Andrea J. Sanche

In a coverage dispute involving an insured, its insurance broker, and the insurer, the broker sought leave to amend its statement of defence to add a crossclaim against the insurer for a declaration that the insurer was required to defend and indemnify the insured.

The insured opposed the amendment, arguing that no independent cause of action existed between the broker and the insurer and that a prior settlement agreement eliminated any lis between them.

The court held that a crossclaim does not require an independent cause of action and may be advanced where parties share a legal relationship regarding a real issue in the litigation.

Because the question of insurance coverage directly affected the broker’s potential liability and remained unresolved despite the settlement agreement, there remained a sufficient lis between the broker and insurer.

Leave to amend was granted as the proposed pleading was legally tenable and caused no prejudice that could not be compensated by costs.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an alleged oral agreement granting him a 10% equity interest in a startup company in exchange for his work.

In the alternative, he claimed oppression under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act arising from his termination and the denial of equity.

The court found that no binding oral contract had been formed, emphasizing the absence of contemporaneous documentation and the lack of objective evidence of mutual intention to create legal relations.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish offer, acceptance, and enforceable agreement.

The court also rejected the oppression claim, holding that the plaintiff was not a shareholder, officer, or director and had no reasonable expectation of equity.

Following reasons dismissing a motion to stay or dismiss an action for lack of jurisdiction, the court addressed the quantum and scale of costs payable to the successful responding party.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs due to the complexity of a cross‑border employment dispute and the defendant’s attempt to pre‑empt Ontario proceedings with litigation in another jurisdiction.

The defendant argued costs should be limited to partial indemnity as the motion was reasonably brought.

Applying the principles in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the proportionality considerations articulated in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, the court found substantial indemnity appropriate.

Costs were fixed at $19,177.07 payable within 30 days with post‑judgment interest if unpaid.

The defendant moved under Rule 21.01(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to stay or dismiss an Ontario wrongful dismissal action on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction and that North Carolina was the more appropriate forum.

The moving party relied on contractual terms stating that the agreement was governed by the laws of North Carolina and argued that related proceedings had already been commenced there.

The responding party argued that she had worked in Ontario for 27 years, was paid in Canadian dollars through a Canadian bank, and that the termination occurred in Ontario.

Applying the forum non conveniens principles articulated in Van Breda and subsequent appellate authority, the court held that the defendant had not met the high burden required to displace the plaintiff’s chosen forum.

Ontario was found to be the appropriate forum given the location of the plaintiff, witnesses, and the employment relationship.

The respondent requested the dismissal of a human rights application, arguing it was barred under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had filed a civil claim based on the same facts.

The Tribunal found that the civil claim was a wrongful dismissal action seeking common law damages and did not allege any Code breaches or seek human rights remedies.

As the proceedings were not duplicative, the Tribunal retained jurisdiction and dismissed the respondent's request.

The plaintiff sought an order setting aside two certificates of pending litigation registered against title to residential property in Vaughan to allow completion of a pending sale.

The court found that the certificates had been obtained on the basis of affidavit evidence that was misleading and false in material respects, including failure to disclose that the registered owner had died.

The court held that the plaintiff should not benefit from such misrepresentations but permitted the certificates to be vacated only on strict conditions.

The plaintiff was required to pay into court an amount representing the difference between the sale proceeds and the court‑determined fair market value of the property, less specified deductions.

If the payment was not made, the certificates would remain and the court would consider appointing a receiver.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment based on age and language proficiency, culminating in his layoff.

The respondent requested that the application be barred or deferred because the applicant had already commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal that included allegations of age discrimination.

The Tribunal found that while the civil claim did not plead all the human rights allegations, the termination was central to both proceedings.

To avoid duplicate proceedings and inconsistent decisions, the Tribunal deferred the application pending the outcome of the civil action.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The tenants appealed both the Board's decision to grant a review and its subsequent decision that the Residential Tenancies Act did not apply to their relationship.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash the appeal regarding the decision to grant a review, finding it was out of time and declining to extend the time limit.

However, the court dismissed the motion to quash the appeal on the merits, concluding it was premature to determine whether the appeal raised a question of law without full submissions.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for failing to comply with a consent order to post $200,000 in security for costs.

The appellants sought an adjournment of the appeal, alleging the respondents' counsel was in a conflict of interest.

The court denied the adjournment, noting the delay and the discrete legal issue on appeal.

On the merits, the court upheld the Master's finding that under Form 56A of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an order for security for costs requires payment in cash unless the order specifies another form of security.

The appellants' attempt to file a late, foreign letter of credit covering only one plaintiff was insufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.