William G. Scott

The appellant, owner of a commercial plaza, was sued after a worker was electrocuted while working on a pylon sign.

The appellant sought a declaration that the respondent insurer, who issued a policy to one of the appellant's tenants naming the appellant as an additional insured 'as landlord only', had a duty to defend the claim.

The application judge dismissed the application, declining to consider extrinsic evidence regarding who hired the worker.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extrinsic evidence was not undisputed and, even if admitted, would not trigger a duty to defend because the true nature of the claim was against the appellant as owner of the plaza, not as landlord.

The plaintiff municipality sought to recover environmental remediation costs following a residential furnace oil spill that migrated onto public lands and into a lake.

Several defendants, including an insurer, insurance adjuster, and environmental remediation contractor, brought summary judgment motions to dismiss statutory and negligence claims against them under the Environmental Protection Act.

The court held that none of the moving parties were “owners of the pollutant” or persons “having control of the pollutant” within the meaning of the statute and dismissed the statutory claims.

However, the court declined to summarily dismiss the negligence claims, finding that the potential duty of care owed by an insurer, adjuster, or remediation contractor to an adjoining landowner presented a novel question requiring a full Anns analysis at trial.

Amendments to the statement of claim were also permitted as they arose from the same factual matrix and did not introduce a new cause of action.

The appellant, a plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action, appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The appeal judge had overturned a Master's decision allowing the action to proceed, reasoning that the appellant failed to meet her onus by not filing affidavit evidence at the status hearing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that initial status hearings ordinarily proceed on oral submissions and affidavit evidence is not strictly required unless a full hearing is ordered.

The Court further found that the delay was sufficiently explained and partially attributable to the respondent's conduct, permitting the action to proceed.

The appellant, plaintiff in a personal injury action where liability was admitted, sought a six-month adjournment of the trial because she lacked up-to-date medical reports.

The motion judge denied the request, citing delays and fading memories, which led to the action being dismissed when the appellant called no evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider that liability was admitted and that the respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice from a short adjournment.

The action was reinstated and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff moved to amend her statement of claim to add a claim for unidentified motorist coverage against the defendant insurer.

However, the plaintiff had previously brought a motion for the same relief in 2005 and delivered a notice of abandonment.

The court held that an abandoned motion cannot be revived absent inadvertence, mistake, misapprehension, or compelling special circumstances.

Finding no such circumstances, the court dismissed the motion to withdraw the notice of abandonment, thereby dismissing the motion to amend the statement of claim.

The appellant's claim for long-term disability benefits was denied in 1995.

She commenced an action in 2006, which was dismissed on summary judgment for being outside the two-year limitation period prescribed by her employee benefit plan.

On appeal, the appellant argued the term 'covered event' was ambiguous and that a rolling limitation period should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the term 'covered event' was clear in context and occurred only once or twice, not monthly, precluding a rolling limitation period.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and commenced an action against the driver, believing him to be the owner based on a police report and an insurer's pleading.

Counsel later received a Crown brief containing a licence plate search that identified the respondents as the true owners, but a law clerk missed this information.

The respondents were sued more than two years after the accident, and a motion judge dismissed the claim as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that counsel acted with reasonable diligence in relying on the initial information until the contrary information actually came to their attention.

The plaintiff's action arising from a motor vehicle accident was administratively dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14.

The status notice and dismissal order were sent to the plaintiff's former counsel due to a court error, despite a notice of change of solicitor having been filed.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the dismissal, finding unexplained delay, prejudice to the defendants, and relying on the principle of finality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of the delay, prejudice, and finality, particularly given the defendants' continued participation in discoveries for a related action.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the tortfeasors, their insurer, and her own insurer under an OPCF 44R endorsement.

The tortfeasors' insurer took an off-coverage position and settled with the appellant for the $200,000 statutory minimum.

The appellant's insurer successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the tortfeasors' policy limits were never legally reduced and the release barred the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an insurer's off-coverage position and settlement do not reduce liability limits 'by operation of law' without a legal determination.

However, the appellant's action against her own insurer could proceed, wherein she would bear the burden of proving the tortfeasors' policy breach.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a registrar's dismissal of their personal injury action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action was dismissed in 2007 after the appellants' former lawyer failed to set the action down for trial or respond to the status notice.

The Court of Appeal found the delay between 2006 and 2010 to be inexcusable, attributing it almost entirely to the appellants' counsel.

The Court held that the finality principle outweighed the lack of actual prejudice to the respondents, noting the appellants still had recourse through a solicitor's negligence action.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurers appealed an order requiring them to pay 90 per cent of the respondents' defence costs under a directors' and officers' liability insurance policy.

The dispute centered on whether Endorsement 3 of the policy applied to allocate defence costs for 'Hybrid Proceedings' that involved both covered and uncovered conduct, despite the claims not being made during the 2001 policy period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the policy's definition of 'Claim' was not time-limited and that Endorsement 3 applied to allocate 90 per cent of the defence costs to the covered loss.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the parties submitted written costs submissions.

The respondent consented to an award of costs in favour of the appellant Board in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The Crown appellants did not seek costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in the agreed amount.

The plaintiff commenced two identical actions for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police and the Crown.

Both actions were dismissed by the registrar as abandoned due to delay.

Almost two years later, the plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal orders under Rule 37.14.

The master dismissed the motion, finding inordinate delay and deemed prejudice to the defendants due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the second action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal and restored the master's order, holding that the master did not err in finding that the expiry of a limitation period gives rise to presumptive prejudice, which the plaintiff failed to rebut.

The plaintiff's personal injury action was dismissed for delay by the registrar after a status notice was not served on the plaintiff or his counsel due to an administrative error.

The plaintiff's counsel discovered the dismissal order shortly after but waited two years to bring a motion to set it aside.

The motion judge dismissed the motion due to the delay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the failure to serve the status notice was an irregularity rather than a jurisdictional error, the motion judge erred by applying a rigid test instead of a contextual approach.

Balancing all factors, including the lack of prejudice to the defendants, the Court set aside the dismissal order and reinstated the action.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing his motions to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of two actions for delay.

The Master had held she had no discretion to extend the time for bringing the motions and that the expiry of the limitation period created deemed prejudice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by ignoring the overarching discretion in Rule 2.03 and by presuming prejudice solely from the expiry of the limitation period when the respondents had early notice of the claims.

The dismissal order for the second action was set aside.

The deceased was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident and died several months later.

His estate commenced an action more than two years after the accident but within two years of his death.

The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred.

On appeal, the estate argued that the limitation period should run from the date of death under the Trustee Act and the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the death of the injured party does not create a new cause of action and the limitation period runs from the date of the accident.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal concerning the allocation of defence costs between an insurer and an insured.

The respondent, the insured university, was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision declaring he had no right to sue his employer, Ontario Hydro, for injuries allegedly sustained in a nuclear accident.

The applicant argued that the federal Nuclear Liability Act created a statutory tort that ousted the provincial Workers' Compensation Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Nuclear Liability Act does not create a federal statutory tort and that federal jurisdiction over nuclear power does not oust provincial jurisdiction over employees' compensation schemes.

The court confirmed that the applicant must pursue his remedies under the provincial workers' compensation scheme.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their motor vehicle accident claims as statute-barred under the Highway Traffic Act.

The motion judge had concluded that the two-year limitation period commenced when the plaintiff knew he had a cause of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the discoverability of the non-pecuniary damages claim, which required meeting a statutory threshold, and the pecuniary damages claim.

The dismissal of the minor's claims and Family Law Act claims was also overturned on consent.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judge's decision allocating 95% of the respondent insured's defence costs to the insurer.

The underlying action involved multiple claims, including wrongful dismissal and malicious prosecution, but only the malicious prosecution claim was covered by the policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the allocation of defence costs for mixed claims is a matter of contractual interpretation, not fairness or equity.

Because the policy contained an unqualified obligation to pay for the defence of covered claims, the insurer was required to pay all reasonable costs associated with defending the malicious prosecution claim, even if those costs also assisted in defending uncovered claims.