Frederick L. Myers

The court considered whether a statement of claim should be dismissed under Rule 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The pleading consisted largely of complaints that the defendants failed to respond to offers to settle and did not disclose actionable causes of action.

The court held it was plain and obvious the action could not succeed as pleaded and that the abbreviated Rule 2.1 process was appropriate.

The action was dismissed, with the first two named defendants entitled to one set of costs if demanded following assessment.

On a Rule 2.1 screening request initiated by counsel for one defendant, the court found the statement of claim failed to allege material facts capable of supporting legal claims against the named defendants.

The pleading appeared on its face to be frivolous and vexatious, including allegations against a regulator that did not disclose a legitimate cause of action.

The court directed the registrar to issue a Form 2.1A notice requiring written submissions from the plaintiff as to why the action should not be dismissed.

Pending that process, the action was stayed under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

On an appeal from a Master's discovery order, the appellants challenged findings that they had failed to substantiate privilege claims over documents listed or redacted in documentary production.

The court upheld the finding that the moving parties had not met their burden to justify privilege and criticized their shifting positions, inadequate evidence, and misuse of procedural advantages available to government litigants.

However, the court held that Rule 30.06 does not permit wholesale disclosure merely because privilege has not been proven; disclosure may only be ordered after a positive determination that the document is not privileged.

After personally reviewing the disputed documents, the court upheld all remaining privilege claims except for one limited redaction and awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs.

This was a costs decision following dismissal of an application for partition and sale of jointly held property, with a prior order requiring the respondents to pay the applicant $13,000 from any future sale or refinancing.

The applicant sought costs up to the date of the respondents' settlement offer, but the court held the respondents were wholly successful on the real issue: preserving the property's equity and restraining enforcement of bare legal title.

Applying the fair and reasonable costs principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court fixed the respondents' costs at $13,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court set that amount off against the applicant's prior $13,000 recovery so that the formal judgment would simply declare the respondents' ownership and dismiss the applicant's claims.

Following summary judgment concerning sham property transfers designed to defeat creditors, the successful plaintiff sought full indemnity costs against two defendants based on reprehensible conduct in the litigation and underlying fraudulent dealings.

The court held this was a rare case where the successful party should bear none of the expense of pursuing justice, given the fabrication of a defence, abusive conduct, stalling, and untrue evidence.

Full indemnity costs of $121,523.99 inclusive of disbursements and taxes were awarded jointly and severally against the two defendants who acted in concert.

The court further held that s. 45(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act applied to one defendant’s liability for costs in relation to the properties at issue.

On a Rule 2.1 screening request brought by the defendants, the court held that a civil action alleging negligent corruption, abuse of authority, constitutional breaches, and police failure to investigate appeared on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The pleaded complaints all arose from the handling of another court proceeding and were required to be addressed within that proceeding rather than through a fresh action.

The court further noted there is no private right of action against police for failing to investigate a particular crime.

Notice under Form 2.1A was directed to issue, the plaintiff was invited to make written submissions, and the action was stayed pending the written hearing.

On a registrar-referred Rule 2.1 review, the court considered a claim against the Crown for malicious prosecution arising from provincial offence charges withdrawn in 2000.

The record disclosed multiple prior proceedings arising from the same underlying prosecution, including dismissals based on res judicata and appellate affirmance.

The court held that the pleading appeared on its face to be an abuse of process and directed that notice issue inviting written submissions on dismissal.

Pending that process, the action was stayed under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and no further filings were permitted except the responding party's written submissions.

The plaintiffs, comprising the estate and family of the deceased, moved for summary judgment on liability in a wrongful death action arising from the defendant's prior first degree murder conviction.

The court held that, under the abuse of process and relitigation principles, a civil defendant will presumptively not be permitted to contest the factual basis of a criminal conviction absent circumstances calling the fairness of the prior proceeding into question.

No such circumstances were raised, and the defendant's limitation argument failed because the action was commenced within two years even on his most favourable assumptions.

Summary judgment on liability was granted, damages were left for later determination, and the supporting damages affidavits were ordered confidential and sealed on consent.

In a wrongful dismissal action previously dismissed for delay, the plaintiff filed non-compliant motion materials that did not clearly identify the relief sought or legal basis.

The court held that the proposed motion appeared on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and that it bore the hallmarks of a proceeding suitable for the abbreviated Rule 2.1 process.

The registrar was directed to issue Form 2.1A notice, the scheduled motion date was released, and both the motion and action were stayed pending the written hearing process.

On a Rule 2.1 referral from the registrar’s office, the court considered whether an action arising from unsuccessful attempts to challenge a will was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff had sued additional parties including former lawyers and an official examiner.

The court held the action appeared suitable for the abbreviated Rule 2.1 process and directed that the plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to file written submissions.

The action was stayed pending the outcome of the written hearing or further order.

Following settlement of a motion to enforce minutes of settlement in a family-related civil dispute, the court determined costs and priority issues concerning trust funds held by a lawyer.

The court held the motion should not have been necessary, criticizing both the plaintiff's obstruction and former counsel's failure to release an order discharging certificates of pending litigation.

Applying the fair and reasonable costs approach under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court fixed the defendants' costs at $55,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court also subordinated the former lawyers' charging orders to the defendants' costs claim and directed payment out of the plaintiff's share of trust funds.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant physician sought summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' expert was unqualified to give opinion evidence in Ontario.

A dispute arose at case conference over the sequencing of expert evidence and the production of experts for cross-examination.

The court held the matter was not ripe for determination because the precise issues and evidentiary record for the proposed summary judgment motion remained unclear, including whether expert evidence would ultimately be relied upon.

The court emphasized that once an issue is put forward for summary judgment, each side must have a fair opportunity to adduce and test relevant evidence, subject to the court's proportionality and case-management powers.

Following scheduling of a summary judgment motion over approximately $10,000 to $13,000 in income replacement benefits, the plaintiff withdrew the motion after producing information and the insurer agreed to pay the benefits sought, subject to a possible dispute over retroactive quantum.

Both sides sought costs.

The court held that both parties were responsible for disproportionate and inefficient motion practice, with the plaintiff slow to disclose relevant corporate structure information and the insurer demanding excessive production inconsistent with proportionality.

Emphasizing the required culture shift toward cooperative, proportionate litigation conduct, the court declined to award costs to either side.

The plaintiff sued for battery, false arrest, and Charter damages after police stopped him without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, forcibly subdued him, searched his pockets and wallet, and kept him handcuffed outside in freezing conditions.

The court held there was no lawful investigative detention under the common law framework in Mann, no lawful basis for the searches, and breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court also found that one officer punched the plaintiff twice and committed battery and false arrest.

General damages of $9,000, punitive damages of $18,000, and declarations of Charter breach were awarded.

The defendants requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the claim appeared patently inappropriate, as it was based on failures to respond to settlement offers and sought relief the court could not award.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the plaintiff to provide written submissions as to why the action should not be dismissed, and stayed the action pending the outcome.

The defendant brought a written request under Rule 2.1 to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence claim as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, arguing it was statute-barred and barred by res judicata.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the statement of claim stated clear and cogent claims for professional negligence.

The court noted that the application of the Limitations Act and doctrines of res judicata or issue estoppel are matters of evidence and not apparent on the face of the pleading.

The applicant sought a partition and sale of a property he purchased with his brother-in-law in 1993 under a trust agreement.

The applicant moved out in 1996 and stopped contributing to the mortgage and expenses, leaving the respondents to carry the property for nearly 20 years.

The court dismissed the application for 50% of the proceeds, applying the equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and waiver, finding it would be fundamentally unfair for the applicant to share in the capital appreciation after standing idly by.

The applicant was awarded only the return of his initial $13,000 down payment upon the future sale or refinancing of the property.

The plaintiff creditor brought a motion for summary judgment declaring that the defendant Clarke was the beneficial owner of two properties, with legal title held by the defendant Bailey in trust.

Clarke claimed his common law spouse, Reid, was the beneficial owner.

The court found numerous badges of fraud and sham transactions, concluding that beneficial title always remained with Clarke.

As Clarke had assigned himself into bankruptcy while holding beneficial title, the court declared the properties remained vested in his discharged trustee in bankruptcy and ordered the trustee's reappointment to complete the administration of the estate.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 considering the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff failed to make submissions within the required time.

The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue on behalf of the co-plaintiff, named non-suable entities as defendants, and failed to state a cause of action.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the Attorney General.

The parties sought clarification of a previous judgment awarding the plaintiff 17 months' salary in lieu of notice, subject to a 10% contingency deduction for mitigation.

The court clarified that the 10% deduction applies only to the 7-month future loss period following the date of judgment, as the plaintiff had already suffered the damages up to the date of the hearing with 100% certainty.