C.W. Hourigan

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully producing marihuana and possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.

At trial, she raised the defence of duress, arguing she participated due to physical and emotional abuse by her romantic partner.

The trial judge failed to relate the expert evidence on battered spouse syndrome to the objective elements of duress in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals as the appellant had already served her sentence.

During an appeal involving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant's trial counsel retained his own lawyers.

Trial counsel's lawyers inadvertently disclosed a letter between trial counsel and themselves to the appellant's appeal counsel.

Trial counsel brought a motion for the return of the document, asserting solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the letter was privileged, the inadvertent disclosure did not constitute a waiver, and the innocence at stake exception did not apply to abrogate the privilege.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that evidence should have been excluded due to Charter breaches.

The appellant was detained at a store for 40 minutes without being advised of her right to counsel, after which police searched her vehicle, arrested her, and found fentanyl.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in requiring a causal connection for the s. 10(b) breach and found an additional s. 9 breach for arbitrary detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded that the serious police conduct and substantial impact on the appellant's rights warranted exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for directing corporate rebate cheques to a company he owned, defrauding his employer of nearly $4 million.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $3.4 million in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge improperly intervened during his testimony, failed to exclude banking records obtained in breach of an implied undertaking, and erred in ordering restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate to assist a self-represented accused.

Assuming the banking records were obtained in breach of the appellant's Charter rights, the Court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s 24(2).

The restitution order was also upheld.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

He argued the Board failed to inquire into the hospital's diagnostic assessment and erred by not transferring him to a less secure facility closer to his family in the Greater Toronto Area.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no treatment impasse that required inquiry and concluding the Board reasonably found the secure environment at Waypoint was necessary to manage the appellant's risk to public safety.

The appellant physician appealed a Superior Court order that set aside a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the respondent incapable of consenting to medical treatment.

The Superior Court had ordered a new hearing because the respondent's current attending physician did not testify before the Board.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge erred by deciding the case on a procedural fairness issue raised for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal further found that the Board's original decision was reasonable and supported by the record, and restored the Board's finding of incapacity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he continued to beat the victim after an initial punch, a theory not put to him at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the initial punch was unprovoked was supported by the evidence and fatal to the appellant's claim of self-defence.

The findings regarding a subsequent beating were therefore irrelevant and did not infect the rejection of the self-defence claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction for child pornography offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his statement to police.

He claimed he was under the influence of a prescription medication overdose and lacked an operating mind, and that the Crown's failure to call two police officers who had contact with him deprived the court of corroborating evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no rule requires the Crown to call every officer, and holding that the trial judge's conclusion that the statement was voluntary was well supported by the videotape and other witness testimony.

The appellant was convicted of having care or control of a vehicle while impaired.

After her first appeal was dismissed by a summary conviction appeal judge, she sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The court found no error of law and noted the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant's conduct created a realistic risk of danger was amply supported by the evidence.

Leave to appeal was denied.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant Estate successfully defended the respondent's claim for a one-half interest in a property, the court determined the costs for the proceedings in the court below.

The Estate sought partial indemnity costs of $169,508.

The court reduced this amount by $30,000 to account for two unsuccessful motions brought by the Estate during the litigation.

Costs were fixed at $134,478.68 payable by the respondent to the Estate.

The appellant, a personal support worker, pled guilty to assault and criminal harassment.

The Crown and defence agreed on a joint submission for an eight-month conditional sentence and one year's probation.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence followed by a six-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the sentencing judge failed to explain why the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The sentence was varied to accord with the joint submission.

The appellant was convicted of break and enter and theft after his blood was found on the broken door frame of a commercial store.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapplied the test for circumstantial evidence and relied on impermissible speculation.

He also appealed his 45-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct analytic framework and the verdict was reasonable given the fresh blood evidence and the appellant's failure to testify.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault and breach of probation and was sentenced to 183 days in custody based on a joint submission.

He subsequently discovered that this sentence triggered potential inadmissibility as a permanent resident.

He appealed the sentence based on fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences.

The Crown conceded that a sentence of six months less a day would have been fit and that the fresh evidence should be admitted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to six months less a day to obviate the unforeseen immigration consequences.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim sought to set aside a transfer of real property to the respondent, alleging an oral promise by their parents to gift the property to the appellants' company.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge's reasons sufficient and agreed with the characterization of the claim as a promise to make a gift.

However, the Court held that the motion judge erred by failing to grant leave to amend the pleading under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their statement of claim to plead an oral agreement concerning the property.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim for an accidental death benefit after her son died from a fall from a balcony.

The motion judge used fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1) to conclude the appellant could not prove the death was accidental rather than suicide.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the insurer, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the evidence.

However, the Court set aside the dismissal against the employer, as the claim against it was based on misrepresentation and it had not participated in the motion.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order granting joint custody of their three-year-old son in the form of a parallel parenting arrangement.

She argued that joint custody was inappropriate given the parties' inability to communicate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision reasonable and necessary to preserve the respondent father's relationship with his son, especially given findings that the mother overstated her fear and refused to cooperate.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order, arguing the motion judge erred by granting it despite a viable set-off defence and inconsistently allowing the counterclaim to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge reasonably exercised his discretion.

The appellants had failed to provide evidence of their damages claim after being given a year to do so, leaving only an unsubstantial punitive damages claim.

The appellants, unsecured creditors, sought to appeal a motion judge's order approving an amended proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and refusing to adjourn the approval motion to allow further examination of the debtor's president.

The Court of Appeal held that leave to appeal was required because the issues were procedural and did not directly involve property exceeding $10,000.

The Court denied leave, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, raised no issues of general importance, and the motion judge's conclusions on the reasonableness and good faith of the proposal were unassailable.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting summary judgment against them in a debt collection matter.

The motion judge had set aside an initial summary judgment and granted a second one after the appellants failed to file responding materials and were denied a further adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment or in the calculation of the amounts owing.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm offences following a high-risk takedown where police seized two loaded handguns.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his Corbett application to exclude his prior firearms conviction, dismissing his stay application regarding a lost surveillance video, and improperly instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion on the Corbett application given the defence's attack on police character, and correctly concluded the lost video did not amount to unacceptable negligence or a Charter breach.