Human Rights

The applicant, J.P., sought a stay of criminal proceedings due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

This was a retrial after a previous stay was overturned on appeal.

The court found that the constitutional clock reset to zero upon remittance from the Court of Appeal, and the 30-month Jordan ceiling applied.

Despite the net delay being below the ceiling, the court conducted a contextual analysis, finding that the Crown's inconsistent positions and failures regarding disclosure of the applicant's cellphone caused significant and unreasonable delay, necessitating the defence to bring additional applications.

The court concluded that the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, while the Crown did not, leading to the delay markedly exceeding what was reasonable.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an impaired driving charge, which resulted from the trial judge's exclusion of breath test evidence.

The trial judge found two Charter breaches: arbitrary detention (s. 9) when the respondent was placed in a police vehicle for an ASD test without reasonable necessity, and unreasonable search/seizure (s. 7 and s. 8) due to video monitoring and recording of the respondent using the toilet in her cell, where the provided privacy gown was ineffective.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings of Charter violations, affirming that the increased restriction on liberty required reasonable necessity and that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists even in police cell toilets.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a sufficient connection between the breaches and the evidence, and that the seriousness of the s. 8 breach warranted exclusion.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with eight firearms offences following the discovery of a loaded prohibited firearm during a search warrant execution at an apartment.

The Crown's case relied entirely on two statements allegedly made by the accused: one in which he claimed ownership of the firearm while detained with other occupants, and another to police regarding the firearm's location and colour.

The court found that the first statement was involuntary, having been induced by police threats that all detainees would be jailed unless someone admitted ownership.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding whether the second statement was made at all.

With no evidence linking the accused to the firearm beyond these statements, the court acquitted on all charges.

The defendant challenged the validity of a second information alleging impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing it was a nullity and constituted an abuse of process in violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown had requested that police lay an additional impaired driving charge alongside the original over-80 charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the second information was valid, that the procedure followed by Peel Regional Police and the Crown Attorney's Office complied with the Criminal Code, and that no abuse of process occurred.

The court upheld the practical arrangement between police and Crown as a reasonable response to high case volumes while maintaining statutory compliance.

The appellant appealed his convictions for luring, sexual exploitation, and making, possessing and accessing child pornography involving two complainants, as well as his 20-month custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the application judge erred in dismissing the appellant's Charter s. 11(b) application regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay of approximately 43 months from charge to trial exceeded both the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months and the Morin guideline of 14-18 months.

The court identified errors in the application judge's analysis, including: (1) incorrectly characterizing the adjournment of the exit judicial pre-trial as a discrete exceptional event; (2) inflating the neutral intake period for Crown disclosure to five months when only 2.5 months was appropriate; (3) treating institutional delay as neutral rather than attributable to the Crown; and (4) failing to consider inferred prejudice from the length of delay.

The court concluded that transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the delay, and the proceedings were stayed.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction, making the mandatory minimum sentence six months imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that while the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate for this particular offender, it would be grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonable hypotheticals involving minimal culpability.

The court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional and imposed an intermittent sentence of 111 days (90 days to serve after pre-trial custody credit) with probation and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with alcohol-impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a traffic stop on Highway 400.

The trial proceeded on the merits with a blended Charter voir dire.

The court found that police violated the accused's Charter section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to provide a Prosper warning when the accused indicated a change of mind regarding legal representation.

The Intoxilyzer readings were excluded as a result.

However, the court found the Crown proved impairment based on the accused's driving pattern and roadside observations, resulting in conviction on the impaired charge and acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control and driving with excess alcohol care and control following a dispatch report of an impaired driver.

An officer located the defendant's vehicle in her driveway with the defendant slumped over the steering wheel.

The defendant claimed she had entered the vehicle only to retrieve her purse after consuming two glasses of wine upon arriving home.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence and found she had entered the vehicle with intent to put it in motion.

The court also rejected a Charter s. 10(b) rights argument regarding a 20-minute delay before rights to counsel were provided, finding the delay justified by legitimate medical concerns regarding a possible diabetic emergency.

The defendant was convicted of both charges, with the excess alcohol charge provisionally stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a traffic stop at approximately 5:05 a.m. on April 12, 2015.

Police received a radio call about a possible impaired driver who appeared to be asleep at the wheel.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer observed signs of impairment and arrested the accused.

A Charter application was brought challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the seizure of breath samples.

The trial judge found reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest existed based on the totality of circumstances.

However, the trial judge found a violation of section 8 of the Charter because the officer gave an approved screening device demand rather than the required approved instrument demand.

Despite this violation, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving, and the over 80 charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The Crown obtained a roadside breath sample via an Approved Screening Device following a traffic stop.

The defence challenged whether the demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code and whether the accused's Charter rights to counsel were violated.

The trial judge found that an informal demand was made within seconds of the officer forming reasonable suspicion, followed by a formal demand minutes later.

The delay in administering the test was found to be reasonably necessary given the time required to obtain the screening device.

The accused's right to counsel was not violated as there was insufficient time to realistically consult counsel before the test.

The trial judge convicted the accused.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial date was approximately 20.5 months, none attributable to the defence.

The delay resulted from delayed disclosure by the Crown and institutional delays.

The court found that the delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court trials.

The Crown failed to establish that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the case was straightforward, the jurisdiction was not plagued by systemic delays, and the Crown's reliance on the seriousness of charges was not reasonable given the disclosure failures.

The charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused brought Charter applications under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), alleging that statements made at the accident scene were statutorily compelled and that his rights were violated.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the accused did not provide a compelled report, that the officers were acting for public safety purposes, and that the brief delay in reading the ASD demand was justified by safety concerns.

At trial, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was operating the vehicle with a BAC over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood during the relevant time period.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired care or control based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's disorientation, admission of drinking, odour of alcohol, and the manner in which the vehicle was parked on a highway.

However, the trial judge found that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) by failing to inform him of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying 16 minutes to administer an Approved Screening Device test.

The trial judge excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought to exclude all evidence obtained during a DUI investigation, including breath sample results, on the basis that his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant for impaired operation based on observed erratic driving and indicia of impairment.

However, the court found a significant breach of the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his counsel of choice before requiring breath samples.

The court excluded the breath test evidence and subsequent statements under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving, driving with a BAC over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and driving while disqualified.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, finding that while there was some Crown delay in disclosure (approximately 1 month 25 days), the total operative delay was only 15 days beyond the Morin guidelines.

The court found no actual or inferred prejudice to the applicant and concluded that societal interests in having the serious charges tried on their merits outweighed the Charter violation claim.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a motor vehicle stop in Caledon, Ontario on October 28, 2010.

The Crown withdrew the companion charge of driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 milligrams) due to a breach of the defendant's right to consult with counsel in private, as his voice was inadvertently recorded on the breath room video while he spoke to his lawyer in the privacy booth.

The defendant raised three Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b).

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on extensive evidence of impairment, including breath test results of 283 and 267 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was sentenced to a $1,700 fine plus victim fine surcharge and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operation impaired and blow over 80 following a motor vehicle stop.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, observations of impairment indicators, and breath test results of 250 and 245 mgs.

A forensic toxicologist extrapolated the readings back to the time of driving, establishing a BAC of 245-290 mgs.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and convicted on the blow over 80 charge.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 of the Charter regarding arbitrary detention, as the booking officer relied solely on the breath readings without considering other relevant factors such as the availability of a responsible person to take charge of the accused.

Despite the breach, no stay of proceedings was granted as the case did not meet the high threshold for judicial stay.

The operation impaired charge was stayed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and exceeding the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a section 24(2) Charter application seeking exclusion of breath test evidence based on an alleged violation of section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused gave an equivocal response ("at this point no") when initially asked if he wished to call a lawyer.

The court found that although the initial response was equivocal, the breath technician subsequently clarified the accused's wishes and the accused unequivocally declined counsel.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding his understanding of the situation and his claim that he wanted to speak to a lawyer.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application to exclude intercepted communications obtained pursuant to two Part VI authorizations under the Criminal Code and to exclude evidence obtained from two search warrants issued under section 487 of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the sufficiency of grounds, investigative necessity, and alleged bias on the part of the issuing Justice of the Peace.

The court found that the first authorization had sufficient grounds and that investigative necessity was established.

However, the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias due to a familial and commercial connection between the accused and the issuing Justice of the Peace.

While the search warrants were found to be invalid due to this bias, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not serve the interests of justice given the good faith of police and the serious nature of the charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mgs of alcohol in his body.

At trial, a dispute arose regarding whether the accused required a Tibetan interpreter.

The Crown challenged the necessity of an interpreter, arguing the accused spoke English.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the accused had a Charter right to interpreter assistance under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court examined the accused's proficiency in English through his testimony and video evidence of police interactions, ultimately finding that the accused spoke English sufficiently and did not meet the threshold for requiring an interpreter.