Gordon D. Lemon

The applicant, Wendy Crane, sought an order declaring her mother, Lesly Metzger, incapable of managing her property and person, and appointing Ms. Crane as sole permanent guardian.

Ms. Crane also sought the removal of Nigel Cason, Mrs. Metzger's uncle, as attorney for personal care and property management.

The court found that Ms. Crane failed to provide strong and compelling evidence of misconduct or neglect by Mr. Cason, or that his removal was in Mrs. Metzger's best interests.

The court noted Ms. Crane's untrustworthy actions, including taking her incapable mother to Seattle under false pretenses and facilitating unauthorized bank withdrawals.

The application was dismissed, and Mr. Cason's powers of attorney remained in effect.

The applicant, Andrew Saiedy, brought a motion seeking an order to amend the record of his ongoing wrongful dismissal proceeding to replace his full name with his initials (A.S.) in public domain legal search resources, citing concerns about future employment prospects.

He also sought costs against the City of Markham.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Saiedy provided no evidence that such an order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, nor that it would be proportional to the public interest in open court proceedings.

The court also noted that any order would only affect the proceedings before it and could not retroactively alter records already in the public domain.

The court further ordered Saiedy to pay $5,000 in costs to the City of Markham, finding his position to be without legal merit despite not being frivolous or vexatious.

The respondent, Ms. Hung, brought a motion seeking an order to find the applicant, Mr. Willis, in contempt of a prior court order, for the delivery of his tax returns and Notices of Assessment, for his attendance at questioning, and for payment of funds into court.

The contempt aspect of the motion was withdrawn due to improper service.

The parties agreed on the questioning schedule.

The court ordered Mr. Willis to file his 2015, 2016, and 2017 tax returns with the CRA and provide them, along with Notices of Assessment, to Ms. Hung, rejecting his arguments that a subsequent order or non-filing with the CRA relieved him of this duty.

The request for payment into court was dismissed as res judicata, having been previously addressed by another order.

Costs were reserved for written submissions.

The applicant sought an interim order for primary residence of the children and specific access for the respondent.

The respondent opposed, alleging parental alienation.

The court granted the applicant's motion, ordering primary residence with the father, structured weekend and weekday access for the mother, and mandating the use of Our Family Wizard for communication.

The decision was based on the children's best interests, considering the younger child's reluctance to spend more time with the mother, issues with school attendance, and the need to ensure continued contact while minimizing direct parental conflict.

A settlement conference was scheduled to move the matter towards trial.

The applicant, convicted of tax evasion and fined $687,000, applied for a ten-year extension to pay the outstanding fine.

The Crown consented to a two-year extension but sought an order for monthly payments.

The court granted the two-year extension without mandating monthly payments, noting the applicant's lack of financial disclosure and failure to seek employment, but finding that a monthly payment order would prioritize form over substance.

The applicant, James Kritz, sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis after successfully obtaining an order to rescind a City of Guelph building inspector's order.

The City of Guelph argued for no costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found Kritz entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The court rejected the City's submission that success on two out of three arguments negated costs, affirming that costs follow the event of overall success.

The court fixed costs at $37,482.01, noting the City's own partial indemnity bill of costs was $29,367.33 and that Kritz's expert fees were reasonable and appropriate.

The request for substantial indemnity was denied as there was no finding of improper conduct by the City, the issue having been withdrawn by the applicant.

The plaintiff, a former employee of the Royal Bank of Canada in British Columbia, moved to Ontario and sought employment at an Ontario branch.

She alleged that a British Columbia-based employee defamed her to Ontario employees, resulting in the withdrawal of an employment offer and constructive dismissal.

The defendants moved to stay the action, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction and that British Columbia was the more convenient forum.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a presumptive connection to Ontario based on the tort of defamation occurring there, and held that the defendants failed to establish that British Columbia was a clearly more appropriate forum.

The applicant sought a declaration that four of his properties, rented to groups of university students, were not being used as 'Lodging House Type 1' under the municipality's zoning by-law.

The municipality argued that because the properties were rented to five or more individuals sharing kitchen and bathroom facilities, they constituted lodging houses.

The court found that the properties functioned as single housekeeping units rented to cohesive groups under single leases, rather than individual lodging units.

The court granted the declaration and further ordered the municipality to remove unsubstantiated references to the properties as 'Possible Lodging Houses' from its public website, criticizing the municipality's use of the website to pressure landowners.

The applicant appealed an order to comply issued by a city building inspector requiring a building permit for interior renovations completed before the applicant purchased the property.

The court held that current owners are responsible for prior unpermitted construction and that the city's inspection was conducted with valid consent.

However, the court rescinded the order, finding that the minor interior renovations (adding non-load-bearing walls and basement laundry plumbing) did not constitute 'material alterations' requiring a building permit under the Building Code Act.

The defendants sought an order for a further defence medical assessment of the plaintiff, Saokeng Mork, by an orthopaedic surgeon and chronic pain specialist, Dr. Hugh Cameron.

The court applied the factors from Bonello v. Taylor, finding insufficient evidence to warrant the examination.

Specifically, the plaintiff was not relying on an orthopaedic expert, and Dr. Cameron's expertise in chronic pain was not sufficiently demonstrated by his resume for the purpose of ordering the examination.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving party wife brought a motion to compel the responding party husband to produce outstanding financial disclosure, including records from a corporation owned by his son.

The husband had previously agreed to a consent order for disclosure but failed to comply.

The court ordered the husband to produce the outstanding personal financial documents.

Regarding the corporate records, the court found them relevant to spousal support and property division, noting the husband had recently disposed of his interest in the company.

The court ordered the husband to request the records from his son and, if refused, to bring a motion to compel their production from the non-party corporation.

This interim motion in a family law proceeding addressed issues of custody, access, child support, section 7 expenses, spousal support, and employment benefits.

The court declined to make an interim custody order, confirming the existing access schedule.

The respondent's request for Office of the Children’s Lawyer intervention was dismissed.

The court ordered the respondent to pay child support and retroactive child support based on his 2015 income, and to continue contributing to Montessori school fees (section 7 expenses).

Interim spousal support was dismissed due to insufficient financial information from the applicant and the respondent's limited capacity after other support payments.

The respondent was ordered to maintain the applicant and child on his employment benefits.

The applicant, Mr. Noor, brought a motion to vary an interim order dated January 28, 2016, seeking to reduce his child and spousal support obligations and to obtain an order allowing him to travel internationally with his son annually.

The court found insufficient evidence to justify a change in interim support, noting that the applicant had not pursued available steps to mitigate income reduction and that the respondent, a stay-at-home mother, should not have income imputed at this stage.

The request for international travel was also denied, with the court suggesting that resources should be focused on resolving outstanding issues.

The motion was dismissed, and the file was adjourned to a settlement conference.

The court issued a consent timetable for the delivery of materials regarding costs and damages, following a suggestion by the Court of Appeal.

A conference call was scheduled to determine the subsequent process.

The trial addressed three issues: whether an interim sole custody order for the applicant should be made final, whether the respondent's access should be extended to include Thursday nights, and whether child support obligations should be varied if access was increased.

The court found the respondent's evidence unreliable due to past dishonesty regarding alcohol addiction and anger management issues, which significantly impacted his ability to communicate and cooperate.

The court determined that the parties could not effectively communicate without a third party and that joint custody was not in the children's best interests.

The respondent's request for increased access was denied, partly because it was tied to a desire to reduce child support without a clear plan for the children's well-being.

Consequently, the interim sole custody order for the applicant was made final, and the respondent was ordered to pay child support according to the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought a motion to exclude his videotaped statement to police, alleging breaches of his s. 10(b) and s. 7 Charter rights.

Although the accused spoke briefly with Duty Counsel, he expressed confusion during the subsequent police interview and indicated he wanted to speak to a lawyer of his own choosing.

The interviewing officer interrupted the accused's attempt to find a lawyer in the phone book and continued questioning him.

The court found that the officer failed to facilitate the accused's right to counsel, resulting in a serious breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter following the death of a 14-month-old child in her care.

The child suffered a severe skull fracture and subdural hematoma.

The court found that the accused momentarily lost her patience and intentionally assaulted the child, causing the fatal injuries.

Alternatively, the court found that the accused failed to provide the necessaries of life by delaying calling 911 for over an hour after observing the child was unresponsive and limp, which significantly contributed to the child's death.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter after a 14-month-old child in her care died.

The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to police officers.

The court found the accused was detained by the first responding officer without being advised of her rights, rendering subsequent statements to that officer inadmissible.

Statements made during a videotaped interview and a walk-through with a detective were found voluntary and admissible, except for a phone call to her husband which breached her right to privacy in seeking counsel.

Statements made to a third officer after the child's death were excluded as involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics, including ignoring repeated assertions of the right to silence, denying adequate warmth, and exploiting the accused's emotional distress.

The defendants moved to set aside ex-parte certificates of pending litigation and an injunction previously granted to the plaintiffs regarding three properties.

The plaintiffs claimed the properties were transferred to the defendants in trust, but failed to disclose to the ex-parte judge that they were in mortgage arrears prior to the transfers and that the defendants had assumed nearly $1.2 million in mortgages.

The court found this failure to make full and fair disclosure shocking and sufficient to discharge the CPLs and the injunction.

The defendants' requests for immediate eviction and forfeiture of a $50,000 deposit were dismissed pending further evidence.

The defendant manufacturer brought a motion for security for costs against a corporate plaintiff in a commercial dispute involving alleged breach of a furniture supply arrangement, copyright infringement, and passing off.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a potential costs award.

Applying Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found there was good reason to believe the corporate plaintiff had insufficient exigible assets and that its financial disclosure lacked the required robust particularity.

The court rejected arguments that the merits of the claim or the overlap with the counterclaim made security unjust.

Security for costs was ordered on a step‑by‑step basis, requiring payment into court pending further proceedings.