding sexual urination.

Finally, the court permitted the Crown to call an expert witness to testify about the basic neurobiology of trauma to dispel myths and stereotypes, but restricted the expert from applying that science specifically to the context of sexual assault.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Garofoli application challenging a production order for his cell phone records, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained significant errors and omissions violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the affiant made several errors due to inexperience and negligence, there was no intent to mislead.

After excising the errors and amplifying the ITO, sufficient reliable evidence remained to justify the production order.

The court concluded there was no section 8 violation and noted that, even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The offender was found guilty of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose after attacking a friend with a meat cleaver.

The court considered the offender's severe PTSD from the Sri Lankan civil war and his alcoholism, alongside the unprovoked and vicious nature of the attack.

The court imposed a 4-year sentence for the aggravated assault, but granted 11 months of credit for onerous pre-sentence release conditions (Downes credit) and 10 months and 20 days for pre-sentence custody (Summers credit), resulting in a net sentence of 26 months and 10 days.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the Crown sought to admit several pieces of evidence.

The court admitted antemortem statements of the deceased and evidence that one of the accused was a marijuana dealer, finding the latter's probative value in establishing narrative and identity outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded rap lyrics found on the other accused's phone, ruling that their limited probative value as circumstantial evidence of participation was outweighed by significant moral and reasoning prejudice.

The accused was charged with firearm and drug offences after police executed a search warrant at his residence targeting another individual.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The Crown sought to prove the voluntariness of the accused's statements and relied on the Garofoli step 6 procedure to uphold the search warrant based on confidential informant information.

The court found the search warrant was constitutionally valid and dismissed the section 9 claim.

However, the court found section 10(b) violations because police compelled the accused to open a safe without re-advising him of his right to counsel, and delayed implementing his right to counsel at the police station.

Despite these breaches, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breaches were not serious and had minimal impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused's statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The offender was found guilty of possessing a loaded 9mm handgun with an over-capacity magazine in his car, while bound by two weapons prohibitions and trafficking drugs.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to conditionally stay the s. 92(1) charge.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for gun crimes associated with drug trafficking, the court imposed a total sentence of 4 years (minus 10 days) for the firearm and breach offences, consecutive to a prior sentence for the drug offences.

The offender received statutory credit for pre-sentence custody plus 150 days of enhanced credit for harsh conditions due to lockdowns and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of a search warrant executed at her residence, which yielded a loaded handgun and crack cocaine.

The warrant relied heavily on information from a confidential source.

After denying the defence's request to cross-examine the affiant and allowing the Crown to rely on step 6 of the Garofoli procedure, the court assessed the facial validity of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court found that the police failed to sufficiently corroborate the confidential source's information, rendering the search a violation of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's privacy outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, resulting in the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused brought an application for direction seeking a ruling that certain electronic communications exchanged between himself and the complainant over WhatsApp were not 'records' captured by s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The communications involved social planning and discussions about drug use.

The court held that the communications did not contain personal information for which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of the circumstances.

Therefore, the communications did not fall within the definition of 'record' under s. 278.1 and could be adduced at trial without a s. 278.92 hearing.