C.W. Hourigan

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to import cocaine after a controlled delivery of a package containing over 3.5 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the law on importing and post-offence conduct, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made minor factual errors, they were not essential to the convictions given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of guilt, including the appellant's possession of shipping details, phone records, and flight from police.

The appellant suffered a bowel leak after surgery and developed septic shock.

He sued the hospital and a nurse for delayed diagnosis and treatment, alleging nursing negligence and medication errors.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care and that the appellant failed to prove causation, as his injuries were inevitable due to the onset of the sepsis cascade before the alleged negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the 'but for' causation test.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their medical negligence action arising from delayed diagnosis and treatment of an anastomotic leak following routine bowel surgery, which resulted in septic shock and bilateral below-knee amputations.

The jury found five defendants breached the standard of care but that none of the breaches caused the injuries.

The Court of Appeal addressed the proper causation test in delayed diagnosis cases involving multiple tortfeasors, finding that the trial judge's use of the word "necessary" from Clements in jury questions and instructions was problematic and that the phrase "caused or contributed to" should not have been rejected.

However, the court held that the jury clearly accepted the defence theory that a rare necrotizing infection, not the delay, caused the injuries, and no reformulation of questions or instructions would have changed the verdict.

Developers holding registered title to a parkette appealed a declaration that a municipality was the legal and beneficial owner of the land.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge’s finding that a 1973 subdivision agreement requiring conveyance of the parkette to the municipality superseded an earlier 1972 agreement that included a potential re‑conveyance clause.

The court further held that the land’s administrative conversion to the Land Titles system did not extinguish the municipality’s equitable interest because the developers had actual notice of that interest.

The municipality’s claim was not statute‑barred under the Real Property Limitations Act because it had remained in continuous possession of the park since the 1970s.

In the alternative, the doctrine of dedication and acceptance independently supported municipal ownership after decades of public use.

The appellant contractor scratched approximately 180 windows while performing cleaning services at a newly constructed commercial building and reimbursed the building owner about $134,000 for the damage.

It sought indemnification under its commercial general liability policy, but the insurer denied coverage relying on “your work” exclusions.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the occurrence causing the property damage was the scratching of the windows during the cleaning operation and that the damage arose out of the insured’s work.

Because the property damage fell squarely within the policy’s exclusions, coverage was properly denied and the appeal was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of cocaine trafficking and related offences, receiving a 6.5-year sentence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentencing judge erred in interpreting aggravating factors under the CDSA and in refusing a half-parole order.

The offender cross-appealed, seeking pre-trial custody credit for time spent in custody on unrelated charges that were later stayed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed the aggravating factors, appropriately exercised discretion regarding parole eligibility, and correctly refused to credit time served on unrelated charges.

The young person appealed a conviction for attempted robbery arising from a meeting arranged through an online classified ad.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding the identification evidence, which included surveillance video and IP address tracking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the identification and the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a psychiatric facility, arguing he did not pose a significant threat to public safety and should receive an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board reasonably addressed conflicting medical evidence and properly considered a recent incident where the appellant brought methamphetamine into the facility.

The appeal was dismissed, as the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the convictions were unreasonable because no cocaine was seized during the transactions and the substance could have been methamphetamine.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting intercepted communications without a Carter ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, police surveillance, and physical evidence found upon arrest, overwhelmingly established the substance was cocaine.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to make a Carter ruling, the error was harmless given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break and enter and breach of probation, receiving an eight-month sentence based on a joint submission.

Four months later, an amendment to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act came into force retrospectively, rendering him inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality with no right of appeal due to the sentence length.

The appellant sought to reduce his sentence to five and a half months to preserve his right of appeal against deportation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the reduced sentence remained proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to export ecstasy into the United States and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and corroboration of a co-conspirator who testified for the Crown after receiving a reduced sentence in the U.S. The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including recorded phone calls that demonstrated the appellant's involvement.

The court also upheld the six-year sentence, noting the large quantity of drugs and the appellant's use of a courier to take the cross-border risk.

The appeals were dismissed.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissing a motion to extend the time to file an application for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The panel agreed with the single judge that there was no prospect of success on the merits of the proposed leave to appeal motion.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant moved to review an order refusing to restore his motion to review a previous order that refused to extend the time for a motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it to be the latest in a series of frivolous and meritless interlocutory motions.

The appellant provided no reasonable explanation for his lengthy delays, and there was no merit to his underlying request for leave to appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from two interlocutory orders.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from interlocutory orders of a Superior Court judge lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and the appellant's cross-motion was dismissed.

In this addendum to a previous judgment, the Court of Appeal amended its declaration regarding the duty to defend under commercial general liability policies.

The court removed Royal & Sunalliance Insurance Company of Canada from the declaration, as it had settled prior to the appeal.

The court also removed a stipulation regarding a Professional Services Exclusion, which the insurers had withdrawn reliance upon.

Finally, based on a prior agreement between the parties, the court vacated its previous costs award and directed submissions for full indemnity costs.

The respondents were wholly successful on the appeal and sought partial indemnity costs totaling over $111,000.

The appellants conceded the respondents were entitled to costs but argued the amounts sought were excessive, proposing a total of $30,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs payable by the appellants at $20,000 for Vicentini, $10,000 for Ford Credit, and $10,000 for Personal Insurance, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision dismissing its application for a preliminary determination of whether the respondent was involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued this was a coverage issue that had to be determined by a court before the mandatory dispute resolution scheme under s. 279 of the Insurance Act applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the s. 279 scheme is a comprehensive alternative dispute resolution process that governs all disputes concerning entitlement to statutory accident benefits, including whether a claimant qualifies as an insured person involved in an accident.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault, child luring, and other offences, and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment along with prohibition orders under ss. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the parties agreed that the s. 161(1)(c) order must be replaced with the former version of the provision, following the Supreme Court's ruling in R. v. K.R.J. regarding retrospective operation.

The appellant also challenged the fitness of the s. 161(1)(d) order, which imposed a 20-year blanket ban on Internet use and device ownership.

The Court of Appeal found the blanket prohibition demonstrably unfit and overbroad, noting it would unreasonably hinder rehabilitation and employment.

The court varied the order to specifically prohibit accessing illegal content and participating in social networks or chat rooms.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for uttering threats and failing to comply with probation, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board imposing a detention order with community living privileges.

He argued the ORB applied the wrong legal test and should have granted a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB applied the correct test and reasonably concluded that a detention order was necessary to manage the appellant's risk, ensure medication compliance, and allow for expeditious return to the hospital if his condition decompensated.

The appellant sued her landlord for negligence after suffering serious personal injuries from a fall on a fire escape, alleging it was not kept free of ice and snow.

The trial judge dismissed the action, accepting the superintendent's evidence of daily inspections and finding no snow or ice was present, while rejecting the appellant's evidence on credibility grounds.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the record and there was no basis to interfere with the finding that the standard of care was met.