Derek Edward Daniel Zulianello

The applicants sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondents vexatious litigants.

The individual respondent had commenced multiple actions in Ontario regarding matters already settled in California, all of which were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process.

He also engaged in harassing and abusive communications with opposing counsel.

The court found the respondent's conduct met the criteria for a vexatious litigant and ordered that he and his corporations require leave to commence any new proceedings in Ontario.

Requests to stay existing appeals and seal the court file were dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by her employer based on gender identity, race, colour, ethnic origin, and ancestry.

The respondent requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that the applicant provided no evidence connecting the alleged workplace mistreatment to any protected grounds under the Code, nor any evidence of reprisal.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend a scheduled summary hearing held by telephone conference call.

The respondents attended.

As the Notice of Hearing warned that failure to attend could result in the application being dismissed as abandoned, the Tribunal dismissed the application on that basis.

The defendants were successful in a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for want of jurisdiction and sought costs.

The self-represented plaintiff argued costs should be stayed pending appeal.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found the defendants' hourly rates reasonable but the total time claimed excessive.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,500 for fees plus disbursements and HST.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing no real and substantial connection to Ontario and a California choice-of-law clause.

The plaintiff, residing in Ontario, contended the defendants carried on business in Ontario through third-party retailers and marketing.

The court, adopting prior rulings, found no actual presence of the defendants in Ontario and that the claims arose from a California-governed contract, thus dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a 20-year employee, went on stress leave and never returned to work after her employer hired an individual who had sexually harassed her 12 years earlier.

The plaintiff sued for constructive dismissal and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The court dismissed the tort claim, finding that while the employer's conduct was flagrant and outrageous, it was not calculated to produce harm.

However, the court found the plaintiff was constructively dismissed because the employer's dismissive response to her concerns made continued employment intolerable.

The plaintiff was awarded 12 months' pay in lieu of notice and $100,000 in Honda damages for the employer's insensitive conduct.

The defendants, Man-Shield (NWO) Construction Inc. and Manshield (NWO) Construction, Inc., brought an application to stay multiple construction lien actions in favour of arbitration.

The subcontractors and owners opposed the stay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Man-Shield had unduly delayed in seeking the stay, as measured from the date the statements of claim were issued.

The court also found Man-Shield estopped by its conduct and that granting a stay would create more uncertainty and delay, rather than facilitate resolution.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a dismissed motion by two campers' associations to intervene in a proceeding.

Rock Solid Holdings Inc., the applicant in the main proceeding, sought costs.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, awarded Rock Solid partial indemnity costs of $7,750 plus HST and disbursements of $829.08.

The court considered Rule 39.02(4)(b) regarding cross-examinations but "ordered otherwise" due to "bald assertions" in the affidavits filed by the proposed intervenors.

The costs were to be paid jointly and severally by the two campers' associations.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a previous order that struck his statement of claim as an abuse of process.

The court noted that the plaintiff had already appealed the previous order to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal for delay and found the action devoid of merit.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the order, finding it to be yet another attempt to circumvent a court order and an abuse of process.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants.

The defendant Rainy River First Nation brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation claim, which arose from a band council resolution (BCR) describing them as "undesirables" and prohibiting their entry onto First Nation territory.

The court found that the BCR was published and contained defamatory words.

The defendant's arguments of qualified privilege, issue estoppel, and abuse of process were dismissed.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiffs, with damages assessed at $5,000 for each plaintiff due to limited publication and minimal impact on reputation.

No costs were awarded.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's statement of claim on the grounds that it was an abuse of process and statute-barred.

The plaintiff requested an adjournment, which was denied due to his failure to comply with prior court orders regarding the filing of materials.

The court found that the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period and that it improperly duplicated claims that had already been struck in a parallel proceeding.

The motion was granted, the action was dismissed, and full indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking to vacate a scheduling order for the defendants' motion to strike, and seeking leave to amend his statement of claim.

The plaintiff had previously delivered an email abandoning an earlier motion but argued it was not abandoned because he did not file the notice.

The court held that Rule 37.09(1) only requires delivery, not filing, of a notice of abandonment, and alternatively, the motion was deemed abandoned under Rule 37.09(2) because the plaintiff failed to appear.

The plaintiff's current motion was dismissed as an abuse of process because he failed to provide a draft of the proposed amended pleading and had previously refused to attend the scheduling hearing he now sought to vacate.

A dispute arose between brothers over long-term use of a family recreational property after the owner indicated an intention to sell despite earlier assurances that the property would be left to the claimant in a will.

The claimant had occupied the property for decades and made improvements, relying on those assurances.

The court found the elements of proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment established because the claimant acted to his detriment in reliance on the owner’s representations.

However, the court concluded that a proprietary remedy was unnecessary because the improvements were largely removable.

The appropriate remedy was monetary compensation and reimbursement for certain expenditures, with removal costs of the claimant’s structures to be paid by the owner.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and claims for aggravated and punitive damages arising from a failed joint venture concerning a key‑cutting machine.

Applying the “plain and obvious” test from Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., the court held that the pleadings sufficiently disclosed causes of action for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and inducement of breach of contract.

However, the claims for intentional interference with economic relations and interference with prospective economic relations were struck as they lacked the necessary allegations that a third party had an actionable claim against the defendant.

Claims for aggravated and punitive damages were also struck for lack of particularization but with leave to amend.

Certain evidentiary paragraphs were struck for breaching pleading rules.

The defendant First Nation brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff’s statement of claim under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff alleged defamation arising from a Band Council Resolution declaring her a trespasser on First Nation territory after her employment termination, claiming reputational and financial harm.

The defendant argued the claim was barred by res judicata and abuse of process because the plaintiff had previously obtained damages for wrongful dismissal in Small Claims Court.

The court held the earlier proceeding concerned a contractual wrongful dismissal claim, while the present action alleged a tort of defamation that arose later and constituted a continuing cause of action.

The motion to strike under Rule 21 was dismissed, though certain pleadings and evidentiary attachments were struck under Rule 25 with leave to amend.

A commercial tenant sought a declaration that its lease had been validly renewed for an additional five‑year term and alternatively requested relief from forfeiture under s. 20 of the Commercial Tenancies Act.

The court held that the renewal clause, as amended, was unenforceable because it required rent to be determined by future agreement without providing a mechanism such as arbitration, making it an agreement to agree.

The tenant also failed to satisfy the conditions precedent for renewal, including timely written notice and compliance with lease obligations.

The court further found that s. 20 of the Commercial Tenancies Act did not apply where the landlord was not seeking re‑entry during the existing term, and equitable relief was unavailable because the tenant sought to obtain a new right rather than preserve an existing one.

Waiver and estoppel arguments were rejected, particularly given a non‑waiver clause and the involvement of third‑party leasing arrangements.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent leave to examine a hostile, out-of-jurisdiction witness before trial pursuant to Rule 36.01(2).

The motions judge had ordered the examination to be videotaped but denied further conditions.

The Divisional Court agreed the examination was warranted but allowed the appeal in part, ordering that a judge be present during the examination to resolve anticipated objections and privilege issues given the witness's hostility.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking production of a defence medical examination report and later sought costs after the report was produced following service of the motion.

The defendants argued the motion was unnecessary and that no order for a medical examination had been made under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act, rendering rule 33.06(2) inapplicable.

The court held that disclosure obligations could still arise under the broader document production rules and found the defendant failed to produce the report promptly after receiving it.

Although the motion was resolved prior to argument, it was reasonable for the moving party to have brought it.

Partial indemnity costs of $1,000 were awarded, reflecting both the defendant’s delay and the plaintiff’s own failure to comply with an earlier order to set the action down for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 36 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to examine a former defendant and corporate executive before trial.

The witness had relocated outside Canada and the plaintiff argued the examination was necessary to preserve potentially crucial evidence regarding the hiring of a defendant.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that witnesses should generally testify at trial, particularly before a jury, and that alternative mechanisms such as letters rogatory were available.

The court held that Rule 36 was designed for circumstances where a witness may be outside the jurisdiction and could possess important evidence.

Leave was granted to conduct a pre‑trial examination of the witness, with the examination to be videotaped and undertakings completed beforehand.

The respondent was successful on appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $9,458.72.

The appellant challenged the amount based on proportionality.

The Divisional Court fixed costs at $6,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the appeal was not complicated and took half a day to argue.