C. Argiropoulos

The defendants were convicted of 69 counts under the Employer Health Tax Act and 62 counts under the Retail Sales Tax Act, involving the failure to remit over $1,675,000 in taxes.

The sentencing decision addresses a sophisticated, multi-year tax evasion scheme involving the operation of multiple related corporations and the deliberate mischaracterization of employment relationships.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 21 months imprisonment, substantial fines totaling approximately $9.9 million, and probation, finding that the offences constituted fraudulent conduct warranting incarceration despite the defendant's lack of prior criminal record.

This is a comprehensive tax evasion prosecution involving Le Jardin Banquet and Conference Centre Inc. and its director Carlo Parentela.

The defendants operated a banquet hall in Woodbridge, Ontario and were charged with 131 offences under the Retail Sales Tax Act and Employer Health Tax Act, including wilfully evading tax, making false statements in returns, failing to remit collected taxes, failing to collect taxes, failing to file returns, operating without a vendor permit, and wilfully failing to register as a vendor.

The Crown's investigation revealed that the defendants concealed true sales revenue through restricted access to the Sales Logix software system, withheld cash sales information from their bookkeeper and accountants, and systematically underreported tax obligations.

The defendants were found guilty on all counts after a lengthy trial spanning multiple years.

Following a successful breach of contract action and defence of a counterclaim, the successful plaintiffs sought costs.

The court considered the outcome of the litigation, the length of the trial, the issues involved, and the amounts at stake.

Finding the plaintiffs entirely successful, the court held that they were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court determined that $20,000 represented a reasonable amount that would have been contemplated for the proceeding.

The defendants were ordered to pay that amount.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract arising from the sale of a dry cleaning business, alleging the defendants failed to pay the full purchase price.

Although the written agreement stated a purchase price of $300,000, the court accepted evidence of an oral agreement establishing a true purchase price of $360,000.

After crediting payments already made, the court found that $49,000 of the purchase price remained unpaid along with additional contractual payments for continued use of the business name.

The defendants’ counterclaim for negligent misrepresentation regarding the condition of a boiler was dismissed, as the written agreement contained no warranties as to condition and the defendants had the opportunity to inspect the equipment.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiffs for $49,240.66 plus pre‑judgment interest.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought summary judgment against the defendant mortgagors following multiple defaults on a mortgage and fire insurance policy.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff's acceptance of a partial payment 'without prejudice' remade the agreement, requiring the plaintiff to restart the collection process, and counterclaimed that the plaintiff dissuaded a donor from paying off the mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no direct evidence to support the counterclaim and concluding that the partial payment was merely on account, not a remaking of the agreement.

The court also rejected the argument that the action was barred by section 42(1) of the Mortgages Act.

A co-mortgagor brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by a lender on a mortgage securing a $50,000 loan used by the co-defendant spouse for business purposes.

The moving party argued she misunderstood the deadline to file a defence and moved promptly after retaining counsel.

The court applied the principles governing the setting aside of default judgments, including whether the default was explained, whether the motion was brought promptly, and whether there was an arguable defence.

Although two proposed defences lacked merit, the court found that evidence suggesting the debt may have been paid in the co-defendant’s bankruptcy raised an arguable defence.

In the interests of justice and absent procedural prejudice to the lender, the default judgment was set aside and the defendant was permitted to file a defence.

The Public Guardian and Trustee sought court approval of a proposed settlement of a long-running personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident and requested appointment as guardian of property under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The injured party opposed both the settlement and the guardianship appointment.

The court reviewed extensive medical evidence and litigation history, including expert capacity assessments and prolonged procedural delays.

It concluded the settlement was reasonable and in the best interests of the injured party given evidentiary risks and the age of the litigation.

The court also found the respondent incapable of managing property and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as guardian of property.

In a costs-only decision following a successful summary judgment and possession order under a mortgage, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs based on contractual entitlement and a Rule 49 offer, while also alleging bad faith and unreasonable delay under Rule 20.06.

The court rejected findings of bad faith or unreasonable conduct, but held the contract and Rule 49 consequences supported substantial indemnity costs.

After applying Rule 57.01 factors and proportionality, the court reduced the amount claimed and fixed fair and reasonable costs at $10,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, payable forthwith.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to repay student loans to the respondent bank.

The central issue was whether the loans were ordinary bank loans subject to a two-year limitation period, or government student loans exempt from limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court found the trial judge erred in concluding the loans were made under the Canada Student Loans Act, as that statute had been replaced by the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act at the relevant time.

Given the insufficient evidentiary record regarding the exact nature of the loans, the court allowed the appeal in part and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed a judgment based on a promissory note and uncontradicted evidence of debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain submissions that contradicted concessions appropriately made by the appellants' counsel before the motion judge.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.