Douglas G. Christie

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against their long-time accountant and his corporation for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

The accountant had advised the plaintiffs to invest over $1 million in his own unregistered pooled mortgage fund, granting his corporation absolute discretion over the funds without disclosing the lack of regulatory safeguards or advising them to seek independent legal advice.

The court found the accountant and his corporation breached their fiduciary duties and contracts, and awarded restitutionary damages of $1,074,716 plus substantial indemnity costs.

Following a motion concerning whether to set aside a default judgment or reduce an interest rate, the court had awarded costs to the plaintiff.

After judgment, the defendants argued that a prior Rule 49 offer to settle matched the result and therefore disentitled the plaintiff to costs while entitling the defendants to their costs of the motion.

The court held that the cost consequences regime under Rule 49.10 does not apply to motions to set aside default judgments in the same manner as trial judgments.

The defendants therefore could not rely on the offer to alter the costs determination.

The previously ordered costs award in favour of the plaintiff was confirmed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision and the associated award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's findings of fact.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and substituted an award of partial indemnity costs, as the parties had not made submissions on costs and there was no basis for substantial indemnity costs.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and, alternatively, sought security for costs under Rule 56.01(d).

The court held that a pleading need not expressly name a cause of action provided it pleads sufficient material facts to support a recognized legal claim.

While the claim adequately pleaded causes of action including knowing assistance and inducing breach of contract, the allegation of fraud was materially deficient because it failed to provide particularized allegations against each moving party as required by Rule 25.06(8).

The court struck the fraud allegation with leave to amend but dismissed the remainder of the motion.

The request for security for costs was also dismissed because the evidence of a small PPSR registration did not establish good reason to believe the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets to satisfy a potential costs award.

The plaintiff brought an action against a developer for breach of a partnership agreement and included several co-owners of the development project as defendants, alleging they were trustees de son tort who knowingly received trust funds.

The co-owner defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

The court found no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the moving defendants, and no evidence that they knowingly assisted in a breach of trust or received more than their proportionate share of profits.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action against the moving defendants was dismissed.

Following dismissal of a motion for an interlocutory injunction, the respondent municipality sought costs against the unsuccessful applicant.

The applicant argued she should be treated as a public interest litigant and shielded from adverse costs due to limited financial means and alleged broader public importance of the litigation.

The court held that public interest status does not exempt litigants from ordinary cost rules and found the case did not meet the recognized criteria for public interest litigation.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court awarded partial indemnity costs but reduced the claimed amount due to concerns that the municipality’s bill included costs related to other steps in the proceeding.

Costs were fixed at $4,700 payable forthwith.

A municipal resident brought a motion under s.273(4) of the Municipal Act, 2001 seeking an interlocutory order restraining the city from continuing stormwater management construction associated with the abandonment of a municipal drain.

The applicant argued that the by-law abandoning the drain was invalid because the city failed to follow public consultation procedures allegedly required by its Official Plan after an environmental impact study was prepared.

The court held that the traditional three-part test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald applies to relief sought under s.273(4).

Although the applicant raised a serious issue to be tried, she failed to establish irreparable harm and the balance of convenience strongly favoured the municipality due to substantial financial and contractual consequences of halting ongoing construction.

The motion for interlocutory injunctive relief was dismissed.

The applicant, a medical resident, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by the respondent university.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had commenced a civil action in the Superior Court of Justice raising the same allegations and seeking similar remedies.

The Tribunal found that the civil action and the human rights application relied on the same facts, alleged identical human rights contraventions, and sought analogous remedies.

Consequently, section 34(11) acted as an absolute jurisdictional bar, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant, a medical resident, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by the respondents.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had commenced a civil action in the Superior Court of Justice raising the same allegations and seeking similar remedies.

The Tribunal found that the civil action and the human rights application relied on the same facts, alleged identical human rights contraventions, and sought analogous remedies.

Consequently, section 34(11) acted as an absolute jurisdictional bar, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by the respondent university's medical residency program.

The respondent requested the dismissal of the application under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the applicant had commenced a civil action seeking remedies for the same alleged human rights infringements.

The Tribunal found that the civil action and the human rights application relied on the same facts, alleged identical human rights contraventions, and sought analogous remedies.

Consequently, the Tribunal determined it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the application.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in her medical residency program from 2003 to 2009.

The respondents argued that allegations prior to June 2009 were out of time.

The Tribunal found that allegations from 2003 to 2008 were discrete events with significant temporal gaps, did not form a series of incidents, and the delay was not incurred in good faith.

However, the Tribunal found that allegations from December 2008 onwards formed a series of incidents connected to timely allegations and were within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The applicant, a medical resident dismissed from the respondent's neurosurgery program, brought an application for judicial review alleging breaches of natural justice and his Charter right to freedom of expression.

He brought a motion to amend his Notice of Application to add a request for a Charter declaration and to admit fresh affidavit evidence.

The court granted the amendment, finding it was not an independent claim but a request for a declaration regarding the decision under review.

The court partially admitted the affidavit evidence, allowing portions that demonstrated a potential breach of natural justice or met the test for fresh evidence, while excluding irrelevant or repetitive paragraphs.

The respondents brought a Request for Order During Proceedings to remove six individual respondents from a human rights application, arguing they were unnecessary parties as the institutional respondent accepted vicarious liability for their actions.

The applicant consented to the removal of two individuals but opposed the removal of the remaining four.

Applying the factors from Persaud, the Tribunal found no compelling reason to continue the proceeding against the individuals, as the institutional respondent was capable of remedying any infringement and leaving them as parties would unnecessarily complicate the process.

The request was granted and all personal respondents were removed.

The parties arbitrated their family law dispute, resulting in an award requiring the husband to pay an equalization payment out of his share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

The husband subsequently made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The motion judge incorporated the arbitration award into a court order and granted the wife priority over the husband's unsecured creditors, finding the award created an equitable trust.

The motion judge also ordered the transfer of the husband's bankruptcy-exempt RRSP to the wife.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitration award did not effect a division of property or impose an equitable trust or assignment that would defeat the bankruptcy scheme.

The Court also set aside the RRSP transfer, as no such relief was claimed in the arbitration and the motion judge erred in using enforcement proceedings to grant a new proprietary remedy.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding a finding of professional misconduct and a penalty of a seven-month suspension and $50,000 in costs.

The misconduct arose from an estate matter where the appellant provided legal and administrative services, having the client enter into a compensation agreement with his corporation without independent legal advice.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was in a clear conflict of interest and that the penalty was within the reasonable range.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to amend their statement of claim to add a conspiracy claim.

The motion to amend was served before the expiry of the limitation period but was not heard until after it had expired due to inordinate delay.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the parties' rights crystallized on the date the motion was served.

Since the motion was served within the limitation period and the proposed amended pleading was sufficient in law, the amendment was permitted despite the delay.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from a dismissed motion for summary judgment, the court determined the issue of costs.

On consent, no costs were awarded for the motion for leave to appeal or the appeal itself.

Regarding the underlying motion for summary judgment, the court declined to award costs to the successful respondent because it had failed to file a key affidavit for tactical reasons.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order dismissing a motion for judgment on executed Minutes of Settlement.

The motions judge had found genuine issues for trial but then added inconsistent reasons stating he would have found in favour of the applicant if he was in error.

The Divisional Court held that the primary finding of genuine issues for trial was supported by the evidence and dismissed the appeal, noting the subsequent comments were unnecessary and beyond the judge's jurisdiction on a Rule 49.09 motion.

The appellant's home was fraudulently transferred to an impostor who then mortgaged the property to the respondent.

The respondent registered the mortgage without knowledge of the fraud.

The appellant sought to set aside the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal held that the Land Titles Act operates on the theory of deferred indefeasibility.

Because the respondent acquired its interest directly from the fraudster, it was an intermediate owner and its charge was invalid against the true owner.

The appeal was allowed and the mortgage was set aside.

The appellant property owners appealed the dismissal of their action against a former property manager for alleged misappropriation of flea market revenues, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the evidence of misappropriation amounted only to suspicion and that the manager owed no duty of care regarding the flea market's operation.

The Court also affirmed the trial judge's discretionary refusal to order disgorgement of profits from the manager's undisclosed outside business activities, noting the employer suffered no damages and the manager had performed his duties satisfactorily.