David A. Morin

The plaintiff, Diana Lynn Monk, sued her insurer (Farmers’ Mutual) and broker (Muskoka Insurance) for property damage to her log home caused by a contractor's negligent restoration work.

The court found that while the damage was covered under the "all-risk" homeowner's policy, the plaintiff failed to provide timely notice of the loss as required by Statutory Condition No. 6.

Despite the court's finding that the breach was imperfect compliance rather than non-compliance, the plaintiff's conduct was deemed unreasonable, and the insurer suffered significant prejudice due to the delay.

Consequently, the court denied relief from forfeiture and dismissed the claims against both the insurer and the broker.

The respondents purchased a property to convert into a commercial business and experienced a five-year delay in obtaining necessary permits from the appellant municipality.

The trial judge found the municipality liable in negligence for the unreasonable conduct of its Chief Building Officer and awarded damages for business losses.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the negligence finding and the damages award, arguing the respondents failed to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the municipality acted unreasonably and that the respondents were not required to mitigate by spending money they did not have due to the municipality's conduct.

The plaintiff's property was damaged when a dam on a neighbouring property broke, releasing a deluge of water.

The defendant insurer denied coverage under the plaintiff's comprehensive homeowners policy, citing exclusions for ground water, surface water, and general water damage.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

The court found that the initial grant of coverage applied and that the ground and surface water exclusions did not.

While the general water exclusion applied, the court held that the exceptions for the sudden and accidental escape of water from a sewer or drain, and for water entering through an opening created suddenly and accidentally, brought the loss back into coverage.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff.

The defendant, Panolam Industries Ltd., brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Robert John Kuiack, to produce a further and better affidavit of documents, including relevant documents from a prior disability claim against Manulife.

The plaintiff had sued Panolam for wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, and Human Rights Code violations after his long-term disability benefits were terminated and his employment was deemed frustrated.

Panolam argued that the plaintiff's prior disability claim and associated medical evidence were relevant to defend against the current action, particularly regarding the plaintiff's health status and intent to return to work.

The court largely granted the defendant's motion, ordering the production of the Manulife disability claims file, settlement documents, pleadings, undertakings/refusals, and clinical notes and records from specific physicians up to the end of 2013.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for property damage insurance coverage.

The motion judge initially granted summary judgment based on a coverage exclusion, but the Court of Appeal reversed this finding and remitted the limitation period issue back to the motion judge.

The motion judge dismissed the summary judgment motion regarding the limitation period, finding that disputed conversations between the plaintiff and her insurance broker raised significant credibility issues that required a trial.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful six-day trial where they recovered over $292,000 in damages and interest from the defendant municipality.

The plaintiffs had made three formal offers to settle, all of which were exceeded at trial.

They requested partial indemnity costs until their first offer, and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $235,418.99.

The defendant opposed the requested hourly rates and argued for lower costs based on proportionality and the public significance of the issues.

The court found the plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates reasonable, noting the defendant's "high-handed and dismissive" conduct prolonged the litigation.

The court held that the principle of indemnity substantially outweighed proportionality and the public interest argument, awarding the plaintiffs the full amount of costs requested.

The plaintiffs sued a municipality after their efforts to convert a former residence and group home into a tourist outfitting business were repeatedly delayed and burdened by changing building and zoning requirements.

The court held that the municipality owed a duty of care in the operational administration of building permits and rezoning, and breached that duty through unreasonable, inconsistent, and procedurally unfair conduct by its chief building official, compounded by the municipality's failure to supervise and its refusal to allow a later official to assist with permit closure.

Applying the municipal duty of care framework and negligent misrepresentation principles, the court found the plaintiffs suffered foreseeable economic loss.

The court awarded lost profits for 2012 to 2015, certain professional expenses, and general damages for mental distress and inconvenience, while declining to award most claimed renovation costs.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought costs for both the motion and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $90,000 in costs for the motion on a partial indemnity basis, payable by the respondents.

However, the court declined to award costs for the appeal, as the appellant's counsel had explicitly stated during the hearing that he was not seeking appeal costs due to the novelty of the issue and access to justice concerns.

The appellant's home was damaged during exterior restoration work when the contractor failed to properly seal areas against water.

The appellant's insurer denied coverage based on a 'faulty workmanship' exclusion.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding the exclusion precluded claims for both direct and resulting damage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 'faulty workmanship' exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to exclude only direct damage, preserving coverage for resulting damage under the all-risks policy.

Following successful summary judgment motions by the defendants in an insurance coverage dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendants sought substantial costs exceeding $140,000 combined.

Applying Rule 57 and the principle of proportionality, the court considered the novelty of the legal issue, the defendants’ delay in bringing the summary judgment motions, and the plaintiff’s good‑faith pursuit of a non‑frivolous claim.

The court also emphasized access to justice concerns given the modest value of the underlying claim.

Costs were significantly reduced and fixed at $30,000 payable to the insurer and $20,000 payable to the broker, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff sued a contractor for damages arising from water leakage into a basement foundation constructed under her trailer.

The court found that the contractor used a slab‑on‑grade method due to a high water table but failed to follow certain standard industry practices, including properly extending the waterproofing membrane and ensuring drainage measures consistent with the Building Code.

Expert evidence established that remedial work was necessary to prevent further water infiltration and bring the structure into compliance.

Claims for rental income, personal property damage, interior demolition, and general damages were largely rejected due to insufficient proof.

The court awarded damages for foundation remediation, anchoring of the trailer, interior repainting, and a contingency allowance.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action, the defendant sought costs of both the motion and the underlying proceeding.

The plaintiff argued that costs should be limited because the defendant delayed bringing the summary judgment motion until shortly before trial despite participating in discovery and other litigation steps for years.

The court rejected this argument, finding the defendant acted reasonably in defending the claim and that evolving jurisprudence after amendments to Rule 20 justified bringing the motion after discoveries were completed.

Substantial indemnity costs were refused because the defendant’s settlement offers did not trigger Rule 49 consequences.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed by the court, including fees and disbursements, payable forthwith.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims arising from the premature deterioration of pine roof shingles installed on the plaintiff’s home.

The plaintiff alleged breach of contractual warranty, breach of statutory warranties under the Sale of Goods Act, and negligent misrepresentation relating to representations that the roof would last 50 years.

The court found the plaintiff had discovered the alleged defects and the basis of her claims by November 2005, yet did not commence the action until March 2008.

Applying the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, the court held the claims were statute‑barred.

The court also concluded there was no evidence the retailer provided a contractual warranty or representation guaranteeing the shingles for 50 years.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an action as statute barred under the notice provisions of the Municipal Act.

The court held there was no dispute that written notice had not been given within 10 days as required by s. 44(10), and the appellant therefore bore the onus under s. 44(12) to establish a reasonable excuse and absence of prejudice to the municipality.

The motion judge's reasons were found to be careful and considered, and the appellate court found no error in the analysis or in the application of the governing principles.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to enforce payment obligations under a promissory note arising from a share purchase agreement and to enforce a personal guarantee.

The defendants argued that the payment schedule was triggered by completion of a later adjustment process relating to the purchase price rather than the original closing date of the transaction.

The court interpreted the promissory note in light of the share purchase agreement and amendment agreement and held that the payment schedule was triggered by the closing date of the share purchase, not the later adjustment process.

The court further held that the individual guarantor was jointly and severally liable under the guarantee and indemnity.

Summary judgment was granted for the outstanding amounts owing under the promissory note and an additional balance relating to a loan payable to the parent company.

Following a discovery-related motion concerning undertakings and production of Schedule B documents, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized the result of the motion and the parties’ settlement offers.

Although the defendant had agreed to disclose some documents prior to the hearing and had answered undertakings promptly, the court found the plaintiffs were ultimately more successful and had been required to bring the motion.

The court exercised its discretion to fix costs payable by the defendant to the plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a stay of a summary judgment proceeding concerning unpaid promissory notes, arguing the dispute must proceed to arbitration under a share purchase agreement.

The court considered whether the dispute fell within arbitration provisions relating to purchase price adjustments and general arbitration clauses.

It held that the contractual adjustment process had already concluded when the parties’ external accountants resolved the working capital dispute.

As no live issue remained for arbitration, and given delay and attornment to the court’s jurisdiction, the court declined to stay the action.

The court confirmed jurisdiction to hear the summary judgment motion regarding the promissory notes.

The appellants purchased a home after making it clear to their real estate agent and home inspector that they were allergic to mould.

After moving in, they experienced allergic reactions to mould.

The trial judge apportioned liability 50% to the inspector, 25% to the agent, and 25% to the appellants for contributory negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the finding of contributory negligence, as the trial judge had found the appellants lacked the knowledge to appreciate the warning signs in the report.

The Court also set aside the finding of negligence against the agent, as no expert evidence was called regarding the standard of care.

The inspector was held 100% liable.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a noting in default.

The appellants had delivered but not filed a statement of defence, and waited over a year before retaining counsel to bring the motion to set aside, just days before the scheduled undefended trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate a continuing intention to defend, provided an incredible explanation for the delay, and failed to bring the motion expeditiously.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued her father for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse.

The father had previously been convicted of criminal offences based on the same conduct.

At the civil trial, the father adduced evidence from his two sons, who claimed they had committed the abuse, not him.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in permitting the father to relitigate the underlying facts of his criminal conviction.

The evidence of the sons was not 'fresh evidence' as it was known prior to the criminal trial, and allowing the relitigation constituted an abuse of process.