Boswell

The defendant, convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault after a drug-induced psychotic episode, applied post-conviction but pre-sentencing to re-open his constitutional challenge to s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a recent decision by a coordinate judge (R. v. McCaw), which held that a prior declaration of unconstitutionality was binding, constituted exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Lessard test requires exceptional circumstances to re-open a case.

The court disagreed with the reasoning in McCaw, affirming that the horizontal convention of precedent applies to constitutional declarations and that the court was not bound by the prior decision striking down s. 33.1.

The Crown sought to introduce eleven autopsy photographs in a homicide trial where the accused allegedly struck the deceased with a hammer.

The defence contested the admissibility of two photographs that showed the deceased's face alongside the injuries.

The court applied the balancing test for probative value versus prejudicial effect.

Finding that the contested photographs were redundant because other uncontested photographs adequately showed the same injuries without displaying the deceased's face, the court excluded the two photographs to avoid unnecessary emotional impact on the jury.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to cross-examine a Crown witness on out-of-court exculpatory statements made by the accused.

The defence argued the statements were not tendered for the truth of their contents, but to test the witness's credibility and reliability.

The Crown objected to the use of these statements.

The court ruled that generally, out-of-court exculpatory utterances of an accused cannot be introduced through a non-accused witness to challenge credibility, as this offends the rules against hearsay and prior consistent statements.

The court permitted the defence to cross-examine the witness on one specific pre-offence statement to test her recollection, but prohibited questioning on another statement that appeared to be based on hearsay from other individuals.

The plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries in a snowboarding accident and sued the resort and others.

In a separate action, the plaintiff sued a rehabilitation centre for negligent care.

The resort brought a third-party claim against the rehabilitation centre in the main action for contribution and indemnity.

The rehabilitation centre moved to strike the third-party claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court granted the motion, finding that because the plaintiff had expressly limited his claim against the resort to its several share of liability, the resort faced no risk of paying a disproportionate share of damages.

Consequently, the third-party claim for contribution and indemnity was untenable in law.

The accused, charged with murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault after stabbing his father and his father's partner while hallucinating on magic mushrooms, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code.

Section 33.1 precludes the defence of self-induced intoxication for general intent offences involving violence.

The court found that while s. 33.1 violates the accused's rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by substituting the intent to become intoxicated for the fault and voluntariness elements of the offences, the provision is saved under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court held that protecting victims, particularly women and children, from intoxicated violence and ensuring offender accountability are pressing and substantial objectives that justify the Charter infringements.

The Crown applied for a ruling on the voluntariness of a statement made by the self-represented accused to a homicide investigator.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his father, argued he lacked an operating mind during the interview due to mental health issues.

The court applied the Oickle and Whittle tests, finding that the accused understood what he was saying, knew he was speaking to a police officer, and appreciated the potential consequences.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, not the result of threats, promises, or trickery, and ruled it admissible in its entirety.

During a murder trial involving a Mr. Big undercover operation, the Crown sought to introduce statements the accused made to an undercover officer about his prior involvement in the cocaine trade.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

The court applied the framework for propensity evidence and found that the evidence was highly probative to the jury's assessment of the reliability of the accused's confession, as it provided context regarding his sophistication and vulnerability to inducements.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, concluding its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice, which could be managed with a limiting instruction.

The plaintiffs brought a supplemental motion for summary judgment to hold the individual defendants personally liable for the unpaid purchase price of a fitness club business.

The court found that the individual defendants, as the controlling minds of the corporate defendant, used the corporation to engage in improper and dishonest conduct by converting the plaintiffs' assets without payment.

Applying the principles of good faith dealing and piercing the corporate veil, the court granted summary judgment against the individual defendants for $58,697.06.

The plaintiff sued multiple defendants for damages arising from the termination of a commercial sublease for a race shop.

Two defendants, who managed the plaintiff's race car under a separate services agreement, moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

The court found that the moving parties were not parties to the sublease and had no obligation under the services agreement to obtain an occupancy permit for the premises.

The court also dismissed the claims for negligent misrepresentation, intentional interference with economic relations, and trespass due to a lack of evidence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action against the moving parties was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sold their fitness club franchise to the corporate defendant via an Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) without legal representation.

The corporate defendant took possession but failed to pay the purchase price, which involved assuming two small business loans, and failed to pay rent, causing the plaintiffs to default on their lease and incur a claw-back of deferred rent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment for the amounts owed and sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold the personal defendants liable.

The court granted summary judgment against the corporate defendant for the loan amounts and the foreseeable deferred rent claw-back, totaling $85,637.97.

However, the court ordered a mini-trial to determine liability for three months of rent and dismissed the claims against the personal defendants because the tort of conversion and breach of good faith were not pleaded, though leave to amend was granted.

During pre-trial motions for a murder trial, the accused sought an order to have his leg shackles removed while in the courtroom.

The Crown opposed the request for security reasons, citing alleged gang affiliation, a prior incident in the cells, and staffing pressures.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused posed a flight or safety risk to justify the continued use of shackles, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered the shackles removed.

The third party plaintiffs, who installed septic systems in a residential subdivision, were sued by the builder after 35 systems failed and had to be replaced due to non-compliant filter sand.

After settling the main action, the installers brought a third party claim against the aggregate supplier who provided the filter sand, alleging breach of contract and negligence.

The court found the supplier breached an implied warranty of fitness under section 15 of the Sale of Goods Act because the sand did not meet Ontario Building Code specifications.

The court awarded the installers their settlement costs and legal fees as damages, but apportioned fault, reducing the damages by 16.5% to account for the installers' own design and installation errors.

The negligence claim was dismissed due to a lack of expert evidence establishing the standard of care for manufacturing filter sand.

The offender pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a sentence of one year, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court noted the offender's significant rehabilitative efforts, including overcoming addiction, securing employment, and caring for her children and ailing mother.

Finding this to be an exceptional case where a lengthy custodial sentence would impair rehabilitation, the court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence followed by two years of probation.

The applicant lawyer successfully moved to oppose confirmation of an Assessment Officer's ruling regarding unpaid legal accounts, while the respondents' motion to oppose was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs of $21,109.76 for the two motions, including a portion on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' late adjournment request.

The court found no conduct justifying an elevated scale of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Emphasizing proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the respondents to the applicant at $15,448.46 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and weapons dangerous following a late-night altercation outside a nightclub.

The victims, who were highly intoxicated, instigated the confrontation and chased the accused and his friend when they attempted to flee.

The accused, fearing for his life, used a pocket knife to stab at least one of the pursuers.

The court found the accused acted in lawful self-defence and that his possession of the knife was not for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was tried for sexual assault and unlawful confinement of a young employee following a work-related meeting at the accused's home.

The employee became highly intoxicated and passed out, later waking up to find the accused sexually touching him.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's denials and relying on the complainant's testimony, which was supported by circumstantial DNA evidence.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault but acquitted of unlawful confinement due to reasonable doubt regarding physical restraint.

The applicant lawyer and respondent clients both brought motions to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision regarding unpaid legal accounts.

The clients argued the Assessment Officer made numerous errors, including reversing the onus of proof, misapprehending evidence, and improperly relying on business records for a law clerk who did not testify.

The court dismissed the clients' motion, finding that the Assessment Officer properly applied the burden of proof, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and correctly admitted the dockets as business records.

The lawyer's motion was granted solely to remit the issue of costs back to the Assessment Officer, as the parties had not been given an opportunity to make submissions regarding a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The applicant, an incorporated association managing a recreational park, applied to vacate a 1997 court order that established a two-manager governance system.

Three respondent members brought a counter-application challenging the applicant's corporate standing and seeking an external financial audit.

The court found that the applicant lacked standing because the park's constitution was never properly amended to authorize incorporation.

The court partially vacated the 1997 order, removing provisions related to the defunct two-manager system but leaving other substantive provisions intact.

The request for an external audit was dismissed for failing to meet the statutory threshold under the Corporations Act and lacking majority member support.

The applicants, owners of non-waterfront lots, sought declarations that they held valid deeded rights-of-way over the respondents' waterfront lot to access Sturgeon Lake.

The court reviewed the chain of title and applied the prerequisites for creating an easement by express grant.

The court found that only one applicant possessed a valid right-of-way, as the original grants for the other applicants were defective, primarily because they were not executed by all co-owners of the servient tenement at the time of the grant.

The successful applicant was granted a declaration that her right-of-way extended to the water's edge.

The parties, who separated in 2015 but continued to live in the same home, brought omnibus motions regarding child care, exclusive possession, and financial issues.

The court found the high-conflict living situation was causing severe emotional harm to the children, including a suicide attempt by one child.

To protect the children, the court awarded temporary custody and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the applicant, ordering the respondent to vacate.

The court also ordered the immediate sale of the home, an interim disbursement of $100,000 from the sale proceeds for a business valuation, and fixed temporary child support based on previously imputed income.