COURT FILE NO.: F1339/15

DATE: December 9, 2015

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
FAMILY COURT

RE: Rita Uzoma Ehiobu, applicant

AND:

Andrae St. Patrick Buchanan and Erica Ehikwe, respondents

BEFORE: MITROW J.

COUNSEL: Alexandra Kirschbaum for Rita Uzoma Ehiobu

Hamoody Hassan and Sharon Hassan for Andrae St. Patrick Buchanan

Erica Ehikwe not appearing

HEARD: November 9 and 12, 2015

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The issue on the motions before the court is interim custody of the child, Aniyah, age 6. The applicant, Rita Ehiobu, is the child’s maternal aunt (sometimes referred to as “Ms. Ehiobu”); the respondent, Erica Ehikwe, is the child’s mother (sometimes referred to as “Ms. Ehikwe”); and the respondent, Andrae St. Patrick Buchanan, is the child’s father (sometimes referred to as “Mr. Buchanan”). The order below includes a provision to amend the application to show the correct spelling of Mr. Buchanan’s name.

[2] Both Ms. Ehiobu and Mr. Buchanan seek interim custody of the child. The motions were precipitated by emergent circumstances: on October 22, 2015 the child suffered multiple stab wounds while in the care of her mother.

[3] The child was brought to emergency at London Health Sciences Centre and, on that day, in the morning, underwent abdominal surgery. The medical report of Dr. Sarah Jones confirms that the child recovered very well from the stab wounds and the abdominal surgery. She was discharged from hospital on November 3, 2015. Dr. Jones’ medical report confirmed that, at the time of discharge, the child was tolerating a regular diet, had no physical restrictions and, further, that the child had no specific ongoing needs with respect to the physical injuries that she sustained and likely would be able to go back to her usual physical activities within another week. The report noted there is no need for physiotherapy and that exercise should be encouraged as normal. The report also spoke to the necessity of a follow-up appointment with Dr. Jones, an appointment with a general paediatrician and a referral to the Mental Health Intake Team, at which time the child’s psychological needs could be assessed.

[4] There is no dispute that the mother was arrested, as the alleged perpetrator of the serious injuries sustained by the child, and that the mother has remained in custody and has been charged under the Criminal Code.

[5] A number of interim interim orders were made to stabilize the situation until the motions could be heard; this included having the applicant remain as the child’s substitute decision-maker and an order that when the child was ready for discharge, that the child should be discharged to the applicant’s care; orders also were made for Mr. Buchanan to have access to the child, both at the hospital and subsequent to discharge.

[6] On the hearing of the motions, exclusive of the form 35.1 affidavits, there were over 30 affidavits filed on behalf of the applicant and Mr. Buchanan. Each party mustered many affidavits from immediate family, extended family and friends. This included substantial “cheerleader” evidence. The child’s mother, Ms. Ehikwe, did not participate in the motions, but an affidavit was prepared on her behalf and filed.

[7] There is substantial conflict in the affidavit material that is not capable of resolution on the motions.

[8] There are, however, relevant facts that are not in dispute, and it is those facts that primarily inform what is in the child’s best interests and the proper disposition of the motions.

[9] It is not in dispute that Mr. Buchanan has had no involvement in the child’s life for several years. At the time of the child’s birth in Toronto, there is evidence that the Children's Aid Society in Toronto attended at the hospital apparently as a result of an allegation received by that society to the effect that the mother had suggested she was going to engage in conduct that may cause some injury to the child prior to the child’s birth. This resulted in discussions, as a result of which the Children's Aid Society in Toronto did not intervene on the basis that the mother and the child would reside at the residence of the paternal grandmother, in Toronto, together with the father, Mr. Buchanan.

[10] For the purpose of the motions, it is not necessary to make detailed findings as to where the parents and the child resided for the next several years after the child’s birth; however, the gist of the evidence suggests that, in the summer of 2009, the parties moved to Sudbury for reasons that included the mother wanting to be closer to her family. Mr. Buchanan recalled that during this time, while living in Sudbury (he estimates six to seven months), they would visit the applicant and her family, where they lived at the time, in Sault Ste. Marie. After living in Sudbury, according to Mr. Buchanan, the parents and child then moved to Sault Ste. Marie. Thereafter, Mr. Buchanan deposes that he and the mother decided to have “a long distance relationship”; as a consequence, Mr. Buchanan returned to live in Toronto.

[11] According to Mr. Buchanan, the mother later moved back to Sudbury and Mr. Buchanan states that he assisted her in the move.

[12] There is no dispute that the mother, Ms. Ehikwe, and the child then next moved back to Toronto to the residence of Mr. Buchanan’s mother. In her affidavit, Mr. Buchanan’s mother deposes that this was “sometime in 2011.” For the purpose of the motions, I am prepared to rely on this evidence from the paternal grandmother, and also her evidence that by April 2012, Mr. Buchanan had moved his belongings out of her home, and then by “late 2012” the mother, Ms. Ehikwe, said that she was moving back to Sudbury; although Mr. Buchanan’s mother states she was “taken aback” by this information, she also deposed that she wanted the mother “to be happy.” I accept also the paternal grandmother’s evidence that the last time they saw Ms. Ehikwe and the child was in August 2013.

[13] The evidence is sharply in conflict as to why Mr. Buchanan had no contact with the child for over two years. Mr. Buchanan submits that the mother, and also her family members, purposely set out to alienate him from the child; he submits that he did not know where the child and the mother were living after they left his mother’s residence in 2012. In contrast, the applicant’s position is that Mr. Buchanan had no interest in the child, and that he was dismissive and controlling towards the mother, Ms. Ehikwe; further, in her affidavit, Ms. Ehikwe paints a picture of Mr. Buchanan as someone who was abusive and controlling, and who wanted Ms. Ehikwe to choose either his family or her family.

[14] The applicant also suggests further that Mr. Buchanan’s disinterest in the child is corroborated by his failure to properly provide financial support for the child over the last number of years, pointing to the fact that he continued to pay $59 per month child support pursuant to a February 2012 mediation agreement, even though his affidavit material disclosed that he now was earning approximately $50,000 annually.

[15] Although the true reasons for Mr. Buchanan’s estrangement from the child for the past number of years cannot be determined on the conflicting evidence, I find it somewhat curious that Mr. Richards, the ex-brother-in-law of Mr. Buchanan, and also the child’s godparent, and who filed an affidavit on behalf of Mr. Buchanan, deposed that he continued to see the mother and the child in London, Ontario after the mother moved there, and also that the mother would come to Toronto to visit (where Mr. Richards lived). It does seem unlikely that Mr. Richards, who appears to have some ongoing contact with Mr. Buchanan, would not have informed Mr. Buchanan as to where the mother and child were residing; I find that this puts some strain on the credibility of Mr. Buchanan’s explanation that he allegedly had no idea of their whereabouts.

[16] There is little dispute that the applicant, her immediate family and other members of her family have been a regular presence in the child’s life. The evidence supports the conclusion that from 2012 to 2013 that the mother and the child lived in Sault Ste. Marie with the applicant and her husband and children. This is corroborated by others, including Noealla Ehikwe (one of the sisters of the applicant and the mother), who also lived in Sault Ste. Marie at the same time, although not at the applicant’s residence.

[17] On May 19, 2010, the mother obtained a final order in the Ontario Court of Justice awarding sole custody of the child to her. That order was varied pursuant to a final order in the Ontario Court of Justice dated May 4, 2011, which provided on consent that the mother and the father would have joint custody of the child, with the primary residence to be with the mother. There was some conflicting evidence as to whether Mr. Buchanan was aware as to the proceeding that gave rise to the first order, and conflicting evidence also as to the circumstances and reasons why the subsequent order was made. The parties also attended mediation, which resulted in the February 2012 mediation agreement providing that the father and the mother were to have shared custody of the child with the principal residence to be with the mother. The agreement also set out a schedule of regular access between the child and the father.

[18] While it is not necessary for the purpose of the motions to delve into each party’s explanation as to the circumstances surrounding the sole custody order, the subsequent joint custody order and the mediation agreement, the undisputed fact remains that by late 2012, when the mother moved to Sudbury, the mother had “de facto” custody of the child, with no regular access being exercised by the father and that this status quo continued until October 22, 2015.

[19] In 2013, the applicant, the mother and Noealla Ehikwe moved to London. While living in London, the evidence supports the conclusion that there was frequent and regular contact between the applicant and the child. The applicant often assisted the mother in looking after the child, including at times daily contact with the child in picking her up from school. In addition, the child would spend some weekends at the applicant’s residence and this too is corroborated by the applicant’s husband. There were times also when Noealla Ehikwe babysat the child on a regular basis.

[20] Mr. Buchanan’s next involvement with the child occurred on the day that the child sustained her injuries. He deposes that he received information from his mother as to what had happened on the morning of October 22, 2015.

[21] Mr. Buchanan and some members of his family then came to London. Mr. Buchanan deposed, understandably, to being in significant emotional distress during the drive to London. Mr. Buchanan resides in Milton.

[22] At the hospital, there was palpable tension between members of the applicant’s family and members of Mr. Buchanan’s family. Again, it is not necessary to summarize the detailed and conflicting evidence that was adduced in the affidavit material as to what transpired at the hospital.

[23] I find that the conduct of both the applicant and Mr. Buchanan can be subject to some criticism. In particular, the applicant, who was noted as the child’s emergency contact at school, attended at the hospital on October 22, 2015 and the applicant was treated as the child’s substitute decision-maker for medical treatment. However, when Mr. Buchanan arrived, he brought with him a copy of the 2011 joint custody order and, as a result of that order, Mr. Buchanan asserted the role of substitute decision-maker and began to make decisions without fully involving the applicant and members of her family. Despite Mr. Buchanan’s explanations to the contrary, I find that this conduct was not helpful and served to increase the tension between the two families.

[24] For her part, the applicant, and some members of her family, displayed at times a somewhat hostile attitude towards Mr. Buchanan and his family. In one particular instance, the applicant took it upon herself to direct which persons from Mr. Buchanan’s family could be present with the child in the hospital room, despite an order granting Mr. Buchanan access daily while at the hospital from 2:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. There was nothing in the order that permitted the applicant to direct the persons to be present with the child at the hospital during Mr. Buchanan’s access time.

[25] It is also not unfair to say that Mr. Buchanan, at times, was treated with some measure of hostility by the applicant on the basis that, in her view, he had abandoned the child and had not been part of the child’s life, and that he was now showing up and apparently wanting to be involved.

[26] I do agree with submissions made on behalf of Mr. Buchanan that a number of the nurses’ recordings made while the child was at the hospital do portray Mr. Buchanan as being polite, respectful and cognizant of the child’s best interests.

[27] It is the position of Mr. Buchanan that interim custody of the child should be awarded to him. The undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Buchanan and his spouse have a residence in Milton and that they have a daughter, age 3, born in September 2012.

[28] Mr. Buchanan is employed at two jobs, both at a hospital; at one hospital he works as an environmental aide and at the other hospital he works as a dietary aide. Mr. Buchanan’s spouse is employed as a registered nurse.

[29] There is little doubt that Mr. Buchanan can provide financially and physically for the child. Further, the evidence is undisputed that Mr. Buchanan and his spouse have both taken steps to ensure that, should the child live with them, she has proper and adequate follow-up for all medical care that she will require.

[30] Mr. Buchanan submits that the child’s life, while in London, was unstable. Mr. Buchanan points to the evidence of the mother’s deteriorating mental health, and suggests that neither the applicant nor Ms. Noealla Ehikwe, who both reside in London, took adequate and necessary steps to protect the child. In fact, Mr. Buchanan submits that the affidavit material shows that the applicant and others minimized the extent of the mother’s deteriorating mental health, thereby exposing the child to potential risk.

[31] Mr. Buchanan also points to the affidavits of Ms. Avy Reid filed on behalf of Mr. Buchanan. Ms. Reid is also a sister of the applicant, Noealla Ehikwe and the respondent mother. Ms. Reid resides in Sault Ste. Marie and she too is employed as a registered nurse. Ms. Reid is critical of the applicant (Ms. Reid deposed that she spoke with the applicant regularly) in not disclosing to Ms. Reid the extent of Erica Ehikwe’s deteriorating mental health.

[32] In response to Ms. Reid’s affidavit, the applicant and others filed affidavits disputing a number of her allegations. Ms. Reid had stated that she was concerned for the wellbeing of the child to be placed in the care of the applicant but that she did not have concerns about having the child placed with Mr. Buchanan. Ms. Reid deposed that she worried that the applicant, and also Noealla Ehikwe, will exercise poor judgment and that they may not call the Children's Aid Society and make a report should anything happen that is of concern.

[33] It is the applicant’s submission that she should have interim custody of the child. Both the applicant and Noealla Ehikwe are also registered nurses, and both are employed in a hospital in London. The applicant and her husband live in London, Ontario, together with their three children (although the applicant’s husband is not the biological father of the eldest child, age 11). The youngest two children were born in April 2013 and July 2015. Currently, the applicant is on maternity leave, and she submits that this allows her to be available for Aniyah at all times.

[34] Similar to Mr. Buchanan and his spouse, the evidence is clear that the applicant and her husband are well able to meet the physical and financial needs of the child. There is no doubt, similar to Mr. Buchanan and his spouse, that they will attend to ensure that the child receives all the necessary medical care and attention that she requires, including any appropriate psychological counselling.

DISPOSITION

[35] The relevant legislation is the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. Section 24(2) sets out factors that a court should consider when assessing a child’s best interests:

24(2) The court shall consider all the child’s needs and circumstances, including,

(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,

(i) each person entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child,

(ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and

(iii) persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing;

(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;

(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;

(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;

(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing;

(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;

(g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and

(h) the relationship by blood or through an adoption order between the child and each person who is a party to the application.

[36] In considering the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and persons listed in subparagraph (a), the undisputed evidence supports the finding that the child’s “family”, and persons who have been known to her in the recent past, were the child’s mother, the applicant and her husband and children, Ms. Noealla Ehikwe and some other members of the applicant’s extended family. This was the child’s day-to-day world in London, Ontario. The child lived with her mother and had regular and frequent contact with the applicant and other members of the applicant’s family, including the applicant’s husband and children.

[37] Mr. Buchanan’s absence from the child’s life for a substantial period of time has been discussed above and is a fact. Having said that, however, the evidence establishes that Mr. Buchanan, properly, rose to the occasion as any concerned father would and was vigilant in being at his daughter’s side during this time of crisis. Mr. Buchanan’s interactions with the child at the hospital, as corroborated by the nurses’ records, suggest that the child enjoyed her time with her father and that the child appeared to have some recollection of Mr. Buchanan, as either her father or an important person from the early part of her life.

[38] Also, there is no dispute that the paternal grandmother had substantial involvement with the child and also the mother during the early times in the child’s life.

[39] There was no reliable evidence as to the child’s views and preferences. However, there was evidence, not disputed, that the child is distressed at not seeing her mother.

[40] In terms of the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment (subparagraph (c)), Mr. Buchanan urges the court to find that the child has in fact lived in an unstable environment; he points to the number of times that the mother has moved and the fact that the mother, allegedly, set out to alienate him from the child’s life. He also submits that the mother’s deteriorating mental health created an unstable environment.

[41] Given the conflicting evidence, I am satisfied that there is insufficient evidence on which to make a finding, at least since 2013 when the child began to live in London, that the child has lived in an unstable environment. In fact, the preponderance of evidence appears to be to the contrary.

[42] In terms of subparagraph (d), that has been discussed in part in relation to the ability of each of the applicant and Mr. Buchanan to provide for the child’s financial and physical needs. The issue, from Mr. Buchanan’s perspective, is that neither the applicant nor most members of her family will promote a relationship between the child and Mr. Buchanan and members of his family. Mr. Buchanan, however, submits that he will encourage a relationship between the child and the applicant and members of the applicant’s family.

[43] I am not prepared to make a finding, on the basis of the conflicted affidavit material, that the applicant will alienate the child from having a relationship with Mr. Buchanan. While I do agree that the applicant acted inappropriately, initially, as set out earlier, I find that on the whole of the evidence, including later affidavits from the applicant, that the applicant is cognizant of the importance of promoting the child’s relationship with Mr. Buchanan.

[44] In relation to subparagraph (f), dealing with the permanency and stability of each family unit, that has already been dealt with earlier; in relation to subparagraph (h), Mr. Buchanan is the biological father, the applicant is a maternal aunt and Ms. Ehikwe is the mother.

[45] Looking at subparagraphs (e) (the plan proposed by each parent) and (g) (ability of each person to act as a parent), I find that the plan proposed by Mr. Buchanan, at least at this time, does not meet the child’s best interests. I make this finding for a number of reasons.

[46] It is clear that the child has been through an extremely traumatic event; from the child’s perspective, for now, an important part of her life – her mother – is gone. Another substantial change for the child, now at this interim stage, is not in her best interests.

[47] Although the child’s relationship with Mr. Buchanan while at the hospital, and in the subsequent visits, can be described as positive, the fact is that the child had no contact at all with Mr. Buchanan for over two years. Time is required to re-build that relationship.

[48] This is not a case, I find, where the child’s status quo should be altered on an interim basis. In relation to status quo, I adopt the following statement in Tucker v. Tucker, 1994 CarswellAlta 835 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 43:

Status quo should not be defined as merely a geographical place, but rather "a way of life". The home, neighbourhood, school, church, friends, lifestyle and recreational amenities need to be taken into account when assessing the status quo, and the degree of change being proposed by the moving parent. ...

[49] In referring to “status quo,” it is acknowledged that the child’s status quo, of necessity, has changed because she is no longer living with her mother. However, in staying with the applicant and her family, for now, an important portion of the status quo remains. This includes the applicant, her husband and immediate family, the child’s friends and also some other extended family members that have had regular contact with the child while the child has been living in London.

[50] The court is advised that the Children’s Lawyer has accepted this case and has appointed a clinical investigator pursuant to s. 112. At the time of the hearing of the motions, the Children’s Lawyer had not yet started any active involvement in the case; this is understandable, given the very short timeframe between the child’s injuries and the hearing of the interim custody motions. On the facts, the potential of having the child reside with Mr. Buchanan should await the Children’s Lawyer investigation.

[51] It will not be in the child’s best interests to change the child’s principal place of residence to be with Mr. Buchanan on an interim basis and then risk potentially the child being returned to the applicant’s care after trial.

[52] I find it is in the child’s best interests that Mr. Buchanan have regular ongoing parenting time on an interim basis to include alternate weekends and during the week.

[53] It is in the child’s best interests to remain in the primary care of the applicant on an interim basis at this time.

[54] I am not prepared to make an order, however, that either the applicant or Mr. Buchanan have interim custody of the child. Instead, the order below simply provides that each party will have care and control of the child when the child is staying with him or her.

[55] It is important, I find, and in the child’s best interests, to maintain a “level playing field” to the extent possible; however, I find that, for now, the child’s medical care and location of school should be decided by the applicant.

[56] The order below will enable Mr. Buchanan to re-establish his relationship with the child.

[57] The ongoing relationship between the child and Mr. Buchanan, and how that relationship develops between now and trial, will, in my view, be an important factor for the trial judge to consider in the final disposition of this matter.

[58] Mr. Buchanan sought orders for sealing of court records and a publication ban and included this relief in his motion. The parties were ordered to file facta on the issue; none were filed. At the hearing of the motion, Mr. Buchanan abandoned his request, and requested an order withdrawing the claims. The applicant was in support of a sealing order and/or publication ban, and given that no argument was heard, the order below preserves the applicant’s right to bring such a motion.

[59] At the commencement of the hearing of the motion, Mr. Buchanan sought leave to question the child’s school principal, viva voce, who was present in court pursuant to a subpoena. I dismissed this request for reasons to follow. These are the reasons:

a) the parties were already in possession of the child’s school records, as a result of the same school principal having attended in court on a previous occasions (October 30, 2015) with the school records;

b) the court’s primary objective is to enable parties to deal with cases justly, and this includes “saving expense and time” (see r. 2(3)(b) of the Family Law Rules);

c) in the present case, significant court time already was allocated to hear the motions; further, the evidence already tendered via affidavit material was voluminous;

d) entertaining viva voce evidence from the school principal would have provided marginal, if any, assistance to the court on the motions before the court and would have been an unnecessary expenditure of time and money.

ORDER

[60] For the reasons set out above, I make the following order:

1. The applicant and Mr. Buchanan shall have interim care and control of the child while the child is in his or her care according to the schedule below.

2. The child shall be with Mr. Buchanan as follows:

a) alternating weekends from 10:00 a.m. Saturday to 7:00 p.m. Sunday;

b) one weekday, each week, with Mr. Buchanan to provide at least 48 hours written notice as to which day; if the child is not in school, the time shall be from 10:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. and, if the child is in school, then from after school to 7:30 p.m.;

c) effective February 2016, the alternating weekend times shall increase from 6:00 p.m. Friday (or such other start time on Friday as agreed between the applicant and Mr. Buchanan), until 7:00 p.m. Sunday, to be extended to 7:00 p.m. Monday, if Monday is a statutory holiday;

d) the above schedule shall not apply during the regular school Christmas vacation time that commences December 2015, and instead the child shall be with Mr. Buchanan for two 3 day periods, from 10:00 a.m. on the first day to 7:00 p.m. on the third day, with the days being as agreed by the parties or, failing agreement, this matter may be spoken to at the case conference;

e) Mr. Buchanan is responsible for all driving arrangements for pick up and return of the child, except that for the first access weekend of each month, the applicant shall be responsible for attending at Mr. Buchanan’s residence to pick up the child and, for that weekend, the access return time shall be 5:00 p.m.;

f) such further times as agreed to by the applicant and Mr. Buchanan;

g) for 2016, March break week shall be shared as follows unless the applicant and Mr. Buchanan agree otherwise:

i) from after school at the beginning of the March break until noon on Wednesday, the child shall be with the applicant;

ii) for the balance of the March break until 7:00 p.m. Sunday, the child shall be with Mr. Buchanan; and

iii) in the event that March break is two weeks, the schedule for the second week shall be the same as the first week.

3. The child shall be in the care and control of the applicant at all other times.

4. The applicant shall be responsible for the child’s medical and dental care, and taking the child to all appointments. The applicant shall be the child’s substitute decision-maker for all medical treatment; however, the applicant shall give seven days written notice of all medical appointments to Mr. Buchanan, and he shall have the right to attend at all such appointments. Medical appointments include any counselling for the child.

5. Upon production of a photocopy of this order, the applicant and Mr. Buchanan shall each have equal rights to speak with, and to receive, any information concerning the child from the child’s doctors or any other healthcare professionals, from teachers and the school principal, including copies of all medical reports, medical records, school report cards and the child’s Ontario school record.

6. The applicant shall be responsible for enrolling the child in school in London, Ontario, and shall name herself and Mr. Buchanan jointly as emergency contacts and shall provide Mr. Buchanan forthwith with a copy of this designation.

7. The applicant and Mr. Buchanan each shall have reasonable telephone and Skype access to the child while she is in the care of the other.

8. The child shall not be removed from the Province of Ontario.

9. The child’s principal place of residence shall not be changed from London, Ontario.

10. I remain seized of all motions in relation to custody or access, except in the case of an emergency where I am not available to hear the motion.

11. While Ms. Ehikwe remains in custody, all documents that are required to be served on Ms. Ehikwe may be served by serving the officer-in-charge at the correction facility where she is being held.

12. All temporary orders in relation to custody and access, and any orders ancillary to custody and access, made on or after October 22, 2015, are vacated and replaced by this order.

13. The final order of R.A. Humphry J. dated May 4, 2011, made in the Ontario Court of Justice (in Sudbury), awarding joint custody of the child to the respondents is suspended, and shall remain suspended, pending the final determination of this proceeding.

14. The mother, Ms. Ehikwe, shall have no interim access to the child, either direct or indirect, but this order is made on a without prejudice basis to the right of any party and the Children’s Lawyer to bring a motion based on evidence arising subsequent to the date of this order that Ms. Ehikwe have interim access to the child subject to any terms and conditions that are in the child’s best interests.

15. Both parties shall ensure that the child attends all medical appointments as necessary, including all appointments with a psychologist, therapist, or counsellor, as recommended by the child’s healthcare professionals.

16. The claims in Mr. Buchanan's motion requesting sealing of records and a publication ban are withdrawn without costs, but without prejudice to the applicant’s right to bring a motion for similar relief, on notice, said motion to be brought before me.

17. The title of the application is amended by correcting the name of the respondent father to “Andrae St. Patrick Buchanan.”

18. If the applicant and Mr. Buchanan cannot agree on costs of the motions, then written costs submissions may be filed with the trial coordinator, not to exceed 3 typed pages (2 typed pages for reply), plus copies of any time dockets, offers and authorities, as follows: the applicant’s submissions within 2 weeks; Mr. Buchanan’s submissions within 3 weeks thereafter; and reply, if any, within 2 weeks thereafter.

“Justice Victor Mitrow”

Justice Victor Mitrow

Date: December 9, 2015