Catherine H. Rhinelander

The court considered cross-motions for interim spousal support, child support, interim disbursements, and a preservation order in the context of a high-conflict family law proceeding.

The Respondent (husband) sought spousal support and interim disbursements, while the Applicant (wife) sought to impute income to the Respondent, child support, and spousal support.

The court dismissed the Respondent’s motion, finding he failed to establish a prima facie case for spousal support and that his financial disclosure was not credible.

The court imputed income to the Respondent for child support purposes and granted the Applicant’s motion in part, awarding child support but not spousal support at this stage.

The court declined to make a preservation order or require leave for further motions but left open the possibility of such orders if non-compliance with costs orders continues.

The decision addresses a motion by the applicant for retroactive and prospective child and spousal support, interim disbursements, striking the respondent’s pleadings or imposing financial penalties for non-compliance, and costs.

The court grants the motion in part, ordering child and spousal support based on the respondent’s self-reported income, imposing financial penalties for breaches of court orders, and requiring the respondent to provide further disclosure and retain a Chartered Business Valuator.

The court declines to add the respondent’s corporation as a party or pierce the corporate veil at this stage.

Costs are awarded to the applicant.

The respondent brought a motion challenging the Superior Court's jurisdiction to hear the applicant's claim for corollary relief under the Divorce Act, given a separation agreement previously filed in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The respondent subsequently withdrew the motion but still sought an order for mediation and costs.

The court determined that the applicant was the successful party, as the court did have jurisdiction to hear the corollary relief application.

The court declined to reserve costs to the trial judge and ordered the respondent to pay costs of $11,000 to the applicant.

The applicant sought to increase child support and retroactive arrears for their adult disabled son.

The respondent sought to terminate child support and section 7 expenses, and recover overpayments.

The court found a material change in circumstances and confirmed the son remained a "child of the marriage" due to disability.

Applying section 3(2)(b) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court determined that the presumptive table amount was inappropriate given the son's receipt of ODSP and Passport funding.

The court calculated a reasonable monthly budget for the son and determined the respondent's child support obligation based on the shortfall, resulting in a reduced monthly payment.

The court also addressed retroactive overpayments and underpayments, finding the applicant owed the respondent a net amount.

Fixed section 7 contributions were terminated, but parties remained equally responsible for post-secondary expenses not covered by grants.

The Applicant mother sought final orders for sole decision-making responsibility, child support, and section 7 expenses for the child.

The Respondent father sought additional parenting time and joint decision-making responsibility.

The court, after an uncontested trial where the Respondent's pleadings were struck for financial issues, granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility with a duty to consult, ordered the father to pay child support based on his current income and arrears for section 7 expenses, and increased the father's parenting time beyond alternate weekends, including mid-week overnights, finding the previous contact insufficient for a child of the child's age.

The court also ordered life insurance as security for child support and continued health benefits.

The respondent brought a motion for the sale of the matrimonial home.

The applicant opposed, seeking to buy out the respondent's share and arguing that financial disclosure was delayed.

The court found that the respondent's pleading was sufficient to invoke the Partition Act.

While acknowledging the respondent's prima facie right to sale, the court delayed the sale to allow the applicant time to secure financing for a buyout, given the recent receipt of financial disclosure and the children's best interests.

If financing is not secured by a set date, the home must be listed for sale.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside a default judgment that granted the applicant sole decision-making responsibility, primary parenting time, and child support.

The respondent had been served with the application but failed to file an answer despite multiple extensions and warnings.

Applying the factors from Zia v. Ahmad, the court found that while the respondent moved promptly after the order was made, he did not provide an adequate explanation for his failure to participate and did not come to the court with clean hands, having failed to pay child support arrears.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

The Applicant sought summary judgment to enforce child support provisions of a separation agreement, while the Respondent sought to stay the summary judgment and remit the matter to arbitration, and to appoint a specific arbitrator.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the matter, dismissed the Respondent's motion to adjourn the summary judgment, and granted the Respondent's request to stay the summary judgment application, remitting the matter to arbitration.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion to appoint an uncertified arbitrator (William C. McDowell) and instead granted the Applicant's alternate request to appoint a certified family law arbitrator (Cheryl Goldhart), emphasizing the legal requirement for arbitrators to be properly credentialed for awards to be enforceable.

The Respondent father sought unsupervised and increased parenting time, including overnights, and equal parenting time after Labour Day.

The Applicant mother opposed this, requesting the continuation of supervised parenting time and bringing a cross-motion for primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility.

The court, applying the best interests of the child test, granted the father unsupervised daytime parenting time and supervised overnight parenting time, acknowledging his efforts to address past issues while noting serious concerns regarding his criminal history and lack of accountability.

The Applicant's cross-motion for sole decision-making and primary residence was dismissed as premature.

The applicant sought costs of $17,440.19 for a motion to consolidate civil and family proceedings.

The parties reached a consent agreement on the day of the motion.

The court found the motion was premature and could have been avoided if counsel had conferred in advance.

However, the respondents failed to comply with the rules by not filing responding materials or filing them late.

The court awarded reduced costs of $4,500 to the applicant, payable equally by the respondents.

The mother brought a motion to change a final consent order, seeking massive increases to fixed section 7 expenses and table child support, as well as financial compensation for the father's alleged failure to exercise parenting time.

She also sought interim disbursements and extensive financial disclosure, including from the father's new partner and his parents.

The court dismissed nearly all of the mother's claims, finding her disclosure requests to be a fishing expedition and her financial demands unsupported by evidence.

The court found the mother had unilaterally enrolled the child in expensive activities and used child support to fund her own lifestyle.

The father's cross-motion for overpayment of child support and section 7 expenses was granted, and the parenting schedule was varied on consent.

The mother was ordered to obtain leave before bringing further motions.

Mr. Sterling appealed a garnishment order and a previous costs order, arguing that the respondent, Ms. Gaskin, failed to properly serve cost submissions "in writing" and that he was unaware of the $8,000 costs order until much later.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that email service constituted valid "in writing" service under the Family Law Rules, especially given the amendments post-COVID-19.

The court concluded that Mr. Sterling's appeal stemmed from misunderstandings regarding service methods and the terms of a prior settlement agreement, none of which constituted valid grounds for appeal.

The court also awarded Ms. Gaskin $2,000 in costs for the appeal, considering Mr. Sterling's financial circumstances and the need to uphold the justice system's integrity.

The applicant sought an order for the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home under the Partition Act and Family Law Act due to significant mortgage and property tax arrears, and a civil action initiated by the bank.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing it was premature and would prejudice her family law claims, including spousal support and equalization.

The court ordered the immediate sale of the matrimonial home, finding the sale inevitable given the financial circumstances and the bank's actions, and that delaying it would cause further hardship.

The court also set terms for the sale process.

Emron Constantine applied for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his s.11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time, as the total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The court found a total delay of 1689 days.

After deducting 210 days for COVID-19 related delays and 400 days for defence delay, the net delay was 1079 days (approximately 35.9 months), which still exceeded the 30-month ceiling.

The court determined that a significant portion of the delay (236 days) was due to a lack of judicial resources and judicial unavailability, which was not an exceptional circumstance attributable to the Crown or defence.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted, and the charges were stayed.

The Applicant sought to have a separation agreement made a final order, retroactive application of the order, findings of breach against the Respondent, and financial penalties.

The Respondent filed a cross-motion for costs.

The court granted the request to make the separation agreement a final order but denied retroactive application.

It found the Respondent breached communication and ancillary terms of the agreement but declined to impose financial penalties under Rule 1(8) as the agreement was not yet a court order.

The court also denied the Respondent's request for costs for a previous ex-parte motion.

Further submissions on a temporary enforcement order and costs for the current motion were directed.

This case involves a family law trial addressing unresolved issues between separated parents, Zarif Ahmad Shir Ahmad (Applicant) and Nazrin Mumtaz (Respondent), concerning child support (retroactive and prospective), Section 7 expenses, spousal support, international travel with their child, and child exchange locations.

The court determined the Applicant's income for child support purposes, dismissed the Respondent's request to impute income, and calculated child support arrears.

It clarified the sharing of Section 7 expenses, dismissing claims for ordinary extracurricular activities as extraordinary.

The court dismissed the Respondent's claim for retroactive spousal support, finding she achieved financial self-sufficiency.

Regarding travel, the court restricted travel to non-Hague Convention countries without mutual consent and required the Applicant to build a stronger relationship with the child before independent travel.

Child exchange locations were ordered to be in a public place.

Costs were not awarded as both parties were self-represented and had mixed success.

The offender was sentenced for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and unauthorized possession of a firearm while subject to a prohibition order, having been acquitted of attempted murder based on self-defence.

The court considered the offender's lived experiences with anti-Black racism, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions including COVID-19 lockdowns, and his lack of prior firearm convictions.

A total sentence of 40 months was imposed, reduced to 15 months remaining after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions.

This trial addressed whether a temporary restraining order against the respondent, Mr. Visinoiu, should be made permanent under the Family Law Act and Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant, Ms. Grosu, alleged a history of physical and verbal abuse and expressed fear for her safety.

The respondent acknowledged one incident of assault but denied others and highlighted his compliance with previous court orders (bail, peace bond, temporary restraining order) and continued unsupervised parenting time with their daughter.

The court applied the objective and subjective test for restraining orders, balancing the applicant's fear against the respondent's compliance and the passage of time since the last incident.

The court found the respondent less credible but ultimately dismissed the application for a permanent restraining order, vacating the temporary order.

The court also declined to vary a previous parenting order.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, discharging a firearm, aggravated assault, and firearms possession offences following a shooting in a commercial parking lot.

The accused shot his cousin after the cousin lunged at him, allegedly armed with a knife.

The court found the accused acted in lawful self-defence when he discharged the firearm, resulting in acquittals on the shooting-related charges.

However, the court held that the accused did not act in self-defence when he initially took possession of the loaded firearm from a friend, as there was no imminent threat at that time.

The accused was found guilty of possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

In a pretrial Crown application, the court considered whether a young complainant's videotaped statement in a sexual offence prosecution could be admitted for its truth and stand in place of in-court testimony.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the court held that threshold reliability was established through the timing and content of the statement, the child's responses, surveillance evidence, and DNA evidence.

The application nevertheless failed because the Crown did not provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation to establish necessity on the basis of psychological unavailability, as the parents' evidence and a brief doctor's letter did not demonstrate a real possibility of psychological trauma from testifying.

The application was dismissed, without prejudice to renewal if additional evidence became available before trial.