William John Manuel

The appellant appealed an application judge's order appointing an arbitrator and defining the scope of the arbitration regarding a dispute over the use of casino revenues to fund litigation.

The appellant argued the application judge exceeded his authority by defining the arbitrator's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Arbitration Act, 1991 does not grant an arbitrator exclusive authority to decide jurisdictional questions in the first instance.

The court held that the application judge properly exercised his jurisdiction to assist the parties and prevent multiple proceedings by deciding between the competing draft orders.

The applicants sought costs of $120,000 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful judicial review application.

The respondents argued that $30,000 was appropriate.

Applying the overriding principle of reasonableness from Boucher, the Divisional Court considered factors including the length of the hearing, the complexity of the issues, the voluminous record, and duplication of effort by applicants' counsel.

The court fixed costs at $60,000.

The moving parties on this costs motion sought costs for their opposition to a stay motion, an application for leave to appeal, and the costs motion itself, claiming up to $67,000.

The Court of Appeal awarded $20,000 in costs for the stay proceeding, noting that the Ministry's decision to terminate the charity's funding had been quashed.

The court declined to alter its previous costs order of $1,500 for the leave to appeal motion.

The applicants, parents of children with severe disabilities, applied for additional special needs funding from the Ministry of Community, Family and Children's Services.

They submitted detailed proposals but were awarded only a fraction of their requests without any explanation, criteria, or opportunity to respond.

The applicants sought judicial review of these decisions.

The Divisional Court held that the Minister's funding decisions under the Child and Family Services Act are statutory and subject to judicial review.

The court found that the Ministry breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide criteria, reasons, or an opportunity to be heard.

The decisions were quashed and referred back to the Minister for reconsideration.

The applicants sought judicial review of the government's alleged failure to allocate adequate resources to fund treatment for autistic children, raising both administrative and constitutional arguments under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the constitutional arguments on a piecemeal basis, noting that a fuller record was being developed in related litigation (Wynberg and Deskin).

The court adjourned the constitutional issues pending the outcome of those cases and proceeded to hear only the administrative law issues.

The applicant, a residents' association, sought judicial review of decisions by the Ministry of the Environment and the Ontario Realty Corporation relating to the sale of a former psychiatric hospital cemetery to a private purchaser who intended to build a crematorium.

The applicant argued that the MOE Director erred in issuing an air approval without considering fine particulate emissions and that the ORC failed to conduct a proper environmental assessment under the Environmental Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's decision was not patently unreasonable given the lack of existing standards for fine particulates at the time, and that the ORC reasonably applied its Class Environmental Assessment, which did not require assessing the private purchaser's subsequent planning actions.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a Highway Traffic Act offence and was fined.

Due to a clerical error by the justice of the peace, the committal warrant incorrectly stated the appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, leading to his arrest and alleged assault in jail.

The appellant sued the justice of the peace, correctional officers, and others for wrongful arrest and imprisonment.

The motions judge struck the claims against the justice of the peace and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to plead malice or bad faith with particularity as required to overcome judicial immunity.

In an addendum to a previous decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined the issue of costs for the application and the appeal.

Agreeing with the submissions of the respondent Director, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

A real estate broker became insolvent after its principal misappropriated trust funds for day-to-day operations.

The Director, representing the trust claimants, asserted priority over the broker's assets, including accounts receivable collected by a secured bank and funds remaining in trust accounts.

The Court of Appeal held that the accounts receivable were not impressed with a constructive trust because there was no clear connection between the misappropriated funds and the generated receivables, allowing the bank to realize its security.

Furthermore, the funds remaining in the trust accounts were not restored trust funds, giving the Crown priority over those funds pursuant to the deemed trust provisions of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant appealed a decision striking his statement of claim against a Crown Attorney for malicious prosecution.

The motion judge found the claim contained only a bald allegation of malice and refused leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the potential to infer malice from the absence of a reasonable prospect of conviction does not relieve a plaintiff from pleading full particulars under Rule 25.06(8).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sued the provincial Crown for environmental damage caused by waste asphalt buried on their farm during highway reconstruction in the 1960s.

The respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the six-month limitation period in s. 7 of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the disposal of waste asphalt on private land was an operational decision of a predominantly private character, not an act done in pursuance of a public duty.

Therefore, the usual six-year limitation period applied, and the action was not statute-barred.

The appellants challenged a Divisional Court order quashing a police discipline adjudicator's ruling that admitted a complainant's preliminary inquiry testimony after the complainant refused to testify at the discipline hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that, although judicial review of a preliminary evidentiary ruling would normally be premature, the unusual circumstances justified immediate intervention because the prosecution case depended entirely on the transcript and further cross-examination on recovered memory issues was unavailable.

The court agreed that admitting the transcript would amount to a denial of natural justice and declined to interfere with the Divisional Court's exercise of discretion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.