Christina Doris

The appellant mother brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of an interlocutory order that permitted the respondent father to continue in-person access to their immunocompromised child during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The mother also sought the appointment of counsel for the child.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay pending appeal.

While finding the appeal raised a serious issue, the court concluded the child would not suffer irreparable harm due to the strict safety conditions imposed by the motion judge, and the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The mother's motion for a stay and appointment of counsel was dismissed, as was the father's motion to admit fresh evidence.

The parties engaged in a family arbitration that resulted in an award ordering the respondent to pay $450,000 in lump sum spousal support and $185,000 in costs.

The respondent appealed the award and brought a motion to stay its enforcement pending the appeal, while the applicant moved to dismiss or stay the appeal due to the respondent's failure to pay the award.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the respondent failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, particularly given the arbitrator's findings of egregious financial non-disclosure by the respondent.

The court declined to dismiss the appeal as an abuse of process but ordered that the respondent must comply with the support order by a specified date, failing which the applicant could move to dismiss the appeal.

The applicant sought equalization of net family property, but the respondent argued the claim was statute-barred due to a limitation period, asserting an earlier separation date.

The court bifurcated the issue of the date of separation.

The applicant claimed reconciliation and cohabitation from May 2009 to January 2011, while the respondent maintained separation since August 2004 with no reasonable prospect of resuming cohabitation.

The court found the parties separated in August 2004 and did not reconcile, dismissing the applicant's claim regarding the later separation date.

The applicant moved to enforce an access review provision in a separation agreement, seeking to increase his overnight access to the child.

The respondent opposed and brought a cross-motion for dismissal, transfer of the file to Brampton, and a section 30 assessment.

The court granted the applicant's request for increased access, finding that the "review" test, not "material change" applied and that the increase was in the child's best interests.

The court also granted the respondent's request for a section 30 assessment but adjourned the file transfer request.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The appellant and respondent appealed from a trial judge's order dealing with child support and spousal support.

The appellant sought to characterize a $75,000 advance as a payment on account of spousal support, while the respondent contended that the trial judge erred in calculating the length of cohabitation as 13 years instead of 16.5 years, which affected the duration of spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding the $75,000 payment and allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the period of cohabitation should be 16 years and 5 months, resulting in an increased duration of spousal support from 11 years to 14 years from the date of separation.

A father appealed a declaration granted by the Superior Court that his 16-year-old daughter had withdrawn from parental control under section 65 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The father argued that he was entitled to be a party to the application and that the court should not have granted the declaration.

The Court of Appeal held that while parents must be parties to applications under Part III of the CLRA, the court retains discretion to direct the extent of their participation.

The court also held that the factors to be considered on such an application extend beyond the child's age to include the reasons for the declaration, its utility, and the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the father's motion regarding his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, the daughter and mother sought costs.

The court found that while the father did not act in bad faith, he acted unreasonably by omitting relevant evidence, relying on inadmissible letters, using accusatory language, and failing to respond to offers to settle.

The daughter was awarded full indemnity costs of $6,063.52.

The mother's claim for costs was dismissed as her participation was not necessary.

The court issued supplementary reasons for judgment following a trial, addressing outstanding issues regarding life insurance as security for support, the timing of retroactive child and spousal support payments, and post-trial accounting.

The court found the evidentiary record deficient on the life insurance issue and ordered further affidavit evidence and potential cross-examination to resolve it.

For retroactive child support, the court fixed arrears at $86,133.54 and ordered payment in four installments by September 1, 2017.

For retroactive spousal support, arrears were fixed at $183,147.00, to be paid in 60 monthly installments of $3,052.45, commencing November 1, 2016.

The decision on costs was deferred until the life insurance issue is resolved.

The father, Robert Keith Glegg, brought a motion to set aside a prior order declaring his daughter, Olivia Glegg, an independent minor who had withdrawn from parental control, and sought temporary or permanent custody.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that Olivia, being over 16, had a common law and statutory right to withdraw from parental control, and that the father was not entitled to be a party or receive notice of the original declaration application.

The court emphasized Olivia's articulate and thoughtful reasons for her decisions, including accelerating her university entrance and attending a university in Florida, which were deemed to be in her best interests.

A child protection application brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto against parents E.S. and F.S. regarding three children (N., M., and A.) who had been exposed to domestic violence during the marriage.

The respondent father brought a motion to dismiss the protection application, arguing that the Society had failed to establish grounds for protection and that the application constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the father's motion and granted the Society's motion for temporary supervision with conditions, including that the father's access to the vulnerable child M. be subject to the child's wishes, while allowing unsupervised access to the younger child A. pending a full protection hearing.

The parties separated after a 13-year cohabitation.

The central issue at trial was the determination of both parties' incomes for calculating child and spousal support.

The applicant sought to impute significant corporate pre-tax income to the respondent, while the respondent argued for a lower income based on legitimate business retention of earnings.

The court applied the Brophy test and declined to attribute corporate pre-tax income to the respondent, but imputed a higher income due to non-disclosure.

The court also imputed income to the applicant, finding she was intentionally under-employed after a reasonable period for retraining.

The court ordered ongoing child and spousal support, calculated retroactive support arrears after applying significant credits for voluntary payments, fixed the duration of spousal support at 11 years, and affirmed its jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to order life insurance as security for support.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment on a child protection application seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection and orders for their placement in the care of their respective fathers with Society supervision.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing that material facts remained in dispute requiring a trial.

The court granted the Society's motion for summary judgment, finding that the children were in need of protection from risk of emotional harm pursuant to section 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the mother's inability to cope with significant life stressors, coupled with her failure to address underlying issues and seek treatment, created a real and pressing risk of emotional harm to the children.

The court ordered the children to remain in their fathers' care subject to Society supervision for seven months and structured the mother's access to ensure regular, consistent contact while protecting the children from further harm.

The applicant father sought temporary custody of two young children and permission to relocate them to France.

The respondent mother opposed the transfer and sought return of the children to her primary care.

The court found that the father's concerns about the mother's mental health deterioration during the summer were credible and well-grounded, supported by observations from multiple independent sources including the Children's Aid Society.

The court determined that the father could provide greater stability for the children at that time and granted him temporary custody with supervised access for the mother.

The court also granted permission for the father to relocate with the children to France, finding that Canada was not the appropriate jurisdiction for long-term parenting arrangements given immigration constraints, language considerations, and the availability of family support in France.