CIBC v. Houlahan, 2011 ONSC 558

CITATION: CIBC v. Houlahan, 2011 ONSC 558

St. Catharines Court File No.: 50741/08

Dated: January 20, 2011

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

BETWEEN: )

CANADIAN IMPERIAL ) C. Argiropoulos,

BANK OF COMMERCE ) for the plaintiff (respondent)

Plaintiff )

(Respondent) )

─ and ─ )

RANDY HOULAHAN a.k.a. ) defendant (appellant), in person

RANDY J. HOULAHAN )

Defendant ) HEARD: July 26, September 10, 2010

(Appellant) ) and January 14, 2011,

) at St. Catharines

J.W. Quinn J.: ─

I INTRODUCTION

[1] The respondent, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“CIBC”), brought action in the Small Claims Court against the appellant, Randy Houlahan, a.k.a. Randy J. Houlahan (“Houlahan”), for unpaid student loans obtained by him while he was attending university. After a contested trial, CIBC was granted judgment for $9,280.68, plus interest and costs.

[2] This being an appeal from a final order of a Small Claims Court, it was heard by me sitting as a judge of the Divisional Court.[^1]

[3] The Notice of Appeal lists three grounds of appeal. It is argued that the learned Deputy Trial Judge erred: (1) in concluding that the amount claimed by CIBC was a student loan within the meaning of the Canada Student Loans Act; (2) “in disregarding the admission of the [CIBC] witness . . . that the amount claimed was the sole risk of CIBC and that there was no reimbursement or recovery from any other source and that, therefore, the amount claimed was not a student loan”; and, (3) in holding that the action was not statute barred.

[4] The central issue at trial, and the above three grounds of appeal, all require identifying the type of loans received by Houlahan, as this will dictate the applicable limitation period: a Government of Canada student loan is exempt from the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B; an ordinary bank-to-customer loan is not. Houlahan maintains that his loans were the latter and, therefore, are statute barred.

[5] Houlahan also raises an issue, neither pleaded at trial nor found in the Notice of Appeal, for which leave is sought to admit fresh evidence.

II BACKROUND

1. The pleadings

[6] The Claim issued on behalf of CIBC alleges that: (1) Houlahan “applied for loans for post-secondary education under the Canada Student Assistance Program”;[^2] (2) the loan applications of Houlahan “were accepted and loan agreements were duly executed by the parties”; (3) “funds were advanced directly by [CIBC] or assigned under the Program by [Houlahan]”; (4) “The terms of the loans provided for interest to be paid on the outstanding principal balance at the rate of 8.5% per annum”; (5) “the [loan agreements] provided that [Houlahan] would make regular monthly payments . . .”; (6) “[Houlahan] failed to make the required monthly payments and therefore the loans are now in default”; (7) “. . . [CIBC] has demanded payment in full . . .”

[7] The amount sought by CIBC was $9,280.68, being the outstanding principal, plus accrued interest of $1,699.68 as of March 2, 2007 (the Claim was issued on March 19, 2007).

[8] It is undisputed that Houlahan was a full-time student at Brock University in the period 1998-2003.

[9] The Defence is parsimoniously drafted (not a bad thing), occupying less than half of a printed page. It pleads that: (1) Houlahan “is not indebted to [CIBC] in any amount”; (2) “the Claim is statute barred”; (3) “in the alternative, [Houlahan] has made payments in the amount of approximately $3,870 which [have] not been credited”; (4) “in the alternative, [CIBC] has added unauthorized debts”; (5) “in the alternative, [CIBC] is claiming unauthorized interest”; (6) “such further and other defence(s) as may arise and the court may permit.”

[10] Defences (3), (4) and (5) were not pursued at trial. Consequently, the appeal does not raise any arithmetical challenge to the amount of the judgment.

2. The trial

(a) central issue at trial

[11] As I have already stated, the central issue at trial was whether the loans to Houlahan were student loans, made by CIBC under the Canada Student Loans Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-23 or whether they were ordinary loans provided to him by CIBC: if the latter, the loans are governed by the two-year limitation period under s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002; if the former, they are not subject to any limitation period. Section 16(1)(k), as it relates to the circumstances of this appeal, provides:

16(1) There is no limitation period in respect of,

(k) a proceeding to recover money owing in respect of student loans . . . made under the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities Act, the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act or the Canada Student Loans Act, . . .

(b) evidence at trial

[12] There was one witness at trial, Diana Sacco (“Sacco”), a CIBC employee. She told of two types of student loans ─ “there’s provincial and there’s federal” and “the loan[^3] that we’re dealing with and discussing today is under the federal program.”

[13] Sacco testified about the distinction between “guaranteed student loans” and “risk loans” and, importantly, categorized the loans to Houlahan as the latter:

Student loans have sort of evolved over time and changed somewhat, but there were . . . Canada Student Loans that were provided which were fully guaranteed by the government, which would mean that if it went into default the government would repay the financial institution and it would be the government that would pursue the student. In this particular case, we have what is called the ‘Risk Canada Student Loan’ and that is where the government had asked that banks honour the applications that come from students, that the risk resides with the bank . . .

. . . but starting with this type of loan which . . . Houlahan was involved, the loans with us are not guaranteed by the government. We [CIBC] own it lock, stock and barrel.

[14] The following are the CIBC documents concerning the loans in this case, about which Sacco testified (those requiring a signature by the borrower were signed by Houlahan):

	Date	Document	Amount
1.	Sept. 10, 1998	Canada Student Loans Program Schedule 1	not to exceed $3,900 with $1,900 to be remitted to Brock University
2.	Sept. 10, 1998	CIBC Student Loan Agreement (Canada Student Loans Program) containing promissory note	$3,887
3.	Sept. 9, 1999	CIBC Student Loan Agreement (Canada Student Loans Program) containing promissory note	$3,553
4.	Sept. 13, 1999	Canada Student Loans Program Schedule 1	not to exceed $3,600 with $1,285 to be remitted to Brock University
5.	Jan. 17, 2000	CIBC Student Loan Agreement (Canada Student Loans Program) containing promissory note	$1,102
6.	Jan. 17, 2000	Canada Student Loans Program Schedule 1	not to exceed $1,200 with NIL to be remitted to Brock University
7.	Jan. 26, 2000	Canada Student Loans Program Schedule 1	not to exceed $700 with $259.87 to be remitted to Brock University
8.	Jan. 26, 2000	CIBC Student Loan Agreement (Canada Student Loans Program) containing promissory note	$615
9.	Sept. 14, 2000	Canada Student Loans Program Schedule 1	not to exceed $5,500 with $2,200 to be remitted to Brock University
10.	Sept. 17, 2002	Canada Student Loans Program Schedule 2 (confirmation of enrolment)
11.	Mar. 2, 2007	CIBC National Student Centre statement of account sent to appellant	balance owing $10,980.36
12.	Aug. 23, 2007	CIBC National Student Centre statement of account sent to appellant	balance owing $11,259.16
13.	Sept. 7, 2007	CIBC National Student Centre statement of account sent to appellant	balance owing $11,292.53
14.	Nov. 25, 2001	CIBC Student Loan Consolidation Agreement Canada Student Loan Program	for the sum of $9,545.03 @ 7.00%
15.	Dec. 15, 2003	CIBC Student Loan Consolidation Agreement Canada Student Loan Program	for the sum of $9,713.39 @ 7.00%
16.	Jan. 22, 2004	CIBC Student Loan Consolidation Agreement Canada Student Loan Program	for the sum of $9,713.39 @ 7.00%

[15] Documents numbers 2, 3, 5 and 8 show four Student Loan Agreements, totalling $9,157.00 for principal, as of January 26, 2000.

[16] Each of documents numbers 1, 4, 6, 7 and 9 contains the following:

(a) a reference to Brock University as the “educational institution” attended by Houlahan;

(b) a reference to the Ministry of Education and Training as the “appropriate authority”;[^4]

(c) a Confirmation of Enrolment (completed by the educational institution and signed by Houlahan) which reads:

This confirms that this student is enrolled full-time as required (1) by the CSFAA and CSFAR for CSFALs and (2) by the CSLA and CSLR for CSLs; the student is registered at the above named institution at the post-secondary level for the period of studies ending in the month shown above.

(d) a Consent and Certification signed by Houlahan, which mentions “CSFALs and CSLs” and states:

If I have entered into any CSL agreements or CSFAL agreements while a minor, I hereby ratify those agreements.

(e) a reference to a copy of the document being “sent to the Canada Student Loans Program.”

[17] Document number 10 is very similar, in all material respects, to documents numbers 1, 4, 6, 7, and 9.

[18] Documents numbers 2, 3, 5 and 8 (each of which includes a promissory note signed by Houlahan) contain these passages:

(a) “I certify that all information contained on the Canada Student Loans Program’s Certificate of Eligibility and in this Agreement are true and complete . . .”;

(b) “If I entered into any Agreement under the Old Act or the New Act or signed any Promissory Notes while I was a minor, I hereby ratify those Agreements and Notes”;

(c) “I have read and I understand the Additional Terms and Conditions set forth on the reverse, which form part of this Agreement.”[^5]

[19] Sacco described the loan procedure in this manner:

What happens is when the student applies for the student loan program at a particular university he’s provided with a form saying that ‘yes’ he qualifies, depending on the program loan support, for a certain dollar amount. That dollar amount is then on a, on a document brought from and filled out by the university, brought to the [banking] institution of choice for the student, and we then honour that by proceeding with advancing how much the loan has been assigned for.

[20] When cross-examined, Sacco, surprisingly, could not identify the statute under which the loans to Houlahan were advanced:

I’m, I’m not fully familiar with the statute but let me explain it this way, the government has indicated when students get, require the financing and provide the document to the bank, we are required and are obligated to fulfill that request from the student. So, I would assume it would be written somewhere in a statute, although I personally have never read the statute . . .

[21] Sacco answered “Yes” to this question from the trial judge:

But basically your evidence was that there’s a statute that says the bank is required to give the loan when the student brings in the documents and the receipt from the university, is that correct?

[22] It was the testimony of Sacco that the student loan procedure requires the student, upon graduation, “to come in and sign a consolidation statement[^6] which outlines the type of repayment he can choose.” Houlahan signed three consolidation agreements.[^7] The operative one is dated January 22, 2004 (document number 16 above) and it states, in part:

I agree to pay CIBC the outstanding loan balance (line 4) [$9,713.39] with interest calculated monthly on the daily balance of my loan. I will pay CIBC interest at a rate equal to [the] floating rate . . . prime rate plus 2.5% per year . . . amount of each monthly payment [is] $89.02 . . .

[23] Houlahan made a payment of $89.02 on February 29, 2004 and subsequent payments, for varying amounts, in March, April and June of that year, with the final payment coming on September 28, 2004 in the sum of $630.00.

(c) arguments at trial

[24] Houlahan did not testify or call witnesses. The argument presented on his behalf at trial[^8] related only to the statute-barred defence. It was submitted that the documents filed at trial did not mention the Canada Student Loans Act.[^9] Therefore, the loans were not made under any student-loan statute but, rather, arose pursuant to “an ordinary promissory note” and were subject to the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, rendering them statute barred.

[25] Trial counsel for CIBC argued that the documentary evidence refers to the Canada Student Loans Program, such that the documents clearly indicate the nature of the loans as being Canada Student Loans governed by the Canada Student Loans Act. Under s. 16(1)(k) of the Limitations Act, 2002, there is no limitation period for a proceeding to recover money owing under the Canada Student Loans Act.

(d) reasons of trial judge

[26] The trial judge found that:

[CIBC] has proved that [Houlahan] was advanced funds, during his years in university, under a document called ‘Student Loan Agreement,’ under which it is also stated ‘Canada Student Loans Program.’ The agreement also included promissory notes by [Houlahan] from various dates . . . with a final document entitled ‘Student Loan Consolidation Agreement’ under which it also states ‘Canada Student Loans Program.’

[27] The trial judge commented, “the only defence relied upon was that [CIBC]’s claim was statute barred.” He stated:

[Houlahan] argued that these were loans between the bank and [Houlahan] and as such were barred by the two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act. The defence reasoning was based upon the evidence of Ms. Sacco that although these student loans were made under a federal government act, she did not know which act, and that the loans were not guaranteed by the government. The loans were between the bank and student. Therefore, the defence argued that there was no reference to the Canada Student Loans Act and, therefore, the loans were not exempt from the two-year limitation period, as they would have been under s. 16(1)(k) if they were Canada Student Loans.

[28] The trial judge reviewed s. 16(1)(k) and observed that, under the Student Loan Agreements filed in evidence, there was mention of “the Old Act or the New Act.” He then referred to the Certificate of Eligibility that was part of some of the documents tendered in evidence and noted that there was a reference to “the Ministry of Education and Training, which, in s. 16(1)(k), is specifically listed as being excluded from the Limitations Act.” He added:

It further states under the heading ‘Confirmation of Enrolment’ that the student is enrolled full-time as required by, among other things, the CSLA which I take to mean the Canada Student Loans Act, in respect of a CSL or Canada Student Loan.

[29] The trial judge concluded:

The [CIBC] is not required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt but on a balance of probabilities. In this case, I find that the [CIBC] has proven its case near the beyond any reasonable doubt part. These loans fall within the exclusion to the limitation period as set out in s. 16(1)(k) of the Limitations Act and, therefore, the defence of a limitation fails.

III DISCUSSION

1. Standard of review for an appellate court

(a) questions of law

[30] “On a pure question of law, the basic rule with respect to the review of a trial judge’s findings is that an appellate court is free to replace the opinion of the trial judge with its own. Thus the standard of review on a question of law is that of correctness”: see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 at para. 8.

(b) findings of fact

[31] “The standard of review for findings of fact is that such findings are not to be reversed unless it can be established that the trial judge made a ‘palpable and overriding error’. . .”: see Housen v. Nikolaisen, supra, at para. 10.

(c) inferences of fact

[32] “If there is no palpable and overriding error with respect to the underlying facts that the trial judge relies on to draw the inference, then it is only where the inference-drawing process itself is palpably in error that an appellate court can interfere with the factual conclusion. The appellate court is not free to interfere with a factual conclusion that it disagrees with where such disagreement stems from a difference of opinion over the weight to be assigned to the underlying facts”: see Housen v. Nikolaisen, supra, at para. 23.

2. Grounds of appeal

(a) guaranteed loans, risk loans, risk-shared loans and ordinary loans

[33] Historically, the Canada Student Loans Program (“CSLP”), first introduced in 1964, has been administered under two Federal statutes: the Canada Student Loans Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-23 (“CSL Act”); and, the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act, S.C. 1994, c. 28 (“CSFA Act”).

[34] The CSLP was revamped in 1994 with the passage of the CSFA Act which, as I understand the matter, replaced the CSL Act for new student loans.[^10]

[35] Loans under the CSL Act were “guaranteed loans,” meaning that the Government of Canada was liable when borrowers defaulted. Under the CSFA Act, student loans became “risk-shared loans.”[^11] Thus, as of 1995, the Government of Canada ceased guaranteeing new student loans. All of the loans to Houlahan, whatever their type, post-dated 1995.

[36] Sacco was clear in her testimony that the loans to Houlahan were “risk loans,” for which CIBC was fully responsible,[^12] yet neither of the above federal statutes says anything about “risk loans”; although, as I have said, the CSFA Act does address something called “risk-shared loans.”

[37] What is the distinction, if any, between “risk loans” and “risk-shared loans”? At first grammatical glance, the notion of “risk-shared loans” seems to imply something less onerous for the lender than “risk loans.” However, there is no evidence either way.

[38] I am unable to reconcile Sacco’s use of the term “risk loans” with the absence of those words from the CSFA Act. Consequently, it seems to me that I cannot infer that the loans were made under the CSFA Act. More evidence is needed.

[39] If the loans were not made under the CSFA Act (and bearing in mind that they could not have been made under the CSL Act because it was not in force for 1995 student loans), then, in so far as s. 16(1)(k) of the Limitations Act, 2002 is concerned, that leaves only the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.19 – a provincial statute – and Sacco testified that the loans to Houlahan came under the federal student-loans program. As well, that statute is silent as to both “risk loans” and “risk-shared loans.”[^13]

[40] The issue is further clouded by the fact that the documents filed in evidence by CIBC contain references to the CSL Act, legislation that is irrelevant to the loans to Houlahan.[^14] No one at trial mentioned the CSFA Act (even though many of the exhibits contain the acronym “CSFAA,” which likely means the CSFA Act).

[41] As I have already pointed out more than once, Houlahan argued at trial and in this court that the loans were not made under the CSLP but, instead, were simply ordinary loans between him and CIBC.

[42] It is clear that the loans were not guaranteed loans, but beyond that, there is insufficient evidence to identify the nature of the loans.

(b) first ground of appeal

[43] The first ground of appeal is that the trial judge erred in concluding that the loans to Houlahan were made under the CSL Act. That appears to have been the conclusion reached by the trial judge, and he certainly referred to the CSL Act in his decision (as did trial counsel for CIBC in her closing argument). With the CSL Act having been replaced by the CSFA Act at the time of the loans to Houlahan, the trial judge was led into error.

(c) second ground of appeal

[44] The second ground of appeal is awkwardly worded in the Notice of Appeal and so I will quote it again, in part. Houlahan contends that the trial judge erred in disregarding “the admission of [Sacco] . . . that the amount claimed was the sole risk of the CIBC’s and that there was no reimbursement or recovery from any other source and that, therefore, the amount claimed was not a student loan.” Although the loans were “risk loans,” according to Sacco, not “guaranteed loans,” it is incorrect to say that she described them as not being student loans. Indeed, the opposite is the case. However, that begs the question whether the loans were “risk loans,” “risk-shared loans” or ordinary loans.

(d) third ground of appeal

[45] The validity of the third ground of appeal (that the trial judge erred in holding that the action was not statute barred) cannot be determined until the type or nature of the loans is identified.

(e) new ground

[46] Houlahan raised a fourth ground of appeal, one that was neither pleaded nor argued at trial or included in the Notice of Appeal. It was mentioned for the first time in the factum filed by Houlahan on the appeal.

[47] The contention is that the Claim was issued and prosecuted by Accounts Recovery Corporation, as representatives of the CIBC, and that the former is a corporation operating under the Collection Agencies Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 74, which contains certain pre-litigation requirements for a collection agency to follow: (1) Section 21(1) states that “[n]o collection agency . . . shall demand payment . . . of a debt from a debtor unless the collection agency . . . has sent the debtor, by ordinary mail, a private written notice setting out the following information . . .”; (2) Section 23(3)(a) provides that “[n]o collection agency . . . shall commence a legal proceeding for the collection of a debt in the name of the creditor, unless the collection agency . . . has the written authority of the creditor to do so . . .” Houlahan argues that he was not given “written notification or proof of authorization to commence litigation proceedings . . .” He submits: “[I believe] that Accounts Recovery Corporation acted without proper authority to do so.”

[48] This fourth ground, to be argued, would require fresh evidence to be adduced. The “traditional test for the admission of fresh evidence on appeal” was summarized in Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), 2000 SCC 2, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 44 at para. 6:

(1) The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases . . .

(2) The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial.

(3) The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief, and

(4) It must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.

[49] The requirement of due diligence in (1) carries with it an obligation to explain why the fresh evidence was not adduced at trial. No such explanation was proffered.[^15] For that reason alone, I am unwilling to admit the evidence necessary for Houlahan to argue a breach of the Collection Agencies Act.[^16]

[50] Finally, the fact that the Defence pleads “such further and other defence(s) as may arise or this court may permit” does not eliminate the need for compliance with the criteria in Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta.

3. Conclusion

[51] At trial, counsel for CIBC argued that the loans to Houlahan were made under the CSL Act and the trial judge accepted that argument. The CSL Act is not applicable. Trial counsel did not say a word about the CSFA Act and, understandably, neither did the trial judge. This case was argued and decided under the wrong statute.

[52] I am convinced that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial concerning the nature or type of loans to Houlahan. Sacco testified that they were “risk loans,” but the governing legislation (which I take to be the CSFA Act) makes no mention of such loans. Additionally, I am unable to draw inferences from the evidence that would allow me to safely identify the type of loans in issue. I do not think that I should assume Sacco intended to say “risk-shared loans” instead of “risk loans” and that CIBC’s trial counsel intended to argue the CSFA Act instead of the CSL Act, and go on to infer the facts necessary to affirm the judgment. While it is true that the words “Canada Student Loans Program” appear in all 16 of the documentary exhibits, that still leaves an erroneous and incomplete evidentiary record for the purposes of identifying the statutory basis for the loans and the type of loans, all of which is a precondition to determining the applicable limitation period. Should I order a new trial? Yes.

[53] A “court to which an appeal is taken may order a new trial”: see the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134(1)(b).

[54] A new trial shall not be directed “unless some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred”: see the Courts of Justice Act, s. 134(6).

[55] “Where some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred but it affects only part of an order or decision . . . a new trial may be ordered in respect of only that part . . .”: see the Courts of Justice Act, s. 134(7).

IV RESULT

[56] The appeal is allowed in part and a new trial ordered. In my view, the interests of justice plainly require a new trial in this case on the issues of the nature or type of loans received by Houlahan and the applicable limitation period. The arithmetic of the trial judgment shall stand and need not be re-litigated. Also, the fresh-evidence issue shall not be part of the re-trial.

[57] I am inclined to conclude that the costs of this appeal should be in the cause on the new trial. However, if either side disagrees with such a disposition (and recognizing that I have not heard submissions on costs) I will entertain oral argument on a date to be obtained from the trial co-ordinator.

The Honourable Mr. Justice J.W. Quinn

RELEASED: January 20, 2011

CITATION: CIBC v. Houlahan, 2011 ONSC 558

COURT FILE NO.: 50741/08

DATE: January 20, 2011

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE

Plaintiff (Respondent)

• and -

RANDY HOULAHAN a.k.a. RANDY J. HOULAHAN

Defendant (Appellant)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

J.W. Quinn J.

Released: January 20, 2011

[^1]: An appeal lies to the Divisional Court from a final order of the Small Claims Court in an action for the payment of money in excess of $500.00 excluding costs: see s. 31(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O 1990, c. C.43; a proceeding in the Divisional Court may be heard and determined by one judge where the proceeding is an appeal under s. 31: see s. 21(2)(b); every judge of the Superior Court of Justice is also a judge of the Divisional Court: see s. 18(3); and, an appeal to the Divisional Court shall be heard in the region where the hearing that led to the decision appealed from took place, unless the parties agree otherwise or the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice orders otherwise: see s. 20(1).

[^2]: I cannot locate “Canada Student Assistance Program” in any of the 16 documents tendered by CIBC as exhibits at trial. Instead, I see numerous references to “Canada Student Loans Program.”

[^3]: There actually was more than one loan, but they were consolidated.

[^4]: With the exception of document number 9, which says: “Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities.”

[^5]: However, the documents filed at trial were photocopies and did not include the reverse sides.

[^6]: The word “statement” probably should be “agreement.”

[^7]: I do not know why three were signed.

[^8]: Houlahan was represented by a paralegal who is a former lawyer with considerable experience and ability.

[^9]: However, many of the documents refer to “CSLA” and “CSLR” which I assume mean Canada Student Loans Act and Canada Student Loans Regulations, respectively.

[^10]: It seems that, years later, in 2000, banks withdrew from the CSLP and the federal government introduced directly-financed loans, with administration and management being contracted out.

[^11]: Actually, the CSFA Act does not refer to “risk-shared loans.” It is the Canada Student Financial Assistance Regulations, SOR/95-329 that do so. The Regulations are made pursuant to s. 15 of the CSFA Act. Therefore, when, in these Reasons, I speak of “risk-shared loans” under the CSFA Act, I really mean the Regulations under that statute.

[^12]: As she put it in her evidence, and I set out earlier, the CIBC owns the loans to Houlahan, “lock, stock and barrel.”

[^13]: The documentary exhibits refer to the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, but not to the related statute.

[^14]: Mention in the CIBC exhibits of “Old Act” and “New Act” probably means “CSL Act” and “CSFA Act,” respectively. I do not know why there would be a need to cite the CSL Act or the “Old Act” in documents relating to a post-1995 student loan under the CSLP.

[^15]: On its face, the collection-agency issue is one that should have been known to Houlahan from the beginning. The Claim form shows “Accounts Recovery Corporation” as the “representative” of CIBC.

[^16]: Admission of the fresh evidence would, of course, necessitate a new trial.