Andrew J. Goodman

The plaintiffs, L.R. and D.Z., brought an action against their father, S.P., for historical sexual assaults.

The defendant was noted in default, and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial on damages.

The court awarded L.R. $175,000 in general non-pecuniary damages, $10,000 for emotional distress, and $25,000 for aggravated damages.

D.Z. was awarded $250,000 in general non-pecuniary damages, $25,000 for emotional distress, and $25,000 for aggravated damages.

The court denied claims for punitive damages, finding the defendant's 10-year criminal sentence sufficient, and dismissed D.Z.'s claim for economic loss due to insufficient evidence.

Pre-judgment interest was awarded from January 2012 (date of discoverability/reporting of abuse).

Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs on a solicitor and client basis.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion by the plaintiff for the production of an investigative and surveillance report, which the defendant had resisted on grounds of privilege.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant sought set-off costs for a prior motion.

The court found the plaintiff entirely successful on the production issue, which involved a novel point of law.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff, a lawyer represented by counsel from his own firm, should not recover costs, deeming it speculative and inconsistent with cost award principles.

The court determined that the defendant's steadfast maintenance of privilege was the principal cause of delay and the necessity of the motions.

The plaintiff was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Michael Coutts and Sharon Coutts, co-property managers for Primevest Realty Corporation, faced charges of possession of property obtained by crime over $5000, use, deal or act on a forged document (rent rolls), fraud over $5000, and theft of money over $5000.

The charges arose from alleged fraudulent activities during their employment.

Michael Coutts was found guilty of possession of property obtained by crime, fraud over $5000, and theft over $5000, but acquitted of using forged documents.

Sharon Coutts was found guilty of possession of property obtained by crime, based on the doctrine of wilful blindness, but acquitted of the fraud, theft, and forged document charges.

The court found Michael's testimony not credible and that he diverted rent funds for personal benefit, causing a loss of $148,730.00 to Primevest.

The applicant, Jeremy McDermott, charged with robbery and weapons offences, sought to exclude evidence (seized items, informal utterances, and formal statement) under ss. 10(b) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to counsel.

The court found that while the police properly informed McDermott of his rights at the scene, there was an inordinate and unexplained delay of over two hours at the police station in facilitating his access to duty counsel.

This delay constituted a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court determined that the police conduct was not deliberate or systemic, and the weapons and spontaneous utterances were not causally or temporally connected to the breach, thus admissible.

However, the formal video statement, being self-incriminating evidence obtained after a significant denial of the right to counsel, was excluded as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Haiden Suarez-Noa was convicted of second-degree murder.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which must be between 10 and 25 years.

The Crown sought 17-18 years, while the defence argued for 10-12 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the domestic nature of the murder, the victim's vulnerability, the number of stab wounds, and the offender's post-offence conduct.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, turning himself in (albeit 12 hours later), and expressions of regret for his actions' impact on his son.

The court rejected the lower end of the jury's recommendations and the defence's proposed range, finding the offender's remorse less than sincere regarding the victim's loss.

The court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 15 years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and issued a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a non-contact order.

The appellant, Alisa Chaly, appealed convictions for refusing to provide a breath sample and breach of recognizance, following an acquittal on impaired driving.

She raised ten grounds of appeal, including errors in determining reasonable grounds for the breath demand, timeliness of the demand, waiver of the right to counsel, arbitrary detention, failure to preserve video evidence, and conviction for breach of recognizance.

The court reviewed the trial judge's findings, applying a deferential standard for factual findings and legal conclusions.

The appeal court found that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding reasonable grounds, timeliness of demand, and waiver of counsel, and that the appellant failed to establish arbitrary detention or prejudice from lost video evidence.

The conviction for breach of recognizance was also upheld as it was contingent on the other convictions.

The appeal was dismissed.

This criminal trial involved three accused (Adeel Safdar, Shaheen Safdar, and Aatif Safdar) charged with various assaults and uttering threats against Sara Salim, Adeel's wife.

The central issue was whether Sara's extensive injuries were inflicted by the accused or were self-inflicted due to mental illness, as she initially claimed.

The court found Adeel Safdar guilty of two counts of aggravated assault related to breaking Sara's jaw and permanently disfiguring her ear, based on Sara's testimony corroborated by expert medical evidence.

Shaheen Safdar and Aatif Safdar were found not guilty of all charges due to reasonable doubt, as Sara's testimony against them lacked sufficient corroboration and suffered from inconsistencies.

The defence sought to admit expert psychiatric evidence from Dr. Julian Gojer on dissociative amnesia to explain the accused's memory loss regarding the number of stabbings, arguing it was relevant to credibility and intent in a second-degree murder trial.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was unnecessary, inadmissible, confusing, and lacked probative value, especially since Dr. Gojer could not conclusively state the accused experienced dissociation or link it to intent.

The court, applying the Mohan and White Burgess tests for expert evidence admissibility, found that the evidence had limited probative value and was not necessary to assist the jury, as the issue of memory loss for the number of stabs was within the jury's common sense.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, including potential confusion and disproportionate weight, substantially outweighed its probative value.

The application to admit the expert opinion was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order to allow a race-based challenge for cause using a multiple-choice question format during jury selection.

The Crown did not oppose the race-based challenge itself, but objected to the proposed multiple-choice format, advocating for the standard "Parks question" approach.

The court granted the applicant's request to conduct a race-based challenge for cause but denied the use of the specific multiple-choice format.

The judge ruled that the standard open-ended Parks question was sufficient and that the proposed format would unduly prolong the process and potentially confuse prospective jurors without being more effective.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar act evidence against Geoffrey Burnet, who was charged with three counts of exposing his genital organs to persons under 14 for a sexual purpose.

The alleged incidents involved two young complainants, K.C. and K.A., occurring at Burnet's residence in similar circumstances, including a private setting, specific clothing, and contemporaneous viewing of pornography.

The court applied the R. v. Handy framework, balancing the probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudice.

Despite a temporal gap between incidents, the court found sufficient similarities to establish a specific propensity and objective improbability of coincidence, making the evidence probative to the actus reus and the complainants' credibility.

Given it was a judge-alone trial, the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice was deemed minimized.

The Crown's application was granted.

The plaintiffs, self-represented litigants, brought a motion to remove the defendants' counsel, R. Leigh Youd and his firm, BYLD, alleging breach of privilege, that Mr. Youd was a material witness, and a conflict of interest due to an alleged "phantom client" relationship.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no waiver of privilege, no basis for Mr. Youd to be a material witness, and no solicitor-client relationship with the plaintiffs.

The court emphasized that removal of counsel is a discretionary decision made only in the clearest of cases, and that the plaintiffs' arguments relied on speculation and misapprehensions of law and fact.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams.

The trial judge had ruled a breath technician's certificate inadmissible due to a minor omission (a blank date line on one signature portion) and subsequently refused the Crown's application to reopen its case to call the technician.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in law by applying a strict, technical approach to the certificate's admissibility, contrary to modern jurisprudence.

It held that the certificate met statutory requirements and any perceived defect was not material and could have been remedied by other evidence.

The trial judge's late ruling, without prior notice, prejudiced the Crown by denying the opportunity to present further evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, a conviction registered, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondent on charges of impaired operation and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal focused on whether breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" and whether the trial judge properly considered the cumulative effect of impairment indicia.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in her analysis of "as soon as practicable" by penalizing police for an 8-minute delay caused by an unrequested call to duty counsel, which did not actually delay the breath tests given the technician's preparation time.

The court also found that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by taking a piecemeal approach to the evidence of impairment rather than considering its cumulative effect.

The appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Crown's application regarding alleged violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Crown contended that the defence adduced evidence without first confronting Crown witnesses, particularly the complainant, Sara Salim, during cross-examination.

The court found four specific instances where the defence's failure to cross-examine on substantial matters constituted a breach of the rule, while dismissing the majority of the Crown's 16 alleged violations as either insubstantial or generally covered by the extensive cross-examination.

As a remedy, the court permitted the Crown to recall the complainant or other witnesses for reply testimony, declining the Crown's request for an adverse inference against the accused's credibility.

This is a costs endorsement following the denial of the applicant's request to appoint Section 3 counsel for Lynda Miziolek, an incapable person.

The respondent, Elizabeth Miziolek, sought costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant, Alexandra Miziolek, argued for no costs or an offset due to divided success on other application segments.

The court found Elizabeth entirely successful on the discrete Section 3 counsel issue, which was not part of the original application and was deemed ill-conceived after a medical report confirmed Lynda's inability to instruct counsel.

The court awarded Elizabeth costs of $11,500 plus HST, to be paid by Alexandra.

Disbursements for the medical report were directed to be paid from Lynda's estate, acknowledging the public policy of not discouraging reasonable applications for vulnerable persons.

The accused, Scott Reeves, pleaded guilty to one count of fraud over $5000.00, involving a total loss of over $3.1 million from four victims (Donna Aiken, Rachel Reeves, Gayle Meehan, and Peter Vignjevic) over several years.

The fraud involved a significant breach of trust, as the victims were friends, relatives, or long-term clients who relied on the accused for financial advice.

The Crown sought a five-year incarceration, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day or 18 months jail.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the magnitude, complexity, and duration of the fraud, and its severe impact on the victims, as well as mitigating factors including the accused's lack of prior record, late guilty plea, and mental health issues.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, and sentenced the accused to four years' incarceration in a federal penitentiary, along with a lifetime prohibition order, a non-communication order, a DNA sample order, and a restitution order totaling $3,125,453.00, with a fine in lieu of forfeiture of the same amount.

Christopher Newton applied for severance of accused persons in a multi-count indictment, seeking to be tried separately from co-accused Shaquille Collins.

Newton argued that joinder would delay his trial beyond a reasonable time and confuse the jury due to different charges (second-degree murder for Newton, first-degree murder for Collins) and complex liability paths.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was intertwined, separate trials would be inefficient, and juries are capable of following complex instructions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 13-week delay was not significant enough to override the presumption of joint trials, and that jurors are capable of understanding complex legal instructions.

Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought summary judgment for possession of a property and dismissal of a counterclaim against Waheed Michael.

Michael alleged fraud regarding a Power of Attorney (POA) used by his ex-spouse, Nabila Nashid, to transfer the property and secure an RBC mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment to RBC, finding the POA validly exercised as against third parties without notice of limitations, and that Michael was bound by Nashid's acts as agent.

The court also ordered the net proceeds from the sale of another property to be paid towards RBC's judgment against Nashid, with any balance to Michael.

The Crown sought to admit pre-death statements made by the deceased, Jean Paul Page, to five individuals in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence challenged the admissibility of these hearsay statements, arguing a lack of reliability and prejudicial effect, particularly concerning alleged drug transactions.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, requiring tests of both necessity and reliability.

The application was granted in part, allowing certain statements related to a rum purchase and the accused's presence at the deceased's apartment, but disallowing statements related to alleged marijuana transactions due to vagueness and lack of reliability, especially from one witness.

The accused, Richard Bennett, sought to introduce alternate suspect evidence in his first-degree murder trial.

The application concerned four individuals: Jason Bynoe, Nathanial Gibbs, Shaka Reid, and John Gardner.

The court dismissed the application regarding Bynoe and Gibbs due to insufficient connection to the crime, primarily relying on propensity evidence without sufficient opportunity or direct link.

However, the court granted the application in part, allowing the introduction of alternate suspect evidence for Shaka Reid and John Gardner, finding sufficient probative value based on the accused's own statements implicating Reid and Gardner's inconsistent statements, suspicious conduct, and unpublicized knowledge of crime details.

The court rejected the Crown's "additional suspect" argument, affirming that such evidence could address the accused's level of culpability.