Victor Mitrow

Following the dismissal of almost all interim relief sought by both parties in a high-conflict family law dispute, the court determined costs.

Although there was divided success, the court found the respondent was entitled to some costs because the applicant's claims for a restraining order and relocation occupied a significant portion of the materials and argument.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $3,500 in costs.

The appellant father appealed a family arbitration award that permitted the respondent mother to relocate with their child to Rochester, Minnesota, to accept a surgical oncology position at the Mayo Clinic.

The appellant argued the arbitrator misapprehended evidence regarding his ability to work in the United States, the mother's employment prospects in Ontario, and failed to give sufficient weight to the maximum contact principle.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the standard of appellate review, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law in the arbitrator's decision.

The court held that the arbitrator properly considered the child's best interests, the maximum contact principle, and the evidence of immigration experts.

The appeal was dismissed and the arbitration award was confirmed.

Following an interim custody motion where the applicant maternal aunt was awarded primary care of the child and the respondent father was awarded access, the court determined costs.

The court found the applicant was more successful and presumptively entitled to costs, despite divided success.

Considering the unreasonable behaviour of both parties and the excessive time spent, the court fixed costs at $7,000 payable by the respondent father to the applicant.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking frequent overnight access to the parties' two-year-old child.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing it was premature and should await the completion of the Office of the Children's Lawyer report.

The court found that both parties were loving parents and that many of the mother's concerns were unwarranted or based on speculation.

The court granted the father interim overnight access every second weekend, finding that overnight visits were in the child's best interests and long overdue, pending the release of the report.

The applicant mother moved with the two children from London to Brampton without providing the 60 days' written notice required by the final order.

The respondent father brought an emergency motion for the return of the children, and the mother brought a cross-motion to remain in Brampton.

The court applied the Plumley factors for interim mobility, finding a genuine issue for trial and no compelling circumstances to justify an interim move.

The court ordered the children returned to London pending trial, noting the mother could not benefit from creating a new status quo without proper notice.

In an uncontested family law trial, the court determined child support, spousal support, and equalization following the respondent's failure to provide financial disclosure.

The court imputed the respondent's income at $196,879 and ordered periodic spousal and child support.

Finding that the respondent recklessly depleted the equity in the matrimonial home post-separation by unilaterally withdrawing approximately $400,000 from a joint line of credit, the court ordered an unequal division of net family property under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act, increasing the equalization payment by $199,500.

To satisfy the equalization payment, the court vested the matrimonial home and a jointly owned vehicle in the applicant.

The applicant and respondent both brought motions for interim relief in a high-conflict family law proceeding.

The applicant sought to relocate with the children to Blue Mountain, exclusive possession of a chalet, and a restraining order based on allegations of stalking and electronic spying.

The respondent sought to sever the divorce from corollary issues, a restraining order, and an updated custody assessment.

The court dismissed all substantive motions, finding no compelling reason to vary the interim parenting status quo, insufficient evidence to support the restraining orders, and potential prejudice to the applicant regarding medical benefits if the divorce were severed.

The claimant sought $45,670.50 in child support arrears from the estate of her late ex-husband, dating back to a 1978 decree nisi.

The estate trustee contested the claim, arguing it was uncorroborated under s. 13 of the Evidence Act and partially statute-barred.

The court found the claimant's evidence of non-payment was corroborated by her current husband.

However, arrears accruing prior to January 1, 1984, were statute-barred under the former Limitations Act, and the doctrine of special circumstances did not apply to extend the period.

Applying the DiFrancesco factors, the court ordered the estate to pay the enforceable arrears of $20,275.

Applicants sought sole custody of a child born in Nunavut who had been in their care since shortly after birth.

The biological parents consented to the applicants having custody and provided executed consents supported by certificates of independent legal advice.

The court reviewed prior concerns regarding the removal of the child from Nunavut, compliance with documentation requirements under the Children’s Law Reform Act, and the involvement of child protection authorities.

Evidence confirmed the applicants complied with statutory requirements and that the child was thriving in their care.

Applying the best interests test under s. 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court granted a final custody order to the applicants.

Interim custody motion concerning a young child following a serious assault allegedly committed by the mother, who was subsequently charged under the Criminal Code and remained in custody.

The child’s maternal aunt and the father each sought interim custody.

The court applied the best interests of the child analysis under s. 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, emphasizing stability, existing relationships, and the importance of maintaining elements of the child’s status quo following a traumatic event.

Given the father’s prolonged absence from the child’s life and the child’s strong integration into the aunt’s household and community, the court found it inappropriate to change the child’s principal residence on an interim basis.

The child was ordered to remain primarily with the aunt while the father received structured parenting time pending further investigation by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The applicant father sought sole custody, supervised access for the respondent mother, and the elimination of spousal and child support, citing the mother's severe alcohol addiction and relapses following their separation agreement.

The mother, who was residing in a rehabilitation facility during the trial, sought to maintain joint custody and eventually resume equal shared parenting.

The court ordered joint custody, implementing a transition plan with supervised access and mandatory alcohol testing, leading to equal shared parenting once the mother demonstrated sustained sobriety.

The court also imputed incomes to both parties and ordered the father to pay ongoing spousal and child support, including arrears.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the applicant grandfather’s claim for access to his grandchildren under s. 21 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court considered Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules and the summary judgment principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

Applying the grandparent access framework from Chapman v. Chapman, the court found there was no meaningful existing relationship between the grandfather and the children and no evidence that the parents acted arbitrarily in restricting contact.

The parents were demonstrably attentive to the children’s best interests and had previously allowed limited contact before concerns arose about the grandfather’s behaviour.

The evidentiary record disclosed no genuine issue requiring a trial, and the application for access was dismissed.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the applicant father brought a motion to compel the respondent mother's father and boyfriend to attend for oral questioning as non-parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to satisfy the strict criteria under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules, as questioning non-parties is a last resort and the information sought was either irrelevant or available from the respondent herself.

The respondent's father was, however, ordered to provide an affidavit regarding specific financial gifts and a vehicle transfer.

The court addressed a recurring procedural issue concerning the inclusion of annual financial disclosure provisions in child support orders.

The court examined the distinction between the Federal Child Support Guidelines under the Divorce Act and the Ontario Child Support Guidelines under the Family Law Act.

It held that the mandatory annual disclosure requirement in s. 24.1 of the Ontario Guidelines applies only to child support orders made pursuant to the Family Law Act and should not be inserted into orders made under the Divorce Act.

Where parties have already agreed to an annual disclosure regime in minutes of settlement, inclusion of the statutory anniversary-date disclosure clause is unnecessary.

The court signed the final order without reference to s. 24.1 because the parties’ settlement already provided detailed disclosure provisions.

In an uncontested family trial after the respondent's answer was struck for repeated disclosure breaches, the court granted a divorce, sole custody, supervised access at the applicant's discretion, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and contents.

The court found the respondent's non-disclosure and conduct egregious, and accepted evidence of untreated substance abuse as relevant to parenting and access.

Final determinations on equalization, child support, spousal support, and some property issues were adjourned because the evidentiary record remained incomplete, but interim child and spousal support were ordered based on the existing financial record.

The respondent's interest in the matrimonial home was ordered as interim security for support, and the applicant received full indemnity costs.

In a family support proceeding concerning retroactive child support and post-secondary expenses for adult children, the court treated the matter as a corollary relief application under the Divorce Act.

Applying the appellate approach to s. 3(2) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court held that full table support was inappropriate during academic terms when the children lived away from home, but remained payable during summer periods when they resided with the respondent.

The court quantified each child's educational expenses, required substantial contributions from the children through earnings, grants, bursaries, and a portion of OSAP loans, and rejected several claimed section 7 items as not extraordinary or inadequately proven.

After setting off the applicant's overpayment of table support against proven post-secondary contributions, the court ordered a lump-sum child support payment of $7,300, with pre-judgment interest and costs left for possible further determination.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application seeking to terminate a supervision order and place the child in the mother's custody under s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

An issue arose because there was an existing final joint custody order under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court held that it has jurisdiction under s. 57.1 of the CFSA to make an order that has the effect of varying an existing final order under the CLRA, provided all parties to the CLRA order are parties to the CFSA proceeding, are served, and there is a material change in circumstances.

The applicant sought costs following a successful motion for interim spousal support.

The applicant claimed $19,933.50 plus HST, while the respondent argued costs should be limited to $4,500.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs and that her offers to settle were closer to the final order, though they did not trigger the automatic costs consequences of Rule 18(14).

The court fixed the applicant's costs at $15,000 plus HST, for a total of $16,950, noting the complexity of determining the respondent's income.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order of Crown wardship for a child, with no access to the parents.

The mother opposed the motion, proposing a plan of care where she would live with her mother and step-father.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, relying on a previous psychological assessment indicating the mother's cognitive challenges and inability to parent independently, as well as uncontradicted evidence of child protection concerns regarding the maternal grandparents.

The court ordered Crown wardship and, finding the mother failed to establish a beneficial and meaningful relationship, made the order silent as to access.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order of Crown wardship for three children.

The parents, who arrived as refugees and faced significant intellectual and physical disabilities, struggled to provide adequate care despite extensive community support.

The court granted summary judgment for Crown wardship, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the parents' inability to care for the children.

However, the court found the society failed to establish that there was no triable issue regarding access between the parents and the children, and ordered a trial on the issue of access.