Brandon Jaffe

The appellant appealed a preservation order requiring him to deliver luxury vehicles or their sale proceeds to the respondent trustee in bankruptcy, and freezing his bank accounts.

The appellant argued he only acquired a beneficial interest in the vehicles when a court declared a trust agreement valid, years after his bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's beneficial interest existed at the time of his bankruptcy pursuant to the trust agreement, and the motion judge made no error in principle in exercising his discretion to make the preservation order.

A lender brought a motion for summary judgment against personal guarantors after the principal debtor repaid the loan but the lender later returned the funds following a bankruptcy preference claim under s. 95 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The guarantors argued that the debt had been extinguished by payment, that the payment had not been set aside by a bankruptcy court, and that no proper demand had been made.

The court held that preferential payments are void as against the trustee under s. 95 and that the debt and related guarantees were revived when the lender repaid the funds to another secured creditor.

The court also found the debtor was insolvent at the time of payment and that the presumption of intention to prefer applied.

Summary judgment was granted against the guarantors.

This was a costs endorsement following a motion concerning an injunction registered against property and the effect of a stay arising from a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Although the defendants were successful on the underlying motion, the court declined to award costs after considering the plaintiffs' lack of assistance, counsel's non-attendance at the hearing, and the assistance provided by defence counsel in addressing the issues.

Applying the court's discretionary costs principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that fairness and reasonableness required no costs order.

The moving party sought an order directing the Land Registrar to discharge an earlier injunction registered on title to a property that prohibited further encumbrances.

The injunction had been obtained by corporate plaintiffs alleging that the moving party, a director and shareholder, withdrew corporate funds and used them to purchase the property.

After filing a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the moving party argued that the statutory stay invalidated or prohibited registration of the injunction.

The court held that the stay did not nullify the injunction but only stayed its enforcement, and that registration of the order during the stay did not justify discharging it after the proposal was rejected by creditors.

The motion was dismissed and the injunction remained registered to protect the plaintiffs’ claimed trust interest in the property pending trial.

The trustee in bankruptcy appealed a registrar’s decision holding that a trustee’s report filed in response to an appeal from the disallowance of a proof of claim was inadmissible and that evidence had to be provided by sworn affidavit.

The court held that the registrar erred in principle and law by interpreting the Rules of Civil Procedure as requiring affidavit evidence exclusively and by failing to follow binding authority recognizing the admissibility of reports from court officers such as trustees, receivers, and monitors.

The court confirmed that trustee reports are routinely accepted as evidence in insolvency proceedings under common law principles and are not barred by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was directed to be reheard before a different registrar.

A creditor spouse brought a motion seeking to annul the bankrupt’s automatic discharge and to lift the bankruptcy stay to pursue equalization claims against the bankrupt’s pension.

The creditor argued she intended to oppose the discharge but was misinformed about the discharge date and had difficulty filing a proof of claim due to incomplete financial disclosure.

The court held that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act establishes strict statutory timelines and the creditor had received notice of the impending discharge on two occasions.

Because no notice of opposition was filed within the statutory period and prior claim disallowances were not appealed, the court found no basis to set aside the automatic discharge.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the trustee.

Costs decision following an application involving condominium lien rights and priority issues between a condominium corporation, a contractor, and a secured lender.

The court assessed the applicant’s claim for costs against the contractor and found the requested amount disproportionate given the undefended and uncomplicated nature of the proceeding.

Costs were reduced and fixed on a substantial indemnity basis.

Although the lender was successful on the priority issue, the court departed from the general rule that costs follow the event due to the novel and important legal issue raised.

Limited costs were nevertheless awarded to the lender for an adjournment attendance caused by late service.

A condominium corporation applied for declarations and compliance orders requiring a unit owner to pay longstanding common expense arrears and sought to characterize the arrears as damages under s. 134 of the Condominium Act, 1998 so they could be added to common expenses and enforced by a priority lien.

The owner did not dispute that arrears were owed, but a mortgagee intervened, arguing the corporation could not revive expired lien rights after failing to register liens within the three‑month period required by s. 85(2).

The court held that s. 134 cannot be used to circumvent the statutory lien regime or revive expired lien rights in a manner that would prejudice prior mortgagees who had received no notice.

While the owner was ordered to pay the arrears with interest, the court refused to declare the arrears as damages capable of being added to common expenses and enforced by a new priority lien.

The equities favored the mortgagee because the condominium corporation failed to preserve its statutory lien rights.

The moving party sought to set aside default judgments entered against him in two civil actions arising from alleged investment misrepresentations and breaches of fiduciary duty.

The court applied the test under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring prompt motion, a reasonable explanation for the default, and a defence on the merits with an air of reality.

While the first two requirements were conceded, the court found the moving party failed to demonstrate a valid defence.

The affidavit evidence did not deny key allegations of reliance, misrepresentations, or investment advice, and contained unsupported assertions regarding investor sophistication and contributory negligence.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and refused to set aside the default judgments.

The applicants sought approval under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act for a sale of substantially all of their assets following a court‑approved sales and investor solicitation process.

The court considered the statutory factors in s. 36 of the CCAA, including the fairness and reasonableness of the process, the role of the monitor, consultation with creditors, and the adequacy of the consideration.

A late competing bid was rejected to preserve the integrity of the court‑approved sales process.

The court also addressed priority issues involving a DIP lender, secured creditors, and potential claims to HST refunds under the Financial Administration Act.

The proposed transaction and distribution scheme were approved as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against the respondent.

The action had vested in his trustee in bankruptcy by operation of law.

The motion judge found that the trustee had abandoned the action and that the appellant had declared bankruptcy on the eve of trial to defeat the interests of his creditors.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with these findings and dismissed the appeal, noting that re-assigning the action to the appellant would pervert the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy litigation.