Christina Doris

The applicant mother brought a motion to enforce a consent order requiring the respondent father to comply with a court-ordered therapeutic reunification process and to provide photographs and weekly updates about the children.

Over 5.5 years of litigation, multiple clinicians found the father obstructed the children's relationship with the mother, while psychological assessments confirmed the mother posed no risk to the children.

The court found multiple breaches of the consent order, declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying father given his pattern of chronic non-compliance, and imposed monetary penalties under Rule 1(8)(a.1) of the Family Law Rules to incentivize future compliance with the therapeutic process.

The moving party mother sought an interim order permitting her to relocate with the parties' three-year-old child from Toronto to Calgary, pending a final trial.

The mother, who had been the child's primary caregiver since separation, had secured a significant career opportunity in Calgary.

The responding party father, who exercised limited supervised parenting time due to severe and ongoing substance abuse issues, opposed the move.

The court applied the best interests of the child test and the factors for interim relocation, finding a strong probability that the mother's position would prevail at trial.

The court concluded that the move would not significantly impact the young child and granted the interim relocation, establishing a supervised parenting schedule for the father.

This endorsement from a settlement conference in a high-conflict family law case primarily addresses parenting issues.

The court vacated the respondent father's scheduled long motion concerning parenting arrangements, citing his non-compliance with procedural rules (failure to serve notice of motion and file a timetable agreement) and the principle of proportionality.

The court emphasized that bringing multiple motions on the same issue in quick succession, especially after a prior interim order, is contrary to the Family Law Rules and the access to justice principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The judge also noted the high bar for varying interim parenting orders and the application of issue estoppel.

The case was reluctantly placed on the fall 2022 trial blitz, and any future motions require leave of the court.

Directions were also given for questioning and financial disclosure related to a jointly owned cottage.

The parties brought cross-motions for a parenting plan regarding their 17-month-old child.

The mother sought to delay overnight parenting time until March 2022, citing the child's young age and breastfeeding needs.

The father sought immediate overnights to coincide with his upcoming paternity leave.

The court found that the 'tender years' doctrine no longer applies and that breastfeeding is not a bar to overnight access.

The court ordered a progressive parenting schedule that introduced overnights during the father's paternity leave to foster a strong bond, alongside a detailed holiday schedule.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order granting the respondent father sole custody/decision-making responsibility for their child and temporarily suspending the mother's contact, following a finding of parental alienation.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the best interests test, failed to consider less drastic options, did not adequately weigh the child's views, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in these submissions, affirming the trial judge's findings of parental alienation and the drastic change in custody as being in the child's best interests, supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay appeal costs.

Following an urgent motion where the applicant mother was granted interim decision-making authority and permitted to register the child in a school of her choice, she sought full indemnity costs of $13,172.97.

The court found the respondent father acted unreasonably by improperly preventing the child's school registration and involving the child in the conflict post-motion.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court fixed costs at $7,000 payable by the respondent.

The mother brought an urgent motion for interim decision-making authority, permission to register the 17-year-old child in a school of her choice, and the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The child had voluntarily left the father's home to live with the mother and wished to attend in-person school, which the father opposed.

The court granted the mother's requests, finding that the child's views and preferences should be given significant weight given his age, and that the high conflict between the parents necessitated interim sole decision-making authority for the mother.

In this family law appeal, the appellant sought to enforce a daily financial penalty for non-disclosure, which had accumulated to $224,000.

The motion judge declined to enforce the disproportionate penalty and left the matter to the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the order to be interlocutory and thus not appealable, quashing the appeal.

The applicant brought a motion regarding the child's school enrollment, which was decided in favour of the respondent.

The parties submitted written submissions on costs.

The court found that while the respondent was successful, both parties had engaged in unreasonable conduct.

The court fixed costs at $8,000 in favour of the respondent, but ordered that this amount be set off against $8,000 in costs that the respondent already owed to the applicant.

The applicant father brought a motion to enroll the parties' six-year-old child in a French Immersion program in Mississauga, contrary to the respondent mother's choice of a public school in North York.

The parties shared joint custody under a previous order which gave the mother final decision-making authority over education if they could not agree.

The court found that the mother's proposed school was in the child's best interests, noting the child's speech delays, the mother's proximity to the school, and the availability of before and after school care.

The father's motion regarding the choice of school was dismissed.

The moving party (mother) sought an extension of time to appeal a final parenting order and a stay of that order pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the extension of time, finding the three-day delay was minimal and an appeal right existed.

However, the court refused the stay, emphasizing that it was not in the child's best interests to disrupt the therapeutic program and living arrangements established by the trial judge's order, which aimed to rebuild the child's relationship with the father.

The appellant father, a self-represented family law lawyer, brought a motion to extend the time for perfecting his appeal concerning child support arrears, inter-party debt, and parenting time.

The respondent mother opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the appellant's delay inordinate and inadequately explained, his litigation conduct indicative of delay tactics, and the merits of his appeal very weak.

The court also ordered the appellant to pay costs to the respondent.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding child support.

The applicant father sought to reduce his child support obligation after losing his job, while the respondent mother sought to enforce the terms of their separation agreement, which calculated support based on the prior year's income.

The court found that the applicant's job loss constituted a material change in circumstances and temporarily varied the agreement to base ongoing support on his current estimated income.

However, the court also ordered the applicant to pay $34,405 in retroactive child support to account for significant increases in his income in 2019 and 2020 that had not been properly adjusted under the agreement.

The moving party father brought a motion to strike a single sentence from the responding party mother's Reply, arguing it was inflammatory.

The sentence alleged that the father refused to provide funds for a taxi or ride-share for access exchanges during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court reviewed the correspondence between counsel and found the sentence was accurate and relevant to the mother's claim for child and spousal support.

The motion to strike was dismissed, and costs of $6,500 were awarded to the mother.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion to change child custody and parenting arrangements.

The father sought costs on a full indemnity basis of $18,826.65 after the mother's motion to change was settled on terms substantially mirroring his offer to settle.

The mother initially failed to file responding costs submissions, claiming court staff told her she could not file.

The court set aside the initial costs order to allow the mother to respond.

After reviewing both parties' submissions, the court upheld the original costs award of $8,644.00, finding the mother acted unreasonably in commencing and continuing ill-conceived litigation without establishing a material change in circumstances, while the father acted reasonably throughout and served a timely offer to settle.

The applicant (father) sought costs on a full indemnity basis in the amount of $18,826.65 following a motion to change brought by the respondent (mother) that was settled at a case conference.

The father argued he was successful, had served an offer to settle, and the mother behaved unreasonably causing unnecessary legal costs.

The court found the father acted reasonably and the mother's motion was ill-conceived and without legal basis.

However, the court declined to award full recovery, instead ordering costs of $8,644.00, payable by November 30, 2020.

The court considered proportionality, reasonableness, and the mother's ability to pay, and limited recovery to time spent on matters not related to specific procedural steps and the unnecessary case conference attendance.

The applicant mother unilaterally suspended the respondent father's access to their medically fragile child, Mileena, citing COVID-19 risks.

The respondent father brought a motion for compliance and broader relief, while the applicant mother brought a cross-motion.

The court previously ordered the mother to restore access.

In this decision, the court found the respondent father's current motion for compliance was no longer urgent because the applicant mother had restored access.

The court emphasized the parents' obligation to ensure access and protect the child from parental conflict, warning against future non-compliance and potential police enforcement.

An earlier order regarding COVID-19 precautions was amended by consent.

The parties engaged in a family arbitration that resulted in an award ordering the respondent to pay $450,000 in lump sum spousal support and $185,000 in costs.

The respondent appealed the award and brought a motion to stay its enforcement pending the appeal, while the applicant moved to dismiss or stay the appeal due to the respondent's failure to pay the award.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the respondent failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, particularly given the arbitrator's findings of egregious financial non-disclosure by the respondent.

The court declined to dismiss the appeal as an abuse of process but ordered that the respondent must comply with the support order by a specified date, failing which the applicant could move to dismiss the appeal.

The applicant sought equalization of net family property, but the respondent argued the claim was statute-barred due to a limitation period, asserting an earlier separation date.

The court bifurcated the issue of the date of separation.

The applicant claimed reconciliation and cohabitation from May 2009 to January 2011, while the respondent maintained separation since August 2004 with no reasonable prospect of resuming cohabitation.

The court found the parties separated in August 2004 and did not reconcile, dismissing the applicant's claim regarding the later separation date.

The applicant moved to enforce an access review provision in a separation agreement, seeking to increase his overnight access to the child.

The respondent opposed and brought a cross-motion for dismissal, transfer of the file to Brampton, and a section 30 assessment.

The court granted the applicant's request for increased access, finding that the "review" test, not "material change," applied and that the increase was in the child's best interests.

The court also granted the respondent's request for a section 30 assessment but adjourned the file transfer request.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.