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The court dismissed the accused's Charter applications and convicted her of impaired driving after admitting secondary evidence of a destroyed surveillance video.
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle accident on January 15, 2011.
The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The court dismissed the Charter application and found the accused guilty on both counts.
The court found that police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breathalyzer demand, that the accused's right to counsel was properly respected, and that the Crown proved impairment and the blood alcohol readings beyond a reasonable doubt.
The over 80 charge was stayed on the basis of the Kienapple principle, with conviction entered on the impaired operation charge.
Convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance upheld; no unreasonable delay or misapprehension of evidence.
The appellant appealed his convictions for administering a stupefying substance and sexual assault, as well as his 22-month sentence.
The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, misapprehending expert toxicological evidence regarding the effects of GHB and alcohol, and finding that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and that the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's incapacity to consent due to intoxication were supported by the evidence.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed.
Convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance upheld; victims rendered incapable of consenting.
The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of administering a stupefying substance.
He argued the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and the trial judge erred in relying on the complainants' conservative sexual nature to assess consent.
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence, including expert toxicological testimony that the complainants' symptoms were not caused by alcohol alone.
The court concluded the complainants were drugged and rendered unconscious, making them incapable of consenting to sexual activity.
The appeal was dismissed.