David Lepofsky

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault for transmitting HIV to her husband through unprotected sex.

She argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her belief that she was HIV-negative following a Canadian immigration medical assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence by one day to preserve the appellant's right to appeal a potential deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant fired a sawed-off shotgun at an intended victim following an altercation, missing the target but seriously injuring three innocent bystanders.

He was convicted of attempted murder for both the intended target and the bystanders, with the bystander convictions based on the trial judge's instruction regarding the common-law doctrine of transferred intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the inchoate crime of attempted murder.

The convictions for the attempted murder of the bystanders were quashed and substituted with convictions for aggravated assault.

The conviction and sentence for the attempted murder of the intended target were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on liability under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge failed to relate evidence to critical issues.

The Court of Appeal found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of planning and deliberation or forcible confinement.

The court also held that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement that the appellant be an active participant in the killing to be convicted under s. 231(5)(e).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and his co-accused were convicted of first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to provide an adequate limiting instruction regarding his prior acts of violence, failing to properly instruct the jury on his statements to civilian witnesses including a Vetrovec warning, and misdirecting the jury on liability under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the jury instructions, noting the lack of objections from trial counsel and the overall fairness of the charge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of various assault and firearms-related offences arising from a robbery and shooting at an auto repair shop.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the permissible uses of out-of-court statements made by the victim and his brother, and that the trial judge's review of the appellant's statement on arrest was unfair.

He also appealed his seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions, which were responsive to the defence's position at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the brutal nature of the shooting and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the requisite intent for murder by reason of mental disorder falling short of insanity, and by leaving the defence of insanity to the jury over the objections of both counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's charge was fair and balanced, and that there was an air of reality to the insanity defence given the appellant's own doctor raised the issue.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for multiple offences, including procuring prostitution, assault, and extortion.

He argued the trial judge's jury charge was deficient for failing to include a Vetrovec warning, distinguish between credibility and reliability, and instruct on all constituent elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal found the charge deficient but concluded it did not amount to reversible error for most counts, as the case rested simply on the complainant's credibility.

However, the court substituted a conviction for common assault in place of assault with a weapon because the trial judge failed to specify the weapon in the charge.

The total sentence of eight years was upheld, though the individual sentences were varied to correct an unlawful six-year concurrent sentence for common assault.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had punched the victim, causing him to fall and hit his head, which resulted in fatal injuries.

The accused also kicked the victim shortly after.

The trial judge limited the Crown's cross-examination of the accused on his prior convictions for crimes of violence, and instructed the jury on self-defence and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary ruling on the criminal record.

Although the trial judge erred in her instructions regarding whether the punch and kick constituted a single transaction, the error did not affect the verdict, as the jury clearly found the punch was in self-defence and the medical evidence did not support the kick as a contributing cause of death.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and related offences following a jewellery store heist.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on eyewitness identification, the Crown's use of his pre-trial silence to prove joint possession of stolen watches, and the admission of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions on the frailties of photographic and video identification were inadequate.

Furthermore, the Crown improperly used the appellant's refusal to provide an explanation or sign a waiver form as evidence of guilt, violating his right to silence.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a jury trial following a shooting death.

She argued that the jury charge was deficient on intent because it did not refer to her use of prescribed anti-depressants, that the reasonable doubt instruction was inadequate, and that Crown counsel’s cross-examination created trial unfairness.

The court held that the charge on intent was adequate, the pre-Lifchus reasonable doubt instruction did not create a reasonable likelihood of jury misunderstanding when the charge was read as a whole, and the complained-of Crown conduct did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence following a jury trial for homicide.

He argued that the trial judge improperly highlighted a statement suggesting concealment of relevant evidence and failed to caution the jury against considering that statement in isolation, and further erred by not providing the jury with a written copy of the recharge.

The court held that the impugned statement was only a small part of a larger circumstantial case, that the charge properly instructed the jury to assess all of the evidence, and that the recharge procedure caused no unfairness because the corrections were minor and clearly explained.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were both dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that the trial judge properly dismissed the application to adduce evidence of other sexual conduct under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, particularly where the application was not renewed after the complainant's subsequent testimony and the proposed evidence was irrelevant to the issues raised.

The court also found the jury charge fair and balanced.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because there was no error in principle in refusing a conditional sentence for serious offences involving grave breach of trust and a vulnerable victim.

The appellant railway challenged an environmental prosecution arising from controlled burns that released dense smoke onto neighbouring properties, roads, and residences.

The appeal focused on whether Ontario's broad pollution prohibition in s. 13(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that, in the environmental regulatory context, broad language may be constitutionally valid where the provision provides sufficient guidance for legal debate and does not capture merely trivial or imaginary impairments.

The Court rejected the vagueness and overbreadth claims, affirmed the constitutional applicability of the provision to the federal undertaking, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a federal undertaking, appealed a decision regarding the application of the provincial Environmental Protection Act to the maintenance of its right-of-way.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal on the first ground, holding that the provincial environmental legislation constitutionally applies to the appellant based on established precedent.