Diane Condo

The defendants, including several condominium board members and the condominium corporation, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim.

The court found that several paragraphs attempted to relitigate issues already decided in a prior application between the parties, and thus were barred by issue estoppel.

Furthermore, the court struck the remaining allegations against the individual board members, finding the plaintiff failed to plead material facts establishing that the directors acted outside their corporate duties or exhibited a separate identity of interest to attract personal liability.

The motion to strike was granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime, challenging the search warrant for his home.

He argued the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination of the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and that the ITO lacked sufficient information to justify the warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly restricted cross-examination to avoid a fishing expedition and that the corroborated information from a confidential informant, combined with surveillance evidence, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault against his spouse following a trial involving only the complainant and the accused as witnesses.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework from R. v. W. (D.), misapprehended the accused’s evidence, and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The reviewing court found that the trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and treated portions of the accused’s testimony as an acknowledgment of assault without fully considering whether the accused’s evidence, taken as a whole, could raise a reasonable doubt.

This approach effectively turned the case into a credibility contest and curtailed a proper W. (D.) analysis.

The conviction and accompanying DNA order were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused brought an application to exclude intercepted communications obtained pursuant to two Part VI authorizations under the Criminal Code and to exclude evidence obtained from two search warrants issued under section 487 of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the sufficiency of grounds, investigative necessity, and alleged bias on the part of the issuing Justice of the Peace.

The court found that the first authorization had sufficient grounds and that investigative necessity was established.

However, the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias due to a familial and commercial connection between the accused and the issuing Justice of the Peace.

While the search warrants were found to be invalid due to this bias, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not serve the interests of justice given the good faith of police and the serious nature of the charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to reopen the defence case to permit testimony from the complainant’s daughter.

The proposed witness lived with the complainant and the accused during the relevant period and was said to possess relevant evidence regarding whether the complainant actually feared the accused.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapprehended the relevance of the proposed evidence and improperly imposed a due diligence requirement when applying the test for reopening evidence established in R. v. Hayward.

The daughter’s evidence was potentially significant to the key element of whether the accused’s conduct caused the complainant to fear for her safety.

The refusal to reopen the evidence created the potential for a miscarriage of justice.

The accused were charged with offences under sections 86(3), 88(2), and 91(3) of the Criminal Code.

The trial commenced with an application challenging the validity of a search warrant obtained by Ottawa Police on February 4, 2011, to search the residence at 24 Robinson Avenue.

The applicant argued the warrant was obtained without reasonable and probable grounds, that the affidavit contained misleading statements, and that the statutory preconditions for a telewarrant were not met.

The court found that the telewarrant was invalid due to lack of urgency and impracticability, that the information from confidential informants was insufficiently reliable and detailed, and that the affidavit contained careless and misleading drafting.

The court determined the search constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Under section 24(2), the court excluded the physical evidence seized, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the serious nature of the police conduct and the significant intrusion into the accused's private residence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm, as well as his sentence, following a domestic incident where he struck his spouse with a shovel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal grounds relating to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and the application of the W. (D.) test for credibility.

However, the court agreed that the Kienapple principle applied, staying the conviction for assault with a weapon as it arose from the same delict.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court finding the custodial sentence reasonable given the severity of the spousal abuse.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson endangering life and causing damage by fire to a dwelling house with intent to defraud, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the arson endangering life conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the reasonable doubt standard or treatment of after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the intent to defraud count, as the trial judge failed to find the appellant had the requisite intent when causing the fire, and ordered a new trial on that count.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the custodial sentence based on general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in denying an adjournment request, exhibited bias, and failed to properly guide him while he was self-represented.

He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, no apprehension of bias, and no prejudice resulting from the trial judge's guidance or counsel's performance.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants failed to meet the test to set aside the default judgment and that their affidavit evidence did not disclose a triable issue.