Ellen M. MacDonald

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his reprisal complaint against his employer, the TTC.

The Board had consolidated the hearing of the applicant's reprisal complaint with a motion brought by the TTC to state a case for contempt against the applicant.

The Divisional Court held that consolidating the two proceedings violated the principles of fundamental justice and procedural fairness, as it forced the applicant to defend against quasi-criminal contempt allegations while pursuing his reprisal claim, leading to adverse inferences when he chose not to testify.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter remitted to a differently-constituted panel.

The appellant, an indigent litigant, appealed the dismissal of his motion for a declaration that Small Claims Court fees violate the Charter and the common law right of access to justice.

The Divisional Court held that while poverty is not an analogous ground under s. 15(1) of the Charter and the fees do not violate s. 7, the absence of a statutory provision allowing for the waiver of fees for indigent persons with meritorious claims violates the common law constitutional right of access to justice.

The Court ordered that a statutory amendment be enacted to permit proceedings in forma pauperis in the Small Claims Court.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion to add a third party as a defendant in a snowmobile accident claim.

The Master had dismissed the motion due to case management delays and found the proposed claim untenable in law.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by relying on an outdated timetable and by concluding the proposed pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff was granted leave to add the third party as a defendant.

The appellant, a non-profit housing co-operative, appealed a decision dismissing its application to terminate the respondent's membership and occupancy rights.

The respondent was overhoused in a two-bedroom unit and had refused three offers to relocate to a one-bedroom unit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the co-operative had complied with its by-laws and the Co-operative Corporations Act in terminating the membership of the respondent's former roommate and in requiring the respondent to downsize.

The court issued a declaration terminating the respondent's rights and granted a writ of possession.

The applicant, an African-Canadian male, sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer his complaint against the University of Toronto Faculty of Law to a board of inquiry.

The applicant alleged that the law school's reliance on LSAT scores for admission constituted systemic discrimination against African-Canadians.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable, as it had considered extensive evidence showing the law school used a holistic admissions policy rather than strict numerical cut-offs.

The court also dismissed claims of procedural unfairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board confirming the assessed value of its two senior citizen apartment buildings.

The appellant argued the Board erred by relying on actual rents that included fees for non-realty services rather than fair market rents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the Board made no error of law and that the appellant failed to discharge its onus under section 60(1) of the Assessment Act to prove the assessment was inequitable compared to similar properties in the vicinity.

The appellant, a mortgagee in possession, sought to terminate a fixed-term residential tenancy before the end of the term in order to sell the property.

The appellant served a 60-day notice of termination pursuant to the Mortgages Act and the Tenant Protection Act, 1997.

The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the Tenant Protection Act's requirement that a fixed-term tenancy only be terminated at the end of the term prevailed over the Mortgages Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a mortgagee in possession cannot terminate a fixed-term tenancy prior to the end of the fixed term.

The plaintiff was successful on her appeal regarding interim support and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $17,603.93.

The defendants argued the requested amount was excessive and suggested $4,355.00.

The Divisional Court agreed the plaintiff's bill of costs was excessive, disallowed disbursements for the motion for leave to appeal, and reduced travel expenses.

The court fixed costs in favour of the plaintiff at $6,500 for fees inclusive of GST, plus $1,376.25 in disbursements.

The mother of a Crown ward brought a motion to increase her access under section 58 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society objected, arguing that because the child had lived with the same foster family for over two years, the mother was required to seek a status review under section 64 and obtain leave under subsection 64(5).

The motion judge ruled that section 58 provides a stand-alone route for access variations.

The Society appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a party seeking merely to vary an access order to a long-term Crown ward may apply directly under section 58 and is not required to embark upon a status review.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Ontario Human Rights Commission refusing to deal with his age discrimination complaint on the basis that it was filed outside the six-month limitation period.

The applicant argued that the Commission breached the rules of natural justice by providing insufficient reasons and that its decision was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's screening function attracts a standard of patent unreasonableness, the reasons provided were adequate for an administrative screening decision, and the decision to dismiss the complaint for untimeliness was supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed a Master's order granting summary judgment in favour of the respondent defendants in a multi-vehicle accident case.

The Master had dismissed the claims against the respondents, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding their liability.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that conflicting evidence regarding the number of impacts and the sequence of collisions raised genuine issues for trial that should not be resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The appellant tenant appealed an eviction order and the subsequent refusal of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal to re-open a review hearing.

The tenant had failed to attend the initial review hearing because he was hospitalized for psychiatric care.

The Divisional Court found that the tribunal's refusal to consider the tenant's medical inability to attend constituted a denial of natural justice.

The Court extended the time to appeal the original order, set aside the order denying the review request, and ordered a rehearing.

The appellant pharmacists were shareholders and directors of a corporation convicted of income tax evasion related to undeclared volume rebates from drug companies.

The Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists found them guilty of professional misconduct for engaging in conduct relevant to the practice of pharmacy that would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful, dishonourable, or unprofessional.

On appeal, the Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Committee's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the appellants' participation in the tax evasion scheme reflected adversely on the profession and constituted conduct relevant to the practice of pharmacy.

The City of Ottawa passed a by-law establishing new ward boundaries for upcoming municipal elections.

Three residents' associations appealed the by-law to the Ontario Municipal Board.

The Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing issued a Notice of Deferral under s. 25 of the Municipal Act, staying the appeal.

The City brought an application for judicial review to quash the Notice.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Minister's power to defer applications under s. 25 did not extend to appeals of municipal by-laws under s. 13.1(2).

The Notice of Deferral was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The husband appealed and the wife cross-appealed interim spousal support orders.

The parties had signed a separation agreement containing a spousal support release, alongside an employment contract for the wife in the husband's company.

The husband's company subsequently terminated the wife's employment.

The Divisional Court found that the employment contract implicitly functioned as a support provision.

Applying the Miglin framework, the court held that the wife's termination constituted a material change in circumstances entitling her to interim support.

The court set aside the lower court's orders and fixed interim spousal support at $800 weekly.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Hearing Officer's decision declaring jurisdiction to proceed with a hearing regarding an amended Plan for the Niagara Escarpment Planning Area.

The applicants argued that an investigation and survey under s. 3(2) of the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act was a condition precedent to amending the Plan following a boundary alteration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the statutory requirement for an investigation and survey only applied when the Area was originally established, not for subsequent boundary amendments.

The father applied to reduce his child support obligations, claiming the child was in his custody for at least 40 percent of the time.

The motions judge granted the application and reduced the support retroactively, without making findings on income or analyzing the factors under section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The mother appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the principles from Francis v. Baker apply to all statutory exceptions under the Guidelines, requiring a presumption in favour of the Guidelines amount and clear and compelling evidence to justify a deviation.

The original support order was restored.

The appellant mortgage portfolio manager appealed a trial judgment that dismissed its claim for investment losses allegedly caused by a land registry error.

The registry had failed to register a second mortgage against the correct property, which the appellant claimed affected its decision to advance loan money.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant suffered no loss as a result of the registration error and that the appellant got what it bargained for.

The defendant appealed a jury trial judgment regarding liability for a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant argued the trial judge erred in his jury charge and sought to rely on allegations of negligence against third parties to reduce his liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the defendant could not rely on third party negligence after having previously settled and dismissed the third party claim on consent without claiming contribution or indemnity against the plaintiff.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the applicants' judicial review application for delay.

The Divisional Court acknowledged substantial delay but found the applicants' unchallenged explanations supported permitting the matter to continue.

The court noted the respondent had not demonstrated prejudice and had taken no prior steps to address the delay.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the court directed the matter to proceed on the merits.