Abella

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.

The parties entered into a comprehensive separation agreement that was incorporated into a 2003 court order, providing the wife with indexed spousal support with no termination date.

The wife had multiple sclerosis and was unable to work.

In 2007, the husband applied to vary the order under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, arguing the wife should seek employment.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal reduced and terminated support, finding the wife capable of working.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the original order, holding that the proper test for variation under s. 17 is whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the order was made.

As the wife's medical condition had not changed since 2003, there was no material change to justify varying the order.

The parties divorced in 1984 and the husband was ordered to pay spousal support, which was varied to $2,000 per month in 1991.

In 2008, the husband applied to terminate spousal support, citing his retirement and a market downturn that negatively impacted his assets.

The trial judge reduced support to $1,500 per month, and the Court of Appeal further ordered that support be gradually reduced and terminated.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the wife's appeal and restored the 1991 order.

The Court held that the husband failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act because he provided no evidence of his financial circumstances at the time of the 1991 order, nor did he prove that his investment losses were crystallized rather than temporary market fluctuations.

The appellant taxpayer engaged in a series of transactions, including a horizontal amalgamation of sister corporations, to preserve the paid-up capital of a subsidiary's shares that would have been cancelled in a vertical amalgamation.

The amalgamated corporation subsequently redeemed shares and paid out the preserved paid-up capital to its non-resident shareholder as a tax-free return of capital.

The Minister assessed the taxpayer for withholding tax, applying the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to reduce the paid-up capital and deem a portion of the redemption a taxable dividend.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the taxpayer's appeal, holding that the transactions constituted an abusive avoidance transaction that circumvented the purpose of section 87(3) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant union disputed an arbitrator's award regarding the calculation of vacation benefits for casual employees who became permanent.

The arbitrator concluded that time as a casual employee was not to be included.

On judicial review, the chambers judge found the arbitrator's reasons insufficient and unreasonable, but the Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, clarifying that under the Dunsmuir reasonableness standard, the adequacy of reasons is not a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision nor a question of procedural fairness.

Instead, reasons must be read together with the outcome to determine if the result falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner received complaints that the respondent disclosed private information in contravention of the Personal Information Protection Act.

The Commissioner took 22 months to extend the 90-day statutory time limit for completing the inquiry.

An adjudicator subsequently found the respondent had contravened the Act.

On judicial review, the respondent argued for the first time that the Commissioner lost jurisdiction by failing to extend the time limit within the initial 90 days.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the adjudicator implicitly decided the timelines issue, and this decision was reviewable on a standard of reasonableness because the tribunal was interpreting its home statute.

The Court found the adjudicator's implied decision to be reasonable and restored the order.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring s. 144 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases inoperative in relation to a requirement to pay issued under s. 126(4) of the Employment Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding a conflict of legislative purposes between the federal provision, which aims to recover overpayments summarily without regard to provincial exemptions, and the provincial provision exempting income replacement benefits from seizure.

The provincial provision was held to be constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant employer appealed a decision setting aside an arbitrator's award.

The arbitrator had found that while the employer breached the collective agreement regarding vacation entitlements, the respondent union was estopped from grieving the practice due to its long-standing acquiescence.

The Court of Appeal held the arbitrator's application of estoppel was reviewable on a standard of correctness and set it aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that labour arbitrators are not bound to apply equitable doctrines exactly as courts do, and their application of such doctrines is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.

The arbitrator's decision to impose an estoppel was reasonable given the labour relations context.

The Lax Kw'alaams Indian Band claimed an Aboriginal right to the commercial harvesting and sale of all species of fish within their traditional waters, arguing this right evolved from their pre-contact practices.

The trial judge found that while the pre-contact society relied heavily on fishing for sustenance, their only significant trade was in eulachon grease, and trade in other fish was not integral to their distinctive culture.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a modern commercial fishery in all species lacked sufficient continuity and proportionality with the pre-contact trade in eulachon grease.

The Court also affirmed that Aboriginal rights claims must be characterized based on the pleadings, rejecting a 'commission of inquiry' approach to determining pre-contact practices.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had set aside the accused's conviction for first degree murder and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the first degree murder conviction, adopting the dissenting reasons of MacPherson J.A. at the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and murder.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging sexual harassment by the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal substantiated the complaint in part and awarded compensation, including $47,000 for legal costs under the statutory provision allowing compensation for 'any expenses incurred'.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Tribunal's decision should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, its interpretation of the statute to include legal costs was unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the Tribunal does not have the authority to award legal costs.

The complainant workers suffered from chronic pain and received a fixed compensation award from the Workers' Compensation Board.

They appealed to the Board's Review Division, arguing the policy was discriminatory under the Human Rights Code.

The Review Officer concluded the policy was not discriminatory.

Instead of seeking judicial review, the complainants filed new complaints with the Human Rights Tribunal.

The Tribunal refused to dismiss the complaints under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Tribunal's decision was patently unreasonable because it ignored the principles of finality and the rule against collateral attack, effectively allowing the relitigation of an issue already decided by a decision-maker with concurrent jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the police had subjective and objective reasonable grounds to believe the occupants of the vehicle possessed illegal firearms.

Consequently, the arrest and subsequent search incident to arrest were lawful, and there was no violation of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The appellant was charged with possessing child pornography between 1999 and 2006.

He claimed he collected the materials to create an artistic exhibition about child exploitation.

The trial judge acquitted him based on the pre-2005 artistic merit defence and the post-2005 legitimate purpose defence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in law by applying the artistic merit defence to materials lacking artistic merit, and by using a purely subjective test for 'legitimate purpose'.

However, the Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction by making its own factual findings to substitute a conviction instead of ordering a new trial.

The appellants sued the respondent for defamation after the respondent posted an article on his website containing hyperlinks to other websites with allegedly defamatory information about the appellants.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a hyperlink, by itself, is content-neutral and merely refers to other content without repeating it.

Therefore, creating a hyperlink does not constitute publication of the defamatory material to which it links.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with second degree murder after her spouse was found with a gunshot wound to the head.

The trial judge found that the police had systematically violated the appellant's Charter rights, including conducting warrantless searches of her home, detaining her without advising her of the reasons or her right to counsel, and violating her right to silence.

The trial judge excluded all evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding that the physical evidence should not have been excluded because it was discoverable and the police had not deliberately acted abusively.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in substituting its view of the police conduct for the trial judge's and in placing undue weight on the discoverability of the evidence.

The accused was acquitted at trial of two counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in law by taking a piecemeal approach to the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge did not fail to consider the evidence as a whole.

The Court clarified that a trial judge's assessment of evidence only constitutes an error of law allowing a Crown appeal from an acquittal in limited circumstances, such as when a reasonable doubt is tainted by a legal error.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter at trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a planned robbery and relied on this to infer the accused's presence at the crime scene.

The Court of Appeal partially based its decision on R. v. Beaudry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The majority held that Beaudry does not apply to mistakes as to the substance of evidence, which are governed by R. v. Lohrer.

Furthermore, the majority found the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, as she did not rely on the existence of a planned robbery to infer the accused's presence at the scene.

The claimants, who were members of a Métis settlement in Alberta, registered as status Indians to obtain medical benefits.

Consequently, their membership in the Métis settlement was revoked pursuant to the Metis Settlements Act, which precludes status Indians from settlement membership.

The claimants challenged their exclusion under ss. 15, 2(d), and 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Metis Settlements Act is a genuinely ameliorative program protected by s. 15(2) of the Charter, as its object is to enhance and preserve Métis identity, culture, and self-governance through a dedicated land base.

The exclusion of status Indians serves this object.

The Court also dismissed the s. 2(d) and s. 7 claims, concluding the legislation is constitutional.

The tax debtor owed tax to the federal government.

The Minister of National Revenue issued requirements to pay to the appellant bank, seeking to intercept funds from cheques drawn by the tax debtor on his trust account and deposited into a joint account held by the tax debtor and a third party.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was not liable to make a payment to the tax debtor personally.

When the bank received the cheques for deposit into the joint account, it acted as a collecting bank for the joint account holders, not as an agent for the payee.

Therefore, the requirements to pay under s. 224(1) of the Income Tax Act were not triggered.