Boswell

The Crown applied under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking and procuring case to testify via closed-circuit television.

The complainant expressed significant anxiety about testifying in the presence of the accused due to past trauma.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would infringe the accused's right to face his accuser and impede cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding that the use of a testimonial aid would facilitate a full and candid account from the witness and enhance the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior disreputable conduct and ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased in a murder trial where the accused allegedly beat his roommate to death.

The court ruled that statements by the deceased expressing a desire to move out and fear of the accused were admissible under the present state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

However, a statement attributing a 'hard punch' to the accused was excluded for lacking threshold reliability.

The court also admitted most of the circumstantial evidence of the accused's prior physical abuse of the deceased to show context and animus, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, but excluded observations of bruising that could not be directly linked to the accused.

During a jury trial, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police after he called 911 regarding his roommate's medical emergency.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of the accused's s. 10 Charter rights, alleging he was psychologically detained without being cautioned.

The court found that a reasonable person in the accused's position would not have felt detained, as the police were responding to a medical emergency and had no reason to suspect foul play at the time.

The court concluded the statements were voluntary and admissible.

The offender was convicted of fraud over $5,000, uttering a forged document, and defrauding the public after holding himself out as a lawyer and defrauding multiple victims, including his employer.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record for offences of dishonesty and committed the index offences while serving a conditional sentence.

The court sentenced the offender to 3 years in the penitentiary, less pre-sentence credit, and ordered restitution to the victims.

The accused, who allegedly posed as a lawyer and defrauded his employer and the public, brought a motion for a directed verdict on counts of fraud and uttering forged documents at the close of the Crown's case.

The court applied the Shephard test to determine if there was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a guilty verdict.

The court found that while there was no direct evidence of the accused forging cheques or a power of attorney, there was ample circumstantial evidence to support the charges.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The plaintiff's action and the defendant's third party claim arising from a failed real estate transaction were dismissed on consent following a summary judgment motion.

The court was tasked with determining liability for and the quantum of costs.

Applying the principles from Milina v. Bartsch, the court found that the third party claim naturally and inevitably flowed from the plaintiff's action, justifying a departure from the normal rule that a defendant pays the costs of a third party it brings into the litigation.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of both the defendant and the third parties.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at $20,000 plus HST and disbursements for each, as the amounts claimed were disproportionate to the complexity of the proceeding.

During a jury trial for a slip and fall in a commercial parking lot, the defendants tendered an expert to give opinion evidence on winter maintenance standards.

The plaintiff opposed the qualification.

Following a Mohan voir dire, the court found that the proposed expert had acquired special knowledge in winter maintenance through his post-graduate training and extensive work experience.

The court qualified the witness as an expert, noting that any deficiencies in his training compared to the plaintiff's expert went to weight rather than admissibility.

During a jury trial for a slip and fall in a parking lot, the defendants (the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor) conditionally settled their crossclaims.

The plaintiff sought disclosure of the settlement agreement.

The court ordered the agreement disclosed to the court and then to the plaintiff, finding that it altered the adversarial landscape.

Consequently, the court ruled that the defendants were no longer adverse in interest and prohibited defence counsel from asking leading questions during the cross-examination of each other's witnesses, except on narrow issues where adversity remained.

The self-represented accused, facing fraud charges for allegedly holding himself out as a lawyer and misappropriating funds, brought an application for further first-party disclosure from the Crown and third-party records from his former employers, the police, and the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The court reviewed the requests under the Stinchcombe and O'Connor frameworks.

The court ordered the production of certain invoices and payments to establish the business relationship between the accused and the law firms, and ordered the Crown to provide witness lists and criminal records.

Requests for client files were denied due to solicitor-client privilege, and the request for Law Society records was dismissed as a fishing expedition.

The accused, charged with fraud-related offences, brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained from search warrants executed at his home and business.

He sought leave to cross-examine the police officer who swore the Information to Obtain (ITO), alleging material misrepresentations.

The court denied leave, finding no evidentiary basis to support the alleged misrepresentations and concluding that cross-examination would not elicit testimony tending to discredit the preconditions for the warrants.

The Garofoli application was dismissed, as the court found ample support in the ITO for the issuance of the warrants.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving, and failing to remain at the scene after striking two municipal workers with his truck.

The accused raised a defence of non-mental disorder automatism, arguing he was in a parasomniac state (sleep-driving) at the time of the collision.

The court rejected the automatism defence, finding the accused fell asleep at the wheel due to extreme fatigue and alcohol impairment, rather than a sleep disorder.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

However, he was acquitted of dangerous driving because it was not reasonably foreseeable that he would fall asleep during the short drive, and acquitted of failing to remain because he was asleep during the collision and unaware it had occurred.

The defendants, on trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion and robbery, raised numerous objections to the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown misstated evidence, improperly referenced out-of-court statements, and undermined the presumption of innocence, seeking a mistrial or the right to make reply submissions.

The court reviewed the objections and found that while some of the Crown's comments required corrective instructions in the final jury charge, the conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

The applications for a mistrial and for reply submissions were dismissed.

The accused, along with three co-accused, was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion.

The accused brought a Corbett application to restrict cross-examination on his criminal record, which included five prior convictions for assault.

The Crown and a co-accused brought cross-applications to adduce evidence of the underlying facts of those assaults and other violent conduct as propensity evidence.

The court granted the accused's application, limiting cross-examination to his non-violent convictions, and dismissed the cross-applications.

The court found that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior violent conduct substantially outweighed its probative value, particularly given the risk of propensity reasoning in a trial involving blunt force trauma.

During a murder trial involving a home invasion, defence counsel for one of the co-accused sought to create a summary chart of a key Crown witness's testimony on an easel pad during cross-examination.

The Crown and counsel for another co-accused objected, arguing the chart was unnecessary, cumulative, and potentially misleading.

The court allowed the use of the demonstrative aid, finding that it was a useful organizational tool, met threshold reliability, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any trial management or trial fairness prejudice.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion, the co-accused applied to redact portions of two videotaped police statements made by two of the accused.

The applicants argued that the statements contained inadmissible hearsay that was highly prejudicial to the non-makers.

The court applied the principles for editing co-accused statements, balancing the probative value of the narrative context against the prejudicial effect.

The court ordered the redaction of gratuitous police comments, irrelevant bad character evidence, and highly prejudicial post-offence conduct (wiping a coffee cup), but retained the core narrative descriptions of the events, holding that limiting instructions would adequately protect the co-accused.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the jury reported that a juror's spouse had been attending the proceedings and texting the juror information about the case, which was then shared with other jurors.

Two of the accused brought an application for a mistrial.

The court conducted an inquiry, questioning each juror individually, and determined that the information imparted was innocuous, primarily concerning scheduling delays and a witness's appearance.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the improper contact did not cause actual prejudice or irreparably taint the appearance of justice and fairness.

During a joint murder trial involving five accused, one accused (Mylvaganam) sought to introduce an alternate suspect defence, which included propensity evidence against a co-accused (Carty).

The trial judge prematurely ruled on the admissibility of this propensity evidence without a full evidentiary record or complete submissions.

Carty brought an application for severance, arguing the premature ruling gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the ruling was premature, a fully informed reasonable person would not apprehend bias, as the error could be remedied by conducting a proper and fulsome voir dire on the propensity evidence.

During jury selection for a complex, six-month murder trial, the applicant sought to discharge the sworn jurors and increase juror compensation, arguing that the high rate of excusals for financial hardship violated her Charter right to a representative jury panel.

The court acknowledged the inadequacy of current juror compensation but found that the remaining panel, after hardship excusals, was still sufficiently representative of the community.

The court held that the characteristic of being paid by an employer for jury service is not material to juror competence or impartiality, and dismissed the application.

The respondent was arrested for impaired driving and placed in a police cell under video surveillance.

She was videotaped using the toilet, which she argued violated her s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

The trial judge agreed and granted a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the finding of a s. 8 breach, concluding that the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the use of the toilet.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the remedy, finding that a stay of proceedings was not warranted as this was a case of first instance and the breach was not egregious enough to justify the ultimate remedy.

The stay was set aside.

The plaintiff, a cyclist with significant pre-existing psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities, was struck by a police cruiser while riding through a pedestrian crosswalk at night.

The court apportioned liability 60% to the defendant police officer and 40% to the plaintiff.

Applying the thin skull rule, the court found the collision exacerbated the plaintiff's pre-existing conditions and caused a mild traumatic brain injury, rendering him completely disabled and requiring 24/7 attendant care.

Total damages were assessed at over $5.2 million, reduced to $3,131,370 after accounting for contributory negligence.