Boswell

The plaintiff, a cyclist with significant pre-existing psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities, was struck by a police cruiser while riding through a pedestrian crosswalk at night.

The court apportioned liability 60% to the defendant police officer and 40% to the plaintiff.

Applying the thin skull rule, the court found the collision exacerbated the plaintiff's pre-existing conditions and caused a mild traumatic brain injury, rendering him completely disabled and requiring 24/7 attendant care.

Total damages were assessed at over $5.2 million, reduced to $3,131,370 after accounting for contributory negligence.

The applicant sought interim spousal and child support, section 7 expenses, and a preservation order.

The parties lived a lavish lifestyle during the marriage, funded by a mix of income and capital.

Due to the respondent's inadequate financial disclosure, the court imputed an income of $250,000 for child support purposes and ordered combined interim support of $20,000 per month, recognizing the respondent would need to encroach on capital to pay it.

The request for a preservation order was dismissed to allow the respondent to utilize capital for support.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a non-suit on the classification of the murder.

The accused argued that the victim was already dead when the acts constituting the alleged sexual assault occurred, and therefore s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code could not apply.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'single transaction' principle from R. v. Paré and R. v. Westergard, which holds that the exact sequence of the murder and the underlying offence is irrelevant as long as they form a continuous sequence of events.

The court found sufficient evidence to leave the charge of first-degree murder with the jury.

The Crown sought to admit a confession made by the accused to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence, arguing that the surreptitious recording authorizations were invalid, that his right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter was violated, and that the confession should be excluded under common law principles of abuse of process and prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused was not in the functional control of the state, the police conduct was not abusive, the confession was highly reliable, and the wiretap authorizations were validly issued.

The plaintiff and other lien claimants sought a determination of the basic holdback amount under the Construction Lien Act following the sale of a partially completed retirement home project by the defendant mortgagee.

The mortgagee argued the holdback was reduced by payments made to sub-trades during construction.

The court found that the owner violated section 25 of the Act by releasing holdback funds before certificates of completion were issued, and that such a breach could not be cured retroactively.

The court fixed the basic holdback at the full 10% of the value of services and materials provided, plus applicable GST.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found 252 grams of cocaine hidden under the passenger seat of a vehicle he was driving.

The vehicle belonged to a friend, and the accused had only been driving it for a short time.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of the accused's former girlfriend, who claimed she found the drugs and confronted him about them shortly before the traffic stop.

The court found the girlfriend's evidence unreliable and concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the hidden cocaine.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, charged with importing cocaine, brought pre-trial motions challenging the admissibility of their statements to police, the lawfulness of a cell phone search incident to arrest, and the validity of a search warrant for a residence.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel, including delays in facilitating access, eliciting evidence prior to access, and failing to ensure comprehension given language barriers.

The court also held that the warrantless search of the accused's cell phone contents incident to arrest violated s. 8 of the Charter, as cell phones attract a high expectation of privacy requiring prior judicial authorization absent exigent circumstances.

The determination of remedies under s. 24(2) was deferred.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased to her daughter, and a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for murder.

The court admitted the deceased's statements under the state of mind and principled exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding they were relevant to her fear of the accused and desire to separate, and possessed sufficient indicia of reliability.

The court also admitted the accused's statement to police; although the officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by questioning him prematurely, the court found the subsequent spontaneous utterance was not tainted by the breach.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings on historical sexual assault charges, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, abuse of process under s. 7, and prejudice from lost evidence.

The original charge was laid in 1986 and withdrawn shortly after, then re-laid in 2010 with additional counts.

The court found the 24-year gap between charges was neutral time and the institutional delay was within acceptable guidelines.

The court dismissed the abuse of process claim, finding no prosecutorial misconduct.

While the court found a breach of the right to make full answer and defence due to a lost exculpatory statement, it reserved the determination of the appropriate remedy until the end of the trial.