C.W. Hourigan

The applicant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking in 2008.

Over 11 years later, he was arrested in the United States for immigration violations and sought an extension of time to appeal his Canadian conviction, arguing his plea was uninformed regarding immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the 11-year delay excessive, the proposed ground of appeal weak, and that the applicant failed to establish that the justice of the case required granting the extension.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his convictions and sentence for dredging and filling shore lands without a work permit under the Public Lands Act.

He had been fined $3,000 for each conviction, placed on probation, and made subject to a rehabilitation order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal had no merit and did not meet the high threshold of raising a question of law essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal in the agreed upon, all-inclusive amount of $15,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking methadone after a fellow resident at a transition home fatally overdosed on methadone supplied by the appellant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and misapprehended DNA expert evidence regarding the transfer of the deceased's DNA to the appellant's methadone bottle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Jordan framework, properly excluded verdict deliberation time, and reasonably concluded that a mistaken trial estimate constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The Court also found no misapprehension of the expert evidence, as the trial judge's findings were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial decision determining the terminus of a lot line between two waterfront properties on a controlled lake.

The trial judge found that the term 'High Water Mark' on the registered plan unambiguously referred to the Normal Controlled High Water Level.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the term created a latent ambiguity and that the original subdivider intended to convey all the land it owned, which extended to the water's edge at the time of the 1902 Crown patent.

The matter was remitted to the trial court to determine the water's edge at the time of the Crown patent and the effects of any subsequent erosion or accretion.

Following a successful appeal of a summary judgment order, a dispute arose regarding the settling of the court's order on costs.

The respondents argued that a portion of the motion judge's costs order related to a support motion should remain intact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the motion judge had awarded a global amount for all motions, which were intertwined.

The court clarified that the entire costs award below was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault, incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief against his sibling.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a defence witness, failed to provide meaningful reasons, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, the reasons were sufficient for appellate review, and there was no uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The appellant, a litigation financer, appealed a motion judge's order granting priority over settlement funds to the respondent, the debtor's former partner.

The debtor had signed a separation agreement promising to pay the respondent from any settlement, and later signed irrevocable directions assigning the settlement funds to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the separation agreement did not constitute a valid equitable assignment because it lacked a clear intention to assign the specific funds, whereas the irrevocable directions did.

The appellant was granted priority over the funds.

The appellant, a consultant who submitted a bid for a government standing offer, was investigated and charged with bid-rigging after a government contract manager reported similarities between his bid and another.

The charges were later stayed.

The appellant sued the government and the contract manager for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation, seeking $2,000,000 in damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the government's answers to bidders were accurate and not misleading, and that the contract manager's statements to investigators were protected by qualified privilege without malice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant purchased land from the respondent, agreeing to develop it for retail use.

The agreement included an indemnity clause for community cost-sharing agreements.

The appellant later obtained a zoning amendment for residential development, triggering a $2.8 million fee for school lands, and sought indemnity from the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant breached its obligation to develop the land for retail use and could not profit from its own breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the contract.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its motion to enforce a share purchase agreement.

The parties negotiated a $100,000 purchase price for shares, and the respondent sent an unexecuted share purchase agreement to the appellant.

The appellant executed it, but the respondent did not.

The motion judge found that the agreement contained an enurement provision requiring execution by both parties to be effective, meaning there was no intention to contract until formal execution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the parties intended to defer their obligations until a formal contract was executed.

Following an appeal where the appellant had mixed success on a summary judgment motion and was unsuccessful on a contempt motion, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The court reduced the costs awarded to the respondents on the summary judgment motion from $35,000 to $10,000 due to the appellant's partial success.

The court also awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $3,500 for the contempt appeal and $1,500 for the summary judgment appeal.

Following an appeal with divided success regarding an equalization payment and pension valuation, the parties could not agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the respondent was the more successful party.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's appeal costs fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The issue of trial costs was referred back to the trial judge.

The appellant sued for wrongful dismissal and moved for summary judgment, arguing the termination clause in his employment contract was void for violating the Employment Standards Act.

The respondent conceded the 'Termination for Cause' provision was void but argued the 'Termination with Notice' provision was valid and severable.

The Court of Appeal held that employment agreements must be interpreted as a whole.

Because the 'for cause' provision violated the ESA, all termination provisions in the contract were rendered unenforceable, regardless of whether the employer relied on the illegal provision or if there was a severability clause.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for theft and failure to comply with probation, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention in a secure forensic unit.

He argued the Board erred in finding he represented a significant risk to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the record amply supported the Board's conclusion given the appellant's serious acquired brain injury, psychiatric issues, and history of violence and aggression.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action for breach of contract and solicitor's negligence against their former counsel, Gardiner Roberts LLP.

The appellants alleged errors in judgment, failure to properly advise, and failure to consider costs during the firm's representation of them in a prior action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the firm communicated steps to the appellants, advised them of risks, and did not breach the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent sued the appellants for constructive dismissal.

During a summary judgment motion, the appellants sought production of draft affidavits, which the motion judge dismissed as privileged, while also prohibiting further examinations without leave.

The appellants appealed these orders to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the orders were interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, quashed the appeal, and directed the appellants to seek leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence and admitting his statement to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error by the summary conviction appeal judge and concluding the case lacked significance to the administration of justice.

The respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, discovered a potential professional negligence claim against his deceased wife's insurance agent.

He commenced an action after his discharge, but the cause of action had vested in his trustee in bankruptcy.

The motion judge granted an order nunc pro tunc regularizing the proceeding.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge lacked authority to grant a nunc pro tunc order because it was sought after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of 102 grams of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 18 months' incarceration.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors such as his rehabilitation, bail history, and drug addiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was within the fit range.