Estey

Criminal appeal from conviction for conspiracy to obtain contributions for a governing political party through influence peddling.

The majority held that questioning prospective jurors in private after arraignment and plea, on grounds including possible partiality, formed part of the trial for purposes of s. 577(1) of the Criminal Code and violated the accused's right to be present.

The majority further held that this defect could not be cured by later challenges for cause or by the curative provisions dealing with jury irregularities, and that the process impermissibly intruded into the Code's exclusive scheme for determining juror impartiality.

A new trial was ordered, although the majority indicated agreement with the dissent's resolution of the remaining issues concerning the definition of “person”, the co-conspirators' hearsay exception, and good character instructions.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal which had overturned the trial judge's finding regarding a gift of a one-half interest in property from a mother to her son.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in substituting its view of the weight of the evidence for that of the trial judge, who had the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify.

The judgment of the trial judge was restored.

The appellant appealed her conviction for criminal negligence causing death to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it was not a case of 'no evidence' and that the appeal was essentially an invitation to review the sufficiency of the evidence, which the Court may not do.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding an inmate disciplinary court matter.

The Supreme Court of Canada quashed the appeal, finding that the issue had become moot due to three factors, two of which arose after leave to appeal was granted.

The appellant and an accomplice committed an armed robbery during which the accomplice shot and killed a client.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, despite testifying he believed the gun was unloaded.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 213(d) violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because it allows for a murder conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of at least objective foreseeability of death.

The provision was not saved by section 1, and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent son sued his appellant father for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement for the sale of farm land.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the acts of part performance were insufficient to displace the Statute of Frauds and that no oral agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, substituting its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial judge's findings of fact based on credibility unless there is a palpable and overriding error.

As the trial judge made no such error, the Court of Appeal erred in substituting its version of the facts.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder as a party to the offence under the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code, after his brother beat a homeowner to death during a break and enter.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the constructive murder provision violated the Charter.

Applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Vaillancourt, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the constructive murder provision was inoperative as it violated the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was arrested for murder and informed of his right to counsel.

He subsequently made an inculpatory statement to the police.

The trial judge excluded the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a violation of s. 10(b), and the accused was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that absent proof the accused did not understand his right to counsel, the onus is on him to prove he asked for the right and was denied.

As the police complied with s. 10(b) and the accused did not indicate a desire to exercise his right, no violation occurred.

The appellant, an RCMP officer, assaulted a prisoner and was convicted of a major service offence under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.

He was subsequently charged with common assault under the Criminal Code for the same incident.

The appellant argued that the criminal charge violated his right under section 11(h) of the Charter not to be tried and punished twice for the same offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while section 11 applies to proceedings involving true penal consequences, the appellant was not being tried for the same offence.

The service offence was an internal disciplinary matter, whereas the criminal charge was a public offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant police officer was charged with major offences under the Code of Offences under the Police Act.

He objected that the presiding officer did not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal as required by section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Wigglesworth to hold that section 11 of the Charter does not apply to police disciplinary proceedings because they are neither criminal in nature nor involve true penal consequences.

The appellant, a police officer, was charged with major service offences and appeared before the Deputy Chief of Police for trial.

He argued that the proceedings violated his right to an independent and impartial tribunal under section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 11 does not apply to police disciplinary proceedings because they are neither criminal in nature nor involve true penal consequences, such as imprisonment.

The appellants, police officers, sought to quash a provincial Order in Council establishing a commission of inquiry into the alleged assault of a prisoner while in police custody.

They argued the inquiry was ultra vires the province as it intruded into federal jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the province has the constitutional authority under s. 92(14) and s. 92(6) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to establish an inquiry to investigate and report on alleged wrongdoings by members of a provincial police force.

The inquiry's purpose was not to determine criminal responsibility but to investigate police misconduct that undermined the administration of justice.

The appellants, two police constables, were charged with discreditable conduct under the Code of Offences.

They challenged the disciplinary proceedings, arguing that the police tribunal lacked independence and impartiality, thereby violating section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 11 of the Charter does not apply to police disciplinary proceedings because they are neither criminal in nature nor involve true penal consequences, such as imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency, found to be a dangerous offender, and sentenced to indeterminate detention prior to the enactment of the Charter.

Subsequently, gross indecency was removed from the definition of 'serious personal injury offence' in the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought habeas corpus and Charter relief, arguing his continued detention was unlawful because his offence no longer qualified for indeterminate detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the change in the law did not alter his status as a dangerous offender and his continued detention did not violate the Charter.

The respondent moved to dismiss the appellant's appeal in the Court of Appeal for failure to file a factum within the fixed delay.

A judge of the Court of Appeal granted the motion pursuant to art. 505 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the exercise of the judge's discretion was not reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellant was granted a peremptory delay of ten days to serve and file his factum.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the Court of Appeal did not err in rejecting the trial judge's finding that the accused drove as he did 'probably out of necessity'.

The appellant lawyer was convicted of contempt of court by a Provincial Court judge for conduct that occurred before a different judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, holding that a Provincial Court judge has no jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding for contempt committed before another judge.

The appellant appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from his acquittal on a robbery charge.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal and confirming that the lower court had jurisdiction to entertain the Crown's appeal.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Yukon Court of Appeal that allowed a Crown appeal from his acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law in the application of s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on subsequent jurisprudence.

The matter was returned for retrial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences including breaking and entering and using a weapon in a sexual assault.

Following the guilty pleas, the Crown applied to have the appellant declared a dangerous offender under Part XXI of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the dangerous offender provisions violated sections 7, 9, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate the principles of fundamental justice, do not constitute arbitrary detention or cruel and unusual punishment, and that the offender is not entitled to a jury determination of dangerousness.