M. Gregory Ellies

Postmedia Network Inc. sought a declaration that a publication ban, imposed during a 2017 bail hearing for a sexual assault charge, applied only to the victim and not to a testifying mental health worker (B.M.) who was later identified in a newspaper article and subsequently sued Postmedia.

Alternatively, Postmedia sought to quash the ban via certiorari, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to impose a mandatory ban on adult witnesses.

The Crown opposed, arguing improper collateral attack and lack of standing due to oblique motives and delay.

The court found Postmedia had standing, the application was not an improper collateral attack, and interpreted s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code to mean that mandatory publication bans apply only to victims of all ages and witnesses under 18 years.

The application was allowed, and a declaration issued that the ban applied only to the victim.

The defendant, Preston Proulx, was accused of sexual assault, forcible confinement, threatening death, and assault against his former girlfriend.

The central issue was credibility, as the complainant and defendant presented vastly different accounts of the events.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible, supported by photographic evidence and the defendant's emails containing admissions and demonstrating a tendency to anger and dishonesty.

The defendant was found guilty of all four charges.

The father (M.H.) appealed orders from the Ontario Court of Justice in a child protection application, including the striking of his answer and the award of custody to the mother (M.D.) with supervised access for him.

The father had refused to participate in virtual proceedings due to religious beliefs.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the motion judge did not err in denying an adjournment, she erred in interpreting or applying Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules by striking the father's answer without considering if the delay would be unfair, and by failing to fully consider the child's best interests when making the final custody order, relying on an incomplete Statement of Agreed Facts.

The matter was remitted to the Ontario Court for an expedited hearing.

The Corporation of the Township of Coleman moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action in which the plaintiffs sought a declaration that "Road A" is a public highway.

The plaintiffs argued the road became public through common law dedication and acceptance or by by-law.

The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the claim for a public highway declaration against both the Township and Paul Chitaroni.

The court found no evidence of proper dedication by the owner (who was unaware of ownership of the disputed portion) or sufficient public or municipal acceptance.

Other claims for damages remain to be addressed.

The applicant initiated an application to enforce an agreement for a parcel of land that the respondent had failed to sign.

Before the application was heard, the respondent signed the agreement, rendering the primary relief sought moot.

The sole remaining issue was the applicant's entitlement to costs.

The court found that the application was reasonably commenced and was abandoned due to the respondent's actions.

Consequently, the applicant was awarded partial indemnity costs of $3,500, rejecting the respondent's argument for no costs and the applicant's request for substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant sought an order for partition and sale of a jointly owned 61-acre rural property.

The respondent opposed the motion, raising five arguments including allegations of perjury, disputes over property valuation, child support arrears, equalization of net family property, and claims of hardship.

The court dismissed all of the respondent's arguments, finding them unpersuasive and unsupported by evidence.

The court granted the order for partition and sale, concluding that the hardship to the applicant if the property were not sold far outweighed any potential hardship to the respondent.

David Lewington, a shareholder and officer of Dalew Farms Inc., brought a motion under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to represent the corporation as a non-lawyer.

The motion was unopposed.

The court reviewed factors for granting such leave, including the corporation's structure, the representative's connection and capability, and financial capacity to retain counsel.

Despite vague evidence regarding financial inability, the court granted leave, noting the unopposed nature of the request and the other factors weighing in favour.

The Caisse Populaire de North Bay Limitée moved for summary judgment seeking possession of a mortgaged property due to default on two mortgages and dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim alleging oppressive conduct.

The defendant, Christi-Anne Marie Lafrance, disputed the validity and amounts of the mortgages, arguing they were stayed or discharged by her bankruptcy, and that the Caisse engaged in oppressive conduct.

The court granted leave to amend the plaintiff's name to Caisse Populaire Alliance Limitée, granted summary judgment on the Caisse's claim, and dismissed the counterclaim, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The court clarified that secured debts are not stayed or discharged by bankruptcy if the debtor continues to benefit from the contract.

The defendants moved to transfer the action from Toronto to Sudbury, arguing that Sudbury was a significantly better venue.

The plaintiff opposed, partly on the basis that the motion was brought late.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's procedural objection, finding no prejudice from the three-day delay.

Applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) holistically, the court found that factors such as where the events occurred, where damages were sustained, the subject matter's location, and the convenience of parties and most witnesses favored Sudbury.

The court also noted that the availability of case management and judicial facilities was neutral.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 13.1.02 to transfer an action from Toronto to North Bay, arguing there was no real connection to Toronto and that the property, parties, and witnesses were located in Kirkland Lake.

The defendant was self-represented and did not oppose the motion.

The court granted the transfer but directed the action to Haileybury, which was identified as the Superior Court closest to Kirkland Lake, to better facilitate the defendant's participation, rather than North Bay as requested by the plaintiff.

No costs were awarded as the motion was unopposed.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his two step-daughters, C.F. and T.A. The Crown and defence jointly submitted a six-year incarceration period, acknowledging it was at the low end of the appropriate range for such aggravating facts.

The court accepted the joint submission, emphasizing the profound importance of a guilty plea in providing validation to victims and demonstrating the accused's remorse and potential for rehabilitation, thereby sparing all participants the ordeal of a trial.

The plaintiff, Steele Industrial Supplies Inc., sued its former bookkeeper, Sharon Elliott, and the estate of her late husband for damages arising from theft and unjust enrichment.

Steele moved for summary judgment, while the defendants cross-moved to dismiss the action on the basis that it was statute-barred by the limitation period.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the limitation period commenced when Elliott confessed to the theft, not when the fraud was merely suspected.

The court allowed Steele's motion in part, establishing Elliott's liability for the misappropriated funds and the Estate's liability for unjust enrichment, but determined that the precise quantum of damages required a trial due to conflicting expert evidence.

A trial management conference was ordered to address the damages issue and costs.

This decision addresses an in camera hearing under s. 278.6 of the Criminal Code, following an accused's successful application for production of a complainant's counsellor records.

The court determined which portions of the records should be disclosed to the accused.

It ruled that Crown and defence counsel should be excluded from the in camera hearing, as their participation would be futile without prior access to the records and counter-productive to privacy.

The judge ordered disclosure of relevant excerpts pertaining to the counsellor's role in the complainant's police statements and the identity of the perpetrator, while balancing the complainant's privacy interests.

The applicant sought an order declaring Notices of Sale issued by the respondent condominium corporation against its units null and void, alleging non-compliance with the Condominium Act, the corporation's declaration, and by-laws.

The applicant argued that a special assessment was improperly levied without a budget, the notice of assessment lacked required information and was misleading, and funds were misappropriated.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the corporation had adopted a prior budget, the notice provided sufficient reasons for the assessment, the alleged misinformation was due to the applicant's non-payment, and no misappropriation of funds occurred as payments were reimbursements for expenses incurred on behalf of the corporation.

D.H. was charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm, failing to provide necessaries of life, and assault causing bodily harm related to injuries sustained by a 28-month-old child, B.V. The Crown alleged D.H. assaulted B. or showed wanton disregard for B.'s safety, and deterred B.'s mother from seeking medical attention.

The court found D.H. not guilty on all charges, concluding that the child's severe head injuries were likely caused by a subgaleal hematoma, possibly from hair combing, rather than assault.

The court also found the mother's testimony not credible, noting she changed her story to improve her child protection case, and criticized the police investigation for failing to disprove D.H.'s consistent statements.

Mr. Shultz applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code for a review of a detention order.

The original detention was based on the secondary ground (public safety) due to a lengthy criminal record with violent offences.

A new release plan was proposed with a childhood friend as surety.

The court found the new plan inadequate, citing the proposed surety's lack of awareness of the accused's record and the unreliability of a third party involved in the employment plan.

The court also found detention necessary on the tertiary ground (public confidence in justice administration) due to the gravity of the offences (aggravated assault, attempted drowning) and the Crown's intention to seek a dangerous offender designation, which could lead to indefinite imprisonment.

The application for review was dismissed.

Ms. Smith appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit, alleging breaches of her Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The trial judge had rejected her evidence regarding these breaches and found no Charter violations.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the trial judge properly evaluated the conflicting evidence and that the officer had reasonable grounds for the stop and ASD demand.

The court also affirmed that the right to counsel is suspended during a valid highway traffic stop and that Ms. Smith did not request specific counsel at the police station.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

In this motion for temporary child support, the respondent mother sought an order for child support for the two children of the marriage, which the applicant father resisted.

The parties shared parenting time, necessitating the application of section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

Due to conflicting financial information and a lack of child expense budgets, the court imputed incomes for both parents and calculated a set-off amount.

The court then adjusted this set-off to account for the father's higher standard of living and debt burden, ultimately ordering the father to pay $300 per month in temporary child support.

The court declined to award costs due to unnecessarily lengthy affidavits containing irrelevant information.

This case addresses the jurisdictional limits of a provincially appointed Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) judge to vary a support order made by a federally appointed judge under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 (ISOA), particularly when the applicant resides outside Ontario.

The court clarified that an OCJ judge's power to make a provisional variation order under ISOA s. 26(2) is restricted to situations where the applicant resides in Ontario and the reciprocating jurisdiction requires such an order (ISOA s. 30(1)).

Consequently, the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to make a provisional order in this case, as the applicant resided in Alberta.

The Superior Court of Justice quashed the OCJ's provisional order and assumed jurisdiction over the variation application, requiring further information on the merits of the support variation.

The defendants moved to compel the plaintiffs to produce unredacted banking records and additional documentation to trace the source of funds.

The plaintiffs had redacted portions of bank statements, asserting irrelevance and privacy, and resisted requests for further documentation.

The court allowed the motion for unredacted bank statements, finding the plaintiffs failed to meet the high threshold for redaction, which requires both clear irrelevance and a "good reason" for non-disclosure (e.g., significant harm or public interest infringement).

However, the court denied the motion for additional documentation to trace the source of funds, as the defendants did not establish its relevance beyond an improper fishing expedition.

The court also addressed the procedure for filing sealed documents, granting a temporary sealing order to allow the plaintiffs to formally apply for a sealing order.