Erin Hoult

The applicant sought a confidentiality order to redact certain documents in the Record of Original Proceeding for his application to review IIROC decisions.

The Tribunal granted the agreed-upon redactions concerning the applicant's intimate personal medical information.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the applicant's contested requests to redact his doctor's professional contact information and a letter of reprimand from his former employer, finding that neither met the standard required to depart from the principle of open proceedings.

Following a merits decision finding the respondents engaged in unregistered trading and advising regarding contracts for difference (CFDs), the Capital Markets Tribunal held a sanctions hearing.

The Tribunal imposed 10-year market participation bans, an administrative penalty of $250,000, disgorgement of $430,192.50 representing profit-sharing fees and commission rebates, and costs of $200,000.

The Tribunal rejected the respondents' arguments that they did not benefit financially because they subsequently lost the profits in the market, and found their evidence of impecuniosity incomplete.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order appointing a receiver and manager for Go-To Developments Holdings Inc. and related entities, and continuing freeze directions, following an Ontario Securities Commission investigation into alleged securities law breaches, including misappropriation of investor funds by Oscar Furtado.

The appellants challenged the application judge's denial of an adjournment and the admission of Mr. Furtado's examination transcripts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the adjournment denial, especially in light of fresh evidence demonstrating further misconduct by Mr. Furtado.

The court declined to address the admissibility of transcripts as the issue was not raised below.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission alleged that the respondents engaged in the business of trading and advising in securities without registration by operating a contract for difference (CFD) trading program.

The respondents argued that CFDs were not securities and that they merely acted as employees executing trades.

The Commission found that the CFDs were investment contracts and therefore securities.

The Commission further held that the respondents engaged in acts in furtherance of trades, exercised discretionary authority over investor accounts, and provided advice on CFD trading for a business purpose, thereby breaching the registration requirements under the Securities Act.

Allegations regarding a breach of a prior undertaking were dismissed due to the undertaking's lack of clarity.

The appellant, a real estate development company, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents regarding a request for proposals for the redevelopment of Toronto waterfront property.

The appellant's proposal was disqualified for listing an ineligible person as an advisor.

When the appellant requested reconsideration, the sponsors declined to rescind the disqualification.

The appellant argued the sponsors owed a duty of fairness in the reconsideration process and that the fairness monitor was inadequately involved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfairness in the reconsideration process on a factual basis, without deciding the legal question of whether a duty of fairness was owed.

The plaintiff, CG Acquisition Inc., commenced an action against P1 Consulting Inc., Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corporation (IO), and the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) after being disqualified from a Request for Proposal (RFP) process.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss CG's claim, which was framed in tort, alleging breach of a common law duty of fairness and negligent investigation/service provision during the reconsideration of its disqualification.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no freestanding duty of fairness or care owed to a non-compliant bidder, and that the defendants' actions during reconsideration were reasonable and protected by a limitation of liability clause in the RFP.

The plaintiff, AstraZeneca Canada Inc., applied for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging a sophisticated fraud scheme involving duplicate claims and inflated drug reimbursements under AstraZeneca's patient programs.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud based on multiple suspicious factors, including a significant presence of duplicate claims, a large spike in reimbursement volumes, unusual drug claim patterns, lack of corresponding drug purchases, and frustrated audit attempts.

Applying the five requirements for a Mareva injunction, the court found full and frank disclosure, fulsome particulars of the claim, sufficient assets in Ontario, and a serious risk of asset dissipation due to the defendants' evasive actions (e.g., avoiding audits, sudden business closure, sale of an expensive car, and travel).

The balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, and there was a risk of irreparable harm without the injunction.

A worldwide injunction was granted against the individual defendants and most corporate defendants, with Shepherd RX Pharmacy Inc. temporarily excluded due to insufficient evidence at this stage.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission alleged that the respondent dealers failed to establish sufficient controls and supervision, resulting in clients paying excess fees.

The dealers self-reported the inadequacies, co-operated with Staff, and agreed to pay approximately $11 million in compensation to affected clients, along with voluntary payments totalling $490,000.

The Commission approved the no-contest settlement, finding it in the public interest given the prompt self-reporting, remediation efforts, and significant compensation paid to clients.

The third parties, EMK, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' third party claim for contribution and indemnity arising from a fire at a poultry processing plant.

EMK also sought a declaration that Belgian law governed the contract for the sale of a boiler to the defendants.

The court applied the closest and most substantial connection test and determined that Belgian law governed the contract.

However, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that a fair and just determination of whether EMK had knowledge of the alleged defects under the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods could not be made prior to the trial of the main action, as it risked inconsistent findings of fact.

The applicant university brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent sports organization from releasing a tribunal decision regarding a football player's eligibility.

The applicant argued that the parties had previously reached a settlement agreement wherein the respondent agreed not to pursue the eligibility complaint.

The court found it had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement under contract law.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found a strong prima facie case of a binding settlement, irreparable harm to the players and the university's reputation if the injunction was denied, and the balance of convenience favoured the applicant.

The interlocutory injunction was granted.

The appellant, an Ontario-based multi-national enterprise, appealed a motion judge's finding that Ontario law governed its contract with the respondent, an Alberta corporation.

The contract, which lacked a choice of law clause, was for the design and sale of a fryer and oven system that allegedly caused a fire at the respondent's plant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's application of the 'closest and most real connection' test, agreeing that the nature, subject matter, and place of performance of the contract favoured Ontario, as the system was designed and its components ordered there.

The appeal was dismissed.

Enforcement Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission brought a motion to admit into evidence selected excerpts from transcripts of compelled examinations of the respondents conducted pursuant to section 13 of the Securities Act.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the admission of compelled testimony violated the Securities Act, the Evidence Act, the Charter, and principles of procedural fairness.

One respondent also brought a cross-motion seeking a confidentiality order for the motion materials.

The Commission held that compelled testimony is admissible in regulatory proceedings and is not precluded by the Charter or the Evidence Act.

However, to ensure fairness and obtain the best evidence, the Commission directed that Staff may only tender the transcripts at the conclusion of its case for those respondents who do not undertake to testify, with a limited exception for proving allegations of misleading statements.

The Commission also granted the cross-motion, ordering the motion materials to remain confidential while releasing the decision publicly.

The moving defendants brought a Rule 22 motion seeking determination of whether Ontario or Alberta law governed the plaintiff’s contractual and tort claims arising from a fire allegedly caused by a defective fryer and oven system supplied to an Alberta poultry processing plant.

The parties agreed that if Alberta law governed the tort claims, the claims would be statute‑barred under Alberta’s ultimate limitation period.

Applying the lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson v. Jensen, the court held that Alberta law governed the tort claims because the damage occurred in Alberta, and therefore those claims were dismissed as statute‑barred.

However, applying the “closest and most real connection” test for contractual choice of law, the court found the contract was most closely connected to Ontario, where the system was designed and supplied.

Ontario law therefore governed the contractual claims.

The appellants, acting as mortgagees, sold a 130-acre commercial property under power of sale for $12.5 million.

The trial judge found the fair market value was $16 million and awarded the respondent mortgagor $3.5 million in damages for an improvident sale, noting the appellants failed to adequately market the property or allow meaningful due diligence by potential buyers.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding bad faith, imposing liability without expert evidence of appraiser negligence, and calculating damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct legal test regarding the mortgagee's duty to take reasonable precautions to obtain fair market value and made no palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings.

Following the offender's guilty pleas to fraud and money laundering, the Crown brought a forfeiture application.

Two third parties, Picard Foods Ltd. and SNC-Lavalin Profac Inc., claimed interests in the proceeds of the sale of a property.

In a previous ruling, the court found Picard was entitled to a portion of the municipal service costs.

In this final ruling, the court fixed the principal amount owing to Picard at $72,690.29, excluding carrying costs, with 10% interest payable from June 21, 2008.

The court dismissed Picard's application for costs against the Crown and ProFac, finding no Crown misconduct or exceptional circumstances to justify a costs award to a bystander in a criminal proceeding.

In six Ontario libel actions tied to statements posted by a U.S. company and later republished in Ontario newspapers, the appellants argued Ontario lacked jurisdiction or should defer to Illinois.

The Court held that defamation was presumptively connected to Ontario because publication occurred there through reading, downloading, and republication.

It concluded the appellants did not rebut jurisdiction and did not prove Illinois was clearly the more appropriate forum under forum non conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the respondents for defamation over a newspaper article reporting on a costs award against him and fraud charges against his former client.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim regarding the costs award report based on common law privilege, but allowed the claim regarding the remaining words to proceed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in bifurcating the claim, but agreed that the report of the costs award was protected by privilege.

The Court further held that coupling the report of the costs award with the report of the client's fraud charges was not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning linking the appellant to the fraud.

The appeal was allowed to set aside the motion judge's order, and the action was dismissed in its entirety.

The respondent, Conrad Black, brought libel actions in Ontario against the directors and advisors of a U.S. company for statements posted on the company's website.

The appellants moved to stay the actions, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction or was forum non conveniens.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Van Breda test and upheld the motion judge's finding that the alleged tort was committed in Ontario, establishing a presumptive real and substantial connection.

The court found no unfairness in requiring the appellants to defend the actions in Ontario, as the statements were targeted at Canadian media and the respondent's reputation was damaged there.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants brought a defamation action against the respondent newspaper and reporter over an article concerning a proposed private golf course development and alleged political influence.

At trial, the jury found for the appellants and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial, recognizing a new defence of responsible journalism.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, formally recognizing the new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.

The Court held that the traditional strict liability regime for defamatory statements of fact failed to adequately protect freedom of expression under the Charter.

The new defence applies where the publication is on a matter of public interest and the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegations.

A new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's failure to leave this defence to the jury and errors in the fair comment instruction.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a Defence Fee Funding Protocol, arguing they should have access to further frozen assets to pay legal costs after their bank account was depleted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the protocol's wording specifically limited access to the bank account and did not extend to assets subject to a proprietary claim.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the appellants' access to $3,500 per month for living expenses from all frozen assets was also dismissed.