Tom Halinski

The Respondent municipality sought costs of $142,102.11 against the Applicants following a hearing under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, alleging the Applicants acted unreasonably and frivolously by failing to prepare adequately or present expert evidence.

The Applicants, who were self-represented at the hearing, opposed the motion and sought their own costs of $7,500 for responding to it.

The Normal Farm Practices Protection Board dismissed both costs claims, finding that the self-represented Applicants had prepared as best they could and their conduct did not meet the high threshold of being unreasonable or frivolous.

The Board also found no bad faith on the part of the municipality in seeking costs.

The applicants sought a determination that their proposed importation of approximately 1,500 loads of fill to level a 2-acre portion of their farm for horse training and pasture constituted a normal farm practice under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, thereby exempting them from the municipality's site alteration by-law.

While the Board found the proposal was a necessary but ancillary part of their agricultural operation, it dismissed the application because the applicants failed to provide demonstrable plans, such as grading plans or expert reports, for the proposed site alteration.

Consequently, the Board could not determine whether the proposed fill project was a normal farm practice.

The appellant appealed the property tax classification of three properties with barns that had solar panels installed on their roofs.

MPAC had changed the classification from farm and vacant land to industrial and excess land industrial.

The appellant argued the change was prohibited by s. 42.3(1) or s. 42.2(1) of O. Reg. 282/98.

The Assessment Review Board found that the solar panels were the dominant physical feature on the rooftops, not 'ancillary installations', and that the primary use of the properties was electricity generation, not agricultural.

The Board confirmed the assessments in the industrial property class.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment finding its building in St. Thomas unsafe under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The applicant also sought an injunction to prevent demolition pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions.

The court found that the applicant had not formed an unequivocal intention to appeal, the delay in bringing the motion was not adequately explained, there was significant prejudice to the respondents due to the unsafe condition of the building and public safety concerns, and the appeal lacked merit as the application judge's findings were well-reasoned and supported by evidence.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision released on May 8, 2017.

The appellants were successful on appeal and the cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought partial indemnity costs in the amount of $38,105.67, including disbursements and HST.

The respondent did not dispute the quantum but argued that no costs should be awarded or alternatively that costs should be left to the application judge or awarded in the cause.

The court awarded costs to the appellants in the full amount requested, applying the ordinary practice that the successful party on appeal receives reasonable, fair and proportionate partial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed an application judge's order declaring an Order to Remedy Unsafe Building null, void, and inoperative.

The respondent cross-appealed seeking an interim injunction to prevent demolition and a declaration that the building was not unsafe.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge made two errors: first, in finding that service of the Order to Remedy was defective when it was properly served on the owner by registered mail in compliance with the Building Code Act; and second, in finding that the Order to Remedy lacked the required specificity.

The Court held that the Order to Remedy contained sufficient particularity to enable the respondent to understand the case it had to meet and the deficiencies requiring remediation.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal dismissed, and the issues of interim injunction and whether the building was unsafe were remitted to another application judge.

The moving party brought a motion for the production of confidential information held by the respondent regarding 24 pharmaceutical companies and five non-pharmaceutical companies, to assist in valuing its purpose-built pharmaceutical manufacturing facility.

The respondent and third-party property owners consented to the release of information for the pharmaceutical properties but objected to the non-pharmaceutical properties.

The Assessment Review Board found that the non-pharmaceutical properties lacked sufficient similarity to the subject property and denied disclosure for those five properties.

The Board ordered the disclosure of information for the 24 pharmaceutical properties, subject to strict confidentiality undertakings.

The appellant appealed the property assessment of a large pulp and paper mill in Thunder Bay for the 2009-2012 taxation years.

The parties agreed to use the cost approach to value and agreed on the reproduction cost new of the buildings and yardworks.

The Board had to determine the appropriate deductions for functional obsolescence (excess capital and operating costs), physical depreciation, and external obsolescence due to the severe decline in the pulp and paper industry.

The Board rejected the income-based return on capital method proposed by the municipality and largely adopted the modified greenfield method proposed by the appellant's expert.

The Board reduced the assessed value of the property from $72,232,000 to $32,620,000 and found no further adjustment was required for equity.

Following a finding that the respondent discriminated against the applicant by closing vehicular access to a public beach, the parties agreed on a plan to provide access for visitors with mobility impairments.

The Tribunal issued a consent order requiring the respondent to construct barrier-free parking spaces at the east end of the beach, install speed bumps, and adjust gates to control traffic while ensuring accessibility.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy.

The tenant had submitted a notice to terminate but later tried to rescind it, which the landlord refused.

The Board ordered termination and dismissed the tenant's motion to set aside.

The tenant appealed, arguing the project was a condominium conversion giving her security of tenure under s. 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court found the appeal manifestly devoid of merit as the project was clearly a demolition, not a conversion.

The motion to quash was granted and the certificate of stay was lifted.

The appellant challenged the validity of a municipal bylaw imposing fees for cutting pavement and digging up highways.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant failed to meet the onus of clearly demonstrating that the bylaw was beyond the municipality's powers, noting that the relevant regulation allows for the recovery of costs for issuing such permits.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board granting minor variances for a rear two-story addition to the respondents' neighbouring property.

The applicants argued that the Board failed to provide sufficient reasons regarding the third test for a minor variance, specifically whether the side yard variances maintained the general intent and purpose of the zoning bylaw.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the Board's failure to articulate its analysis on this mandated requirement constituted a fundamental flaw and an error of law.

Leave to appeal was granted, and costs were awarded to the applicants.

The applicant municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that allowed an appeal by a landowner regarding an official plan amendment.

The applicant argued the Board erred in law by failing to consider the public interest, breaching natural justice by ignoring evidence, and failing to properly apply the Planning Act and provincial Growth Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no errors of law and concluding that the Board's decision was supported by evidence and within its jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding the dedication and acceptance of land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact on dedication and acceptance were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference, and that there was no error in the application of the law to those facts.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal terminating his tenancy and ordering him to pay rent arrears.

The tenant argued that he had a private agreement with the landlord's property manager to freeze his rent indefinitely, and that the landlord was estopped from resiling from this agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 2(1) of the Tenant Protection Act prohibits landlords and tenants from contracting out of the Act's provisions, even where the agreement benefits the tenant.

The court also held that the doctrine of estoppel cannot override a clear statutory prohibition.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal which held that the landlord substantially interfered with the tenants' reasonable enjoyment by changing secondary locks installed by the tenants.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in focusing on the ownership of the locks rather than whether the landlord had consented to the alteration of the locking system under s. 23 of the Tenant Protection Act.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to determine the issue of consent for each individual tenancy.

The appellants, developers of a residential subdivision, appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision requiring them to pay $568,391 as their proportionate share of municipal infrastructure costs previously front-ended by a neighbouring developer.

The appellants argued that the Development Charges Act, 1989 prohibited the imposition of such charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the Act prohibited imposing a charge by way of agreement, it did not prohibit the OMB from imposing the charge directly as a condition of draft plan approval under section 51(25) of the Planning Act to ensure a fair and equitable allocation of infrastructure costs.