R. Lichtman

The accused were passengers in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

During the stop, police observed a cannabis grinder and suspected a firearm was under the passenger seat, leading to a search that uncovered two loaded handguns.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing violations of their ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) rights, including complaints about police muting their body-worn cameras and delays in providing the right to counsel.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) due to delays in the informational and implementational components of the right to counsel, but dismissed the other Charter claims.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the firearms should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the evidence was highly reliable, the offences were serious, and exclusion would damage public confidence in the administration of justice.

The defendants were found guilty of exercising control over the movements of a complainant to provide sexual services, receiving a material benefit, and advertising sexual services.

One defendant was also found guilty of trafficking MDMA.

The court found that while the defendants did not coerce the complainant into the sex trade, they exploited her serious drug dependency for financial gain.

The court sentenced A.M. to a global term of 24 months and M.P. to a global term of 18 months, ordered forfeiture of their cellphones as offence-related property, and granted pre-trial custody credit including for house arrest but not for curfews.

The defendants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her history in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged the defendants used drugs to coerce the complainant into sex work.

The court applied the two-stage s. 276 framework, ruling that evidence of the complainant's prior sex work and subsequent sex work was inadmissible as it engaged the twin myths.

However, the court permitted cross-examination regarding the complainant's initial meeting with a third party and her independent sex work during the time of the allegations, finding this evidence relevant to the issue of coercion and not barred by s. 276.