Estey

The Attorney General of Nova Scotia appealed a decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal which found that the powers of the Nova Scotia Residential Tenancy Board were ultra vires the province as trenching on s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a brief oral judgment, dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and granted the motion to quash, with Estey J. dissenting.

The appellant lost his employment due to a strike and subsequently found secondary employment working three days a week at a hospital.

He left the hospital job for medical reasons and applied for unemployment insurance benefits.

The Commission denied benefits under s. 44(1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, arguing he was not 'regularly engaged in some other occupation' because he intended to return to his original employer after the strike.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'regularly engaged' refers to the regularity of the work schedule, not the duration or permanence of the employment.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was entitled to benefits.

The appellant, a registered Indian living on a reserve, was employed by an Indian corporation located on the reserve.

He was paid on the reserve, but the actual work was performed off the reserve.

He objected to the income tax assessment on his wages, claiming exemption under section 87 of the Indian Act, which exempts the personal property of an Indian situated on a reserve from taxation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that income is personal property, and a tax on income is a tax in respect of personal property.

Therefore, the appellant's wages were exempt from taxation.

The appellant lost his employment due to a work stoppage and subsequently found full-time secondary employment, from which he was later laid off.

His claim for unemployment benefits was initially rejected.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed his appeal, following its concurrent decision in Abrahams v. Attorney General of Canada regarding the interpretation of 'regularly engaged in some other occupation' under section 44(1)(c) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The appellant was charged under a Calgary municipal by-law for being on a street for the purpose of prostitution.

She challenged the constitutional validity of the by-law, arguing it invaded the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the by-law was ultra vires the province and the municipality, as its pith and substance was an attempt to control or punish prostitution rather than to regulate street use or public nuisance.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellant insurer paid the maximum amount of its policy ($35,000) plus legal interest and costs following a judgment against its insured for a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer refused to pay the additional indemnity awarded under the second paragraph of article 1056c of the Civil Code, arguing its contract only required payment of 'interest'.

The respondent brought a garnishment proceeding against the insurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the additional indemnity under article 1056c is of the same nature as the interest mentioned in the first paragraph (damages for delay) and is therefore included in the interest the insurer undertook to pay under the policy.

The appellant, a Polish citizen, claimed Convention refugee status after overstaying his visitor's visa in Canada.

The Minister determined he was not a Convention refugee, and the Immigration Appeal Board refused to allow his application for redetermination to proceed under s. 71 of the Immigration Act, 1976.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his application for review.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued the Board applied too strict a test.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the correct test under s. 71 is whether it is more likely than not (a balance of probabilities) that the applicant will be able to establish his claim at a full hearing, rejecting the lower threshold of a 'seriously arguable' case.

The appellant was granted a permit to discharge sewage, which was cancelled by the Pollution Control Board.

The Lieutenant-Governor in Council restored the permit on appeal.

The respondents successfully challenged the appellate jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council in the lower courts as offending s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellate authority of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council was intertwined with its administrative and policy-making functions, and therefore did not constitute a s. 96 court.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving based partly on the opinion evidence of police officers who testified that his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The appellant appealed, arguing that non-expert witnesses should not be permitted to give opinion evidence on the very issue the court had to decide.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that non-expert witnesses, including police officers and laypersons, may give opinion evidence regarding a person's degree of intoxication and impairment.

The Court reasoned that such evidence is admissible as a compendious way of stating facts that are too difficult to narrate individually, and that the trier of fact is free to determine the weight to be given to such opinions.

The appellant employer sought evocation of a labour arbitration award that substituted a suspension for an employee's dismissal under a collective agreement governed by the Canada Labour Code.

The central issue was whether the arbitrator was a statutory tribunal within art. 846 C.C.P. and therefore subject to the Superior Court's superintending jurisdiction.

The Court held that, because the Code conferred broad statutory powers and duties on the arbitrator, the tribunal was statutory notwithstanding the parties' ability to choose arbitration as a dispute-resolution method.

The allegations that the arbitrator refused to hear admissible and relevant evidence had to be taken as true at the authorization stage and disclosed an excess or refusal of jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed and issuance of a writ of evocation was authorized.

The appellant, a lawyer, was charged with theft and criminal breach of trust for misusing clients' trust funds.

He was convicted of theft but acquitted of criminal breach of trust at trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, entering convictions for criminal breach of trust, and applied the Kienapple principle to acquit on the theft charges.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, affirming that the trial judge erred in law regarding the intent to defraud in criminal breach of trust.

Lamer J. noted that in the future, the Kienapple principle should result in a stay of proceedings rather than an acquittal.

The Corporation of the City of Barrie brought a motion to vary the minutes of judgment as settled.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion, amending the Certificate of Order of the Ontario Court of Appeal to reflect that the court erred in refusing to permit cross-examination on the statement of policy of the Government of Ontario.

The appeal was allowed in part, with the appellant entitled to costs in the Supreme Court.

The appellant sought foreclosure on a mortgage executed by the respondents.

The respondents had signed the mortgage without reading it, relying on a third party's misrepresentation that it was a minor amendment to an existing mortgage.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the defence of non est factum is not available to a person who fails to exercise reasonable care in signing a document, as against an innocent party who relies on that document in good faith and for value.

The appeal was allowed and the previous Supreme Court decision in Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Cugnet was overturned.

The parties separated after nineteen years of marriage and agreed on an equal division of family assets.

The wife claimed a share of the husband's non-family assets, specifically Bell Canada shares and an RRSP acquired during the marriage.

The trial judge awarded her $20,000 under s. 8 of The Family Law Reform Act, which the Court of Appeal set aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the wife's financial contribution to the pooling of family finances entitled her to a $10,000 share of the non-family assets under s. 8, without needing to rely on constructive or resulting trust doctrines.

The Government of Quebec referred a question to the Quebec Court of Appeal asking whether its consent was constitutionally required, by convention, for the adoption of a resolution to amend the Canadian Constitution in a way that affected its legislative competence or status.

The Court of Appeal answered in the negative, and Quebec appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments.

The Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that there is no conventional rule of unanimity among the provinces, and found that Quebec failed to demonstrate that the other political actors had recognized or accepted a specific conventional veto power for Quebec.

The appellant contractor entered into a contract with the Crown to build a dam.

The contractor encountered soil conditions significantly different from those indicated in the plans, leading to increased dewatering costs, and also faced delays due to additional work ordered by the Crown.

The contractor sued for additional costs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the contractor could not recover for the soil mistake because it failed to give the required notice under the contract.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, awarding the contractor compensation for the costs of delays caused by the additional work, as provided by the contract's clauses on extra work.

The appellant, a former Premier and Minister of Newfoundland, was subpoenaed to give oral and documentary evidence at an investigation by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission into a corporation.

The appellant sought an injunction to prevent the subpoena, claiming Crown privilege, cabinet secrecy, and that he was not a compellable witness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a former minister does not have absolute testimonial immunity or blanket immunity from producing documents.

The Court affirmed the rule of relative immunity, holding that the courts, not the former minister, must determine whether specific disclosures would be injurious to the public interest.

The appellant police association appealed a decision quashing an arbitration award that included a collective agreement clause reimbursing officers for legal expenses incurred from criminal or statutory charges flowing from their duties.

The lower courts held that the clause interfered with the statutory discretion granted to the municipality under s. 24(6) of The Police Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the permissive power to indemnify in s. 24(6) did not preclude the establishment of a collective bargaining regime under s. 29(2) regarding working conditions.

The respondent's driver's licence was revoked following a Criminal Code conviction, but reinstated pending his appeal.

After his appeal was dismissed, he continued to drive, mistakenly believing he was entitled to do so until he received official notification from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

He was charged with driving while his licence was cancelled under the provincial Motor Vehicle Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the offence is one of strict liability, the respondent's mistake was one of law, not fact.

As ignorance of the law is not an excuse and there was no evidence of officially induced error, the Court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellants sought to adopt a child who was placed in their home by the Director of Child Welfare.

Seven days before the six-month probationary period expired, the Director removed the child based on unfounded allegations of abuse.

The Adoption Appeal Board refused to hear the appellants' appeal, and the lower courts dismissed their habeas corpus application, finding the statute provided a complete code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the lack of a statutory appeal created a legislative gap.

The Court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to fill this gap and ordered the adoption of the child by the appellants, finding it was in the child's best interests.