Paul Cooper

The respondent challenged the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction to make 2013 temporary child and spousal support orders, arguing neither party was ordinarily resident in Ontario for a year prior to the application.

The court agreed it lacked jurisdiction under the Divorce Act but found it had jurisdiction under the provincial Family Law Act.

The court upheld the validity of the 2013 orders and refused to order a retroactive refund.

However, because the parties obtained a valid divorce in Scotland in 2019, the court terminated the respondent's ongoing spousal support obligation prospectively.

During a trial for importing cocaine, the Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from a detective regarding drug paraphernalia and cash seized from the accused's residence.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and constituted prejudicial bad character evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence admissible, finding that tools of the drug trade are logically relevant to the charge of importing large quantities of cocaine, as importers typically do so for distribution.

The court concluded the evidence was highly probative and its admission would not lead to improper propensity reasoning.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert in fingerprint and palm print analysis and comparison using the ACE-V method.

The defence opposed the qualification, arguing that fingerprint analysis is not a science and that the ACE-V method is susceptible to confirmation bias and lacks fixed standards.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey frameworks for the admissibility of expert evidence.

The court found that the officer's extensive training and experience met the threshold requirements and that the evidence was sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant admission, noting that defence concerns could be addressed in cross-examination.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the jury reported that a juror's spouse had been attending the proceedings and texting the juror information about the case, which was then shared with other jurors.

Two of the accused brought an application for a mistrial.

The court conducted an inquiry, questioning each juror individually, and determined that the information imparted was innocuous, primarily concerning scheduling delays and a witness's appearance.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the improper contact did not cause actual prejudice or irreparably taint the appearance of justice and fairness.

During jury selection for a complex, six-month murder trial, the applicant sought to discharge the sworn jurors and increase juror compensation, arguing that the high rate of excusals for financial hardship violated her Charter right to a representative jury panel.

The court acknowledged the inadequacy of current juror compensation but found that the remaining panel, after hardship excusals, was still sufficiently representative of the community.

The court held that the characteristic of being paid by an employer for jury service is not material to juror competence or impartiality, and dismissed the application.