David L. Corbett

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order for the partition and sale of a property under the Partition Act.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by ordering the sale despite a triable issue regarding a trust claim and by failing to find the respondent's conduct was malicious, vexatious, or oppressive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's desire to untangle financial affairs was reasonable and the appellant failed to establish prejudice arising from the sale.

The appellant appealed a final order directing the partition and sale of a jointly owned property under the Partition Act.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by ordering the sale despite a triable issue regarding a trust claim and by failing to find the respondent's conduct was malicious, vexatious, or oppressive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant conceded the conduct issue during oral argument.

The court found no error in the motion judge's application of the relevant legal principles, as the appellant failed to establish prejudice arising from the sale.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory production order made by the License Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court directed the parties to provide written submissions on whether the appeal should be dismissed as premature under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying interference with the ongoing administrative process.

The appeal was dismissed as premature, and costs of $2,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The moving parties, former tenants, sought an extension of time to appeal an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board requiring them to pay rent arrears, as well as an order refusing to extend the time for review.

The court applied the four-part test for extending the time to appeal and found that the moving parties failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, provided no reasonable explanation for their inordinate delay, and failed to show any merit to their proposed appeal.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The respondent moved to dismiss the applicant's application for judicial review on the basis of mootness.

The underlying dispute regarding a discriminatory driver's licensing policy had been resolved in the applicant's favour by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, and the policy was subsequently amended.

However, the court dismissed the motion to dismiss, finding that the underlying legal issue—whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a standalone Charter claim—is an important issue that may be evasive of appellate review.

The mootness issue was left to be decided by the full panel hearing the application on the merits.

The self-represented defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court regarding interlocutory rulings made by the trial judge refusing to dismiss the action.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01, noting that the rulings had merged into the final trial judgment and any appeal must be directed to the Court of Appeal.

Despite the defendant's submissions that his jurisdictional error was made in good faith and not abusive, the court dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.01, finding that the proceeding could not possibly succeed in the Divisional Court and amounted to a collateral attack on a final judgment.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory order removing her solicitor of record and denying her father, a former lawyer, leave to represent her.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 considering dismissing the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting that the proper route was a motion for leave to appeal.

After reviewing the applicant's response, the court dismissed the application and imposed a requirement that the applicant obtain permission or be represented by a lawyer before bringing further proceedings in the court.

The applicant, an Indigenous child welfare agency, sought judicial review of a Minister's decision amending the designations of child welfare agencies in the Thunder Bay area.

The decision expanded the jurisdiction of another Indigenous agency to provide services to its affiliated families residing in Thunder Bay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was a policy decision that met the requirements of procedural fairness and was reasonable under the Vavilov framework.

The appellant obtained leave to appeal a temporary support order.

However, a trial date was subsequently scheduled to commence shortly.

The Divisional Court stayed the appeal pending the trial, noting that interlocutory appeals in family law are generally discouraged, the temporary order would not bind the trial judge, and proceeding with the appeal would disrupt the trial process and waste judicial resources.

The applicants sought judicial review of Landlord and Tenant Board decisions ordering their eviction and payment of rent arrears.

The court had previously quashed the applicants' appeal of the same decisions.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and subsequently dismissed the application for judicial review as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding it to be an improper collateral attack on the court's prior final decision.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the agreed amount of $20,000.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice M. Koehnen dated August 10, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 payable by the moving parties.

The moving party, XTM, Inc., brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice R.A. Lococo dated August 12, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order, triggering an automatic stay.

At a case management conference, the court considered whether to impose terms on the stay.

The tenant claimed he owed no rent because he was being held in the premises by CSIS.

Finding this claim highly unlikely and indicative of gaming the system, the court ordered the tenant to pay $23,624.72 in arrears and $2,500 in ongoing monthly rent to maintain the stay of eviction.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision which dismissed her complaint that her former employer terminated her as a reprisal under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Board had found she was terminated for cause.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness or reasonable apprehension of bias by the Board's Vice-Chair.

Applying the reasonableness standard from Vavilov, the Court held that the Board's decision was logical, well-reasoned, and based on an extensive review of the evidence.

The applicant physician sought a stay, a sealing order, and a publication ban pending judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) of the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court also dismissed the request for a sealing order, citing the open court principle.

However, the court granted anonymization and limited redactions to protect the applicant's personal medical records and her status as a victim of sexual assault.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant, failed to comply with court directions and timetables regarding her motions for leave to appeal and an appeal.

The court had previously issued notices under Rule 2.1.01 indicating it was considering dismissing the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant did not respond substantively to the notices, instead reiterating demands for appointed counsel or amicus curiae.

The Divisional Court dismissed the proceedings without costs due to the applicant's ungovernability and failure to comply with directions.

A motion for leave to appeal an injunction refusal was dismissed as moot because the underlying property had already been sold.

The court declined to restrict the applicant's future access to the courts but noted her ungovernable conduct could be considered in future vexatious litigant applications.

The appellant moved for a stay of a License Appeal Tribunal decision confirming the seizure of its vehicle permits and number plates due to an atrocious safety record.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test and found the appeal lacked merit, the appellant would not suffer irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience strongly favoured public safety over the appellant's economic interests.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a final order that stepped down and terminated her spousal support.

The motion judge had proceeded on the premise that the parties agreed there was a 'catastrophic change in circumstances' and assessed support de novo.

The Divisional Court found this was an error, as the parties vehemently disagreed on what constituted the catastrophic change, and the motion judge failed to use the existing final order as the status quo.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.