Barry M. Tobin

The applicant sought a child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, claiming the respondent was the father of her child born in 2005.

The respondent denied paternity and moved for a finding that he was not a parent.

The court found that parentage was in issue and had not been previously determined by a court.

The respondent's evidence raised an arguable case that he may not be the biological father.

The court ordered DNA testing to resolve the paternity question, which is a necessary prerequisite to determining the respondent's child support obligation.

The respondent mother brought a summary judgment motion seeking custody of the child, ongoing child support, retroactive child support arrears, and Section 7 expense contributions.

The applicant father opposed the motion regarding custody and retroactive support but did not oppose ongoing support.

The court granted summary judgment on custody, finding the mother provided a stable home and that joint custody was inappropriate due to the parties' conflictual history and lack of communication.

The court also granted summary judgment on ongoing child support and the mother's entitlement to retroactive support from August 1, 2010, though the specific credit for payments made required a trial.

A children's aid society brought a motion under subsection 64(8) of the Child and Family Services Act to vary a prior order placing four children in the care of their mother.

The society sought to place the two older children with their father and the two younger children in society care, based primarily on positive hair follicle test results indicating cocaine and cannabis use by the mother.

The mother opposed the motion, supported by counsel for the Children's Lawyer.

The court found a material change in circumstances but determined that removal from the mother's care was not necessary to protect the children's best interests.

Instead, the court imposed additional supervision terms including random drug testing, increased home visits, completion of parenting assessments, and prohibition of contact with an incarcerated father.

The respondent brought a motion without notice seeking an order for substituted service of a motion to change by mailing a copy to the Family Responsibility Office.

The court found that the Family Responsibility Office is a government agency as defined in the Family Law Rules.

Consequently, the respondent's motion for substituted service could not be heard without notice and had to be served upon the Family Responsibility Office before the motion could be heard.

The court ordered that a date for the return of the motion be obtained through the trial coordination office.

This is a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act brought by the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that a child remains in need of protection and an order of Crown wardship without access.

The Society sought to introduce hearsay statements made by the child's siblings to third parties.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of these statements under both the state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

The court found that certain statements met the threshold reliability requirements and were admissible, while others did not satisfy the criteria for admission.

The applicant brought a motion on consent to vary child support provisions contained in a Separation Agreement dated September 9, 2005.

The agreement obligated the applicant to pay $361.00 per month based on an annual income of $41,830.00.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the application because the Separation Agreement had been filed with the Superior Court of Justice Family Court Branch at Hamilton, not the Ontario Court of Justice.

The case was transferred to the Superior Court of Justice at Windsor.

Additionally, the court noted that the consent motion had not been signed by the assignee (the Ministry of Community and Social Services) and had not been served on the assignee as required.

The Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children remain in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and that they be made wards of the Crown with access to their mother.

The respondent mother opposed the motion.

The court found that the children remained in need of protection based on the mother's failure to address mental health concerns and the risk of emotional harm to the children.

The court granted the Society's motion, made the children Crown wards, and ordered supervised access to the mother.

A child protection application brought by the Family & Children's Services of St. Thomas and Elgin concerning four children.

The Society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(a), (b), and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act due to physical and emotional abuse and risk of physical abuse, with a disposition of Crown wardship without access.

The respondent mother sought dismissal of the application or, alternatively, return of the children to her care subject to supervision.

The court found the children were in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(b) and (g) based on exposure to domestic violence, inadequate supervision, and alcohol consumption issues.

However, the court determined it was in the best interests of the children to be returned to the mother's care subject to a 12-month supervision order with specific terms and conditions, rather than making them Crown wards.

This is a ruling on a voir dire in a child protection application brought by the Society seeking a finding that four children are in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act due to physical abuse and risk of physical and emotional abuse, and seeking an order of Crown wardship without access.

The court considered the admissibility of numerous statements made by the children to third parties, applying both the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the principled exception for hearsay evidence.

The court admitted certain statements meeting the threshold reliability test while rejecting others that failed to meet the required criteria.

A motion was brought by C. M. to be added as a respondent to a custody application brought by the paternal grandmother against the child's parents.

The moving party sought party status following the release of a child psychiatrist's report containing allegations of sexual abuse by the moving party.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party was not a necessary party to the proceeding.

The court held that the dispute between the applicant and respondents could be adjudicated without the moving party as a party, and that any relevant evidence could be presented through witness testimony.

The court emphasized that adding a party solely to protect reputation and not to claim substantive relief would divert focus from the paramount consideration of the best interests of the child.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to remove the respondent's father, D.D., as solicitor of record in a child protection proceeding.

The Society argued that D.D. should be removed because: (1) he was too personally involved as a father and grandfather to provide objective representation; (2) he lacked experience in child protection matters; and (3) he would be a necessary witness at trial.

The respondent opposed removal, arguing that D.D. was not adverse in interest, that lack of experience alone should not disqualify counsel, and that it was speculative whether he would testify.

The court granted the motion, finding that D.D.'s personal and emotional involvement in the case, combined with his cognitive dependence relationship with the respondent and his status as a likely witness, created a conflict of interest that undermined the integrity of the administration of justice.

The respondent brought a motion to suspend or terminate the applicant's access to two children pending trial, following a section 112 report from the Children's Lawyer that raised concerns regarding the applicant's behaviour, including allegations of sexual abuse of the younger child and parental alienation of the older child.

The court found a material change in circumstances since the original custody order and determined that a temporary variation of access was necessary in the best interests of the children pending trial.

The court suspended access to the younger child entirely and restricted access to the older child to alternate weekend visits with specific conditions prohibiting negative statements about the respondent.

A motion under section 64(8) of the Child and Family Services Act concerning interim care and custody of a three-year-old child.

The child was placed in the father's care subject to supervision following a prior finding of need for protection.

The child subsequently sustained significant injuries including facial bruising, black eyes, welts on the back and buttocks, and a broken elbow while in the father's care.

The Society sought to remove the child from the father's care and place the child in temporary care and custody of the Society pending final determination of a status review application.

The father disputed the cause of the injuries and argued that police investigation had not resulted in charges.

The court found a material change in circumstances and determined that the child's best interests required removal from the father's care, while maintaining supervised access.

A status review application concerning a Crown ward child.

The Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society sought to terminate the mother's access to the child, who had been made a Crown ward in 2009.

The mother had sought custody of the child following her removal from the paternal grandparents' home and placement in foster care.

The court found that the mother's access had been inconsistent, with numerous missed visits, and that there was no secure attachment between mother and child.

The foster parents expressed a desire to adopt the child.

The court terminated the mother's access order, finding it was no longer in the child's best interests and that the relationship was neither beneficial nor meaningful to the child.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of a video-recorded police statement made by a young person accused of sexual assault, sexual interference, sexual invitation, and forcible confinement.

The Crown sought to use the statement for cross-examination purposes.

The court considered two issues: (1) whether the procedural requirements under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act were followed, and (2) whether the statement was voluntarily given.

The court found that the officer failed to take sufficient steps to ensure the young person understood his rights under section 146, particularly given several red flags indicating comprehension difficulties.

The court also found the statement was not given in oppressive circumstances.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The grandmother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society following a temporary care and custody motion in a child protection proceeding.

The grandmother argued the Society acted unfairly by failing to investigate her as a potential caregiver despite her close relationship with the children and her offer to provide care.

The Society maintained it acted professionally and in good faith.

The court found that while the Society could have been more diligent in investigating the grandmother's plan, its conduct did not amount to unreasonable, unfair, or indefensible behaviour when viewed in context of the emergency circumstances and timeline of events.

The grandmother's request for costs was denied.

The applicant mother and respondent father both brought motions to change a custody and access order made by Phillips J. on April 19, 2011, which had permitted the mother to relocate with the two children to Warren, Michigan.

The preliminary issue was whether the Ontario Court of Justice had jurisdiction to hear the motions to change when the children were no longer habitually resident in Ontario.

The court found that none of the four jurisdictional bases under the Children's Law Reform Act were satisfied: the children were habitually resident in Michigan under s. 22(2)(b); they were not physically present in Ontario at the commencement of the motions; s. 23 did not apply as there was no evidence of serious harm; and the Ontario Court of Justice has no parens patriae jurisdiction.

Consequently, both motions to change were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

A motion by the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that a child born in 2010 is in need of protection under subclause 37(2)(b)(ii) of the Child and Family Services Act and for an order making the child a Crown ward without access to either parent.

The respondent mother opposed the disposition sought.

On consent, statutory findings were made at the outset.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the child's need for protection, given the respondents' history of domestic violence, lack of parenting skills, anger management issues, and cognitive limitations.

The mother's plan for supervision was rejected as inadequate.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, finding that the child's best interests require certainty and permanency in a safe and stable environment that the mother cannot provide.

A child protection application brought by the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society concerning four children found to be in need of protection.

The central issue was whether the children should remain in the care of their mother (T.B.) subject to supervision, or be placed in the custody of their father (M.D.).

The court found that the children should remain in the mother's care subject to a 12-month supervision order with detailed terms and conditions.

The father's request for custody without Society involvement was denied.

The court considered the mother's past conduct, including disturbing wiretap evidence of inappropriate language, but found that with ongoing Society support and services, the risks could be adequately managed.

The father's refusal to participate in a parenting capacity assessment and his inconsistent exercise of access were significant factors against his custody claim.

The Society moved under section 64(8) of the Child and Family Services Act for an order placing a child in the care of the father subject to Society supervision and access to the mother.

The child had been placed in the joint care of both parents following a protection finding.

After the parents separated, the father unilaterally removed the child from the family home without urgent cause.

The court found that the father's act of self-help should not be rewarded and that the mother, as the primary caregiver, should continue to play an active and significant role in the child's upbringing.

The court issued a temporary order placing the child in the joint care and custody of both parents with specified access arrangements and supervision conditions.