David Lepofsky

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault for transmitting HIV to her husband through unprotected sex.

She argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her belief that she was HIV-negative following a Canadian immigration medical assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence by one day to preserve the appellant's right to appeal a potential deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant fired a sawed-off shotgun at an intended victim following an altercation, missing the target but seriously injuring three innocent bystanders.

He was convicted of attempted murder for both the intended target and the bystanders, with the bystander convictions based on the trial judge's instruction regarding the common-law doctrine of transferred intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the inchoate crime of attempted murder.

The convictions for the attempted murder of the bystanders were quashed and substituted with convictions for aggravated assault.

The conviction and sentence for the attempted murder of the intended target were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on liability under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge failed to relate evidence to critical issues.

The Court of Appeal found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of planning and deliberation or forcible confinement.

The court also held that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement that the appellant be an active participant in the killing to be convicted under s. 231(5)(e).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and his co-accused were convicted of first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to provide an adequate limiting instruction regarding his prior acts of violence, failing to properly instruct the jury on his statements to civilian witnesses including a Vetrovec warning, and misdirecting the jury on liability under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the jury instructions, noting the lack of objections from trial counsel and the overall fairness of the charge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of various assault and firearms-related offences arising from a robbery and shooting at an auto repair shop.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the permissible uses of out-of-court statements made by the victim and his brother, and that the trial judge's review of the appellant's statement on arrest was unfair.

He also appealed his seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions, which were responsive to the defence's position at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the brutal nature of the shooting and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the requisite intent for murder by reason of mental disorder falling short of insanity, and by leaving the defence of insanity to the jury over the objections of both counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's charge was fair and balanced, and that there was an air of reality to the insanity defence given the appellant's own doctor raised the issue.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for multiple offences, including procuring prostitution, assault, and extortion.

He argued the trial judge's jury charge was deficient for failing to include a Vetrovec warning, distinguish between credibility and reliability, and instruct on all constituent elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal found the charge deficient but concluded it did not amount to reversible error for most counts, as the case rested simply on the complainant's credibility.

However, the court substituted a conviction for common assault in place of assault with a weapon because the trial judge failed to specify the weapon in the charge.

The total sentence of eight years was upheld, though the individual sentences were varied to correct an unlawful six-year concurrent sentence for common assault.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had punched the victim, causing him to fall and hit his head, which resulted in fatal injuries.

The accused also kicked the victim shortly after.

The trial judge limited the Crown's cross-examination of the accused on his prior convictions for crimes of violence, and instructed the jury on self-defence and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary ruling on the criminal record.

Although the trial judge erred in her instructions regarding whether the punch and kick constituted a single transaction, the error did not affect the verdict, as the jury clearly found the punch was in self-defence and the medical evidence did not support the kick as a contributing cause of death.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting their defences of duress and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to St. Louis's duress claim and that the Crown had rebutted Taillefer's duress claim.

The court also found sufficient differences in the evidence to explain the different verdicts, rejecting the inconsistent verdict argument.

The sentence appeals were dismissed as abandoned.

The respondent was convicted of four weapons offences, including possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition and weapons trafficking, while subject to a weapons prohibition.

The sentencing judge imposed a one-year sentence plus two months of pre-trial custody, mistakenly believing only two offences carried a one-year minimum.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence fell markedly below the acceptable range for such serious weapons offences.

The sentence was varied to a total of two years less a day in addition to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for assault and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to sever the breach of probation charge, admission of prior relationship evidence, or the jury's verdicts.

On the sentence appeal, the Court upheld the eight-month sentence for assault but reduced the consecutive sentence for breach of probation from six months to two months, finding the original total sentence too high as the breach was inextricably linked to the assault.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing he should have been declared a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct legal principles and reasonably concluded there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk presented by the appellant in the community.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting the deceased during a confrontation.

The appellant claimed the gun discharged accidentally while he was using it to ward off the deceased in self-defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the relationship between self-defence and accident.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made errors that would have affected a manslaughter verdict, the jury's conviction for murder meant they must have found the appellant had the requisite intent to kill, rejecting the accidental discharge defence.

Applying the curative proviso, the court concluded the errors did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice and dismissed the appeal.

The young person pleaded guilty to first degree murder and using a firearm during the commission of an indictable offence.

He was sentenced to an intensive rehabilitative custody sentence (IRCS) based on a joint submission, receiving only three months credit for 17.5 months of pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, he argued the youth court judge erred in deferring the weapons sentence and failing to give full credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge intended the custodial portions to be served continuously and had discretion to reduce pre-sentence credit below a one-to-one ratio in exceptional cases involving joint submissions.

In the context of a ministerial reference regarding Steven Murray Truscott's 1959 murder conviction, the court addressed two preliminary issues.

First, the court granted the appellant's request to have the panel hear witness evidence viva voce rather than out of court.

Second, the court dismissed a motion by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to permit camera access to the proceedings, finding that recording is prohibited under s. 136(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the statutory exemptions did not apply because the Crown did not consent.

The appellant appealed a costs order requiring him to pay the costs of an unsuccessful third-party records application to the Simcoe County Children's Aid Society.

The trial judge had relied on the court's inherent jurisdiction and rejected the need for 'fault' on the part of the accused to award costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by departing from the general principles governing costs awards against an accused, which require reprehensible conduct or a serious affront to the court's authority.

The appellant, a licensed insurance broker, pleaded guilty to fraud after misappropriating approximately $227,000 from clients' accounts.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to mitigating factors, including his gambling addiction and health challenges.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the original sentence but admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's severe cardiac condition, which developed shortly after his incarceration.

Given the risk that he could not receive adequate medical treatment in prison, the court allowed the appeal and substituted a 12-month conditional sentence.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association (Ontario) brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning a costs order made against an accused following a dismissed pre-trial motion for third-party records.

The Crown opposed the intervention, arguing the record was inadequate to resolve the broader policy issues.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding the moving party had the expertise and interest to provide a positive contribution, leaving the scope of argument to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder after assisting his cousin in disposing of the bodies of two hitchhikers.

At trial, the appellant claimed he acted under duress due to an implied threat from his cousin, who had just committed the murders in his presence.

The trial judge rejected the defence, finding no air of reality to the claim of an implied threat.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to appreciate the significance of witnessing an execution and by focusing incorrectly on the absence of a specific act or gesture.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, which arose from an allegedly unsafe lane change in front of a transport truck.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to articulate and apply the modified objective test for dangerous driving and misapprehended central evidence regarding the distance between the vehicles.

Concluding that the evidence could not support a conviction, the Court of Appeal entered an acquittal.