Chris Argiropoulos

A co-mortgagor brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by a lender on a mortgage securing a $50,000 loan used by the co-defendant spouse for business purposes.

The moving party argued she misunderstood the deadline to file a defence and moved promptly after retaining counsel.

The court applied the principles governing the setting aside of default judgments, including whether the default was explained, whether the motion was brought promptly, and whether there was an arguable defence.

Although two proposed defences lacked merit, the court found that evidence suggesting the debt may have been paid in the co-defendant’s bankruptcy raised an arguable defence.

In the interests of justice and absent procedural prejudice to the lender, the default judgment was set aside and the defendant was permitted to file a defence.

The Public Guardian and Trustee sought court approval of a proposed settlement of a long-running personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident and requested appointment as guardian of property under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The injured party opposed both the settlement and the guardianship appointment.

The court reviewed extensive medical evidence and litigation history, including expert capacity assessments and prolonged procedural delays.

It concluded the settlement was reasonable and in the best interests of the injured party given evidentiary risks and the age of the litigation.

The court also found the respondent incapable of managing property and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as guardian of property.

In a costs-only decision following a successful summary judgment and possession order under a mortgage, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs based on contractual entitlement and a Rule 49 offer, while also alleging bad faith and unreasonable delay under Rule 20.06.

The court rejected findings of bad faith or unreasonable conduct, but held the contract and Rule 49 consequences supported substantial indemnity costs.

After applying Rule 57.01 factors and proportionality, the court reduced the amount claimed and fixed fair and reasonable costs at $10,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, payable forthwith.

The appellant appealed a default judgment ordering him to pay a lump sum spousal support award of $193,385, secured by a charge on his property, after his pleadings were struck for failing to fulfill undertakings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the application judge's order, particularly given the appellant's abusive behaviour, intention not to pay support, and probable non-compliance with court orders.

The appellant's basement flooded after a municipal culvert became blocked during a major storm.

The appellant sued the city for negligence, alleging inadequate inspection and maintenance.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to establish causation because the culvert likely became blocked during the storm itself.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation or damages and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to repay student loans to the respondent bank.

The central issue was whether the loans were ordinary bank loans subject to a two-year limitation period, or government student loans exempt from limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court found the trial judge erred in concluding the loans were made under the Canada Student Loans Act, as that statute had been replaced by the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act at the relevant time.

Given the insufficient evidentiary record regarding the exact nature of the loans, the court allowed the appeal in part and ordered a new trial.

The appellant publisher appealed a trial judgment that rectified a publishing agreement due to mutual mistake and awarded damages and costs to the respondent societies.

The trial judge found the parties intended the contract's subscriber list requirement to include both institutional and individual subscribers, not just institutional ones.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rectification, finding the trial judge properly applied the test for mutual mistake.

The Court also granted leave to appeal the costs order but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's costs award was reasonable given the appellant's conduct and the complexity of the simplified procedure action.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent on a promissory note, share purchase agreement, and guarantee.

The appellants relied on an alleged collateral agreement as a defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of any collateral agreement in the record to justify looking behind the terms of the written documents.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the order under appeal was interlocutory and its character was unaffected by the passage of time.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a judgment based on a promissory note and uncontradicted evidence of debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain submissions that contradicted concessions appropriately made by the appellants' counsel before the motion judge.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the application judge erred in applying the Miglin test and that there was inadequate disclosure by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge properly applied the Miglin test.

The Court also held that the respondents made proper documentary disclosure, and the appellant's failure to review the documents or seek legal advice did not render the disclosure inadequate.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to allow late amendments to their pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that while Rule 26.01 is generally mandatory unless prejudice cannot be compensated in costs, the proposed amendments in this case were untenable and tendered at the eleventh hour by a party forced to trial.

The appellants appealed a judgment that ordered judgment in accordance with an offer to settle, permitted equitable set-off, and extinguished the remainder of the debt owing to the bank.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment regarding the offer to settle and equitable set-off, but found no evidentiary foundation or reasons for extinguishing the remainder of the debt.

The appeal was allowed in part to vary the judgment, directing that all monies paid pursuant to the offer to settle be used to set-off the indebtedness, without extinguishing the remaining debt.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement benefits for work performed at an equine centre in exchange for boarding her horses.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the arrangement was not employment or, alternatively, was self-employment.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was an employee, not self-employed, and that her income included the value of the payment in kind (horse boarding).

The applicant was awarded $1,639.90 in income replacement benefits.

Claims for a special award and for a frivolous arbitration penalty were dismissed.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits.

The Insurer terminated benefits and scheduled insurer examinations, which the Applicant did not attend.

The Insurer argued the Applicant was precluded from arbitrating her claims under sections 42 and 50 of the Schedule.

The Arbitrator found that the Applicant's counsel had requested a postponement and that the Applicant had reasonable medical explanations for her non-attendance, including a confused state and impending back surgery.

The Arbitrator ruled that the Applicant may proceed with the arbitration.