Douglas A. Fenton

The Court of Appeal considered appeals regarding the priority of claims in the receivership of Bridging Finance Inc. and its investment funds.

The motion judge had previously granted priority to Statutory Rescission Claims but denied it to Redemption Claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by Redemption Claimants, affirming that their claims had not crystallized and were subject to Bridging's discretion, thus lacking priority.

It allowed the appeal by General Unitholders, reversing the priority granted to Statutory Rescission Claims.

The court held that neither the language of the Ontario Securities Act (s. 130.1) nor the inherent nature of the rescission remedy provided a basis for statutory or de facto priority.

Consequently, the court ordered that all Unitholders, including Redemption Claimants, Statutory Rescission Claimants, and General Unitholders, shall rank pari passu with respect to the distribution of proceeds from the Bridging Funds.

The Plaintiffs, Anson Advisors Inc. and Moez Kassam, brought a motion for default judgment against Andrew Rudensky for defamation, seeking $500,000 in general damages and a permanent injunction.

Rudensky, who had been noted in default and had largely ignored the proceedings, appeared at the last minute to request an adjournment, which was denied.

The court found that the facts pleaded in the Amended Claim, deemed admitted by Rudensky's default, established the tort of defamation.

Considering the extensive and malicious nature of the online publications, the plaintiffs' professional standing, and the defendant's persistent and evasive conduct, the court awarded $450,000 in general damages and granted a permanent injunction to prevent further defamatory publications.

Costs were also awarded to the plaintiffs.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Commercial List, addressed two issues in a case conference: a proposed motion by the defendants to amend their Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, and a proposed anti-SLAPP motion.

The court granted leave to amend the pleading by consent.

However, the court declined to schedule the anti-SLAPP motion, finding it untimely given the action was nearly three years old and significant litigation steps had already occurred.

The court emphasized that anti-SLAPP motions are screening devices meant for early stages, not surrogates for summary judgment or trial, and that the evidence relied upon for timeliness was available much earlier.

The parties were directed to agree on a case management timetable to prepare for trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising" s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order regarding the admissibility and production of compelled evidence in a civil contempt motion arising from alleged breaches of a Mareva order.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the motion judge's decision that answers to undertakings and further document production could not be compelled while the contempt motion was outstanding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that evidence compelled prior to the contempt motion was admissible and did not violate sections 7, 11(c), or 13 of the Charter.

However, the court allowed the cross-appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in prematurely ruling on the admissibility of future answers to undertakings and in deferring the production motion.

The court held that the obligation to comply with the Mareva order continues despite the contempt motion, and admissibility should be determined when the evidence is tendered, based on whether the contempt motion is predominantly coercive or penal.

This appeal concerned the constitutional validity of Ontario's third-party election spending limits, specifically the extension of the pre-writ restricted period from 6 to 12 months without increasing the spending cap.

The appellants argued this infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause (s. 33).

The Court of Appeal found that while s. 33 was properly invoked, the extended spending restrictions were not "carefully tailored" and did not permit a "modest informational campaign" thereby infringing the s. 3 right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the impugned provision invalid and suspended the declaration for 12 months.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision to assume jurisdiction over foreign defendants in a complex international fraud and conspiracy case.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) alleged that a Toronto resident orchestrated a scheme to misappropriate billions of dollars from Saudi Arabian corporations and dissipate them globally, with the assistance of family members and various corporate entities.

The appellants (foreign defendants) challenged Ontario's jurisdiction, arguing a lack of real and substantial connection.

The motion judge found jurisdiction based on contracts made in Ontario (including a gift deed central to the alleged scheme), property located in Ontario, and the tort of conspiracy being committed in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding factual errors or legal errors in applying the Van Breda test for jurisdiction, and dismissed the appeal.

The defendant, Dr. Saad, sought a declaratory order that evidence he would provide in support of a renewed motion to stay the action would be inadmissible in a pending contempt proceeding against him, relying on the s. 13 Charter right against self-incrimination.

The Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the evidence was not compelled and the proceedings were not "other proceedings." The court dismissed Dr. Saad's motion, holding that his evidence on the stay motion was not statutorily compelled, and therefore s. 13 of the Charter was not engaged.

The court clarified that the proper time to seek use immunity would be at the contempt hearing itself.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of an application.

The respondent, The Kraft Heinz Company, sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing that they had made a more favourable offer to settle and that the applicant, The Corporation of the Township of South Stormont, had been less than fully candid.

The Township conceded costs but disputed the substantial indemnity scale, arguing the offer was not Rule 49 compliant and denying any sanctionable conduct.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the offer not sufficiently fixed or understandable for Rule 49.10 consequences and no conduct worthy of sanction.

The court also found the time claimed by both sides somewhat excessive and the hourly rates suggested by the respondent's counsel too high for the Ottawa region.