Tanya A. Pagliaroli

The moving parties (plaintiffs) brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of an order adding them as defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The responding parties argued the order was final because it definitively dismissed their limitation period defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's findings regarding the limitation period were preliminary and did not preclude the responding parties from pleading the defence at trial.

Consequently, the order was interlocutory, the appeal was quashed, and the matter was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The moving parties (appellants) sought a stay of several endorsements pending their appeal of an order directing a buyout of their shares in a condominium development project.

The underlying dispute involved mutual allegations of oppression between two 50% shareholders.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay pending appeal.

It found no serious issue to be tried, noting the broad discretion of the motion judge under the OBCA.

While acknowledging that loss of mortgage security could constitute irreparable harm, the court concluded that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the respondents, who risked losing $25 million in financing and the entire buyout transaction if the stay were granted.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Maria Patria Asajar on January 22, 2014, following alleged misdiagnosis and delay in treatment of an aortic dissection at North York General Hospital.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure after the action had not been set down for trial within the prescribed timeframe.

The defendants opposed, arguing the action should be dismissed for delay.

The court found that the plaintiffs provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that there was no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The action was permitted to proceed with new mediation and trial-setting deadlines.

Two equal 50% shareholders in a lakeside condominium development project in Burlington, Ontario (Nautique Lakefront Residences) sought court guidance on separating their partnership following an acrimonious impasse.

The applicant, an investor providing approximately 90% of equity funding, proposed a court-imposed shotgun buy-sell mechanism.

The respondent proposed a buyout under section 207 of the Business Corporations Act using a valuation report prepared by KSV Soriano Inc. The court found that both parties had engaged in oppressive conduct but determined that separation was necessary to preserve the project.

The court ordered a section 207 buyout by the respondent at a price representing the midpoint between two valuation scenarios, rejecting the shotgun mechanism due to procedural fairness concerns arising from late notice and the respondent's good faith participation in case management conferences.

The court granted the Monitor's application to assign John Aquino into bankruptcy and continued the Mareva order against him.

The decision addresses the requirements for a bankruptcy order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the discretion to dismiss or stay such an application, and the standards for continuing a Mareva injunction post-judgment.

The court found that John Aquino had committed an act of bankruptcy, was unable to pay his debts, and that there was no bona fide dispute with the Monitor.

The court also rejected arguments that the application was brought for a collateral purpose and found the continuation of the Mareva order appropriate.

The court granted a bankruptcy order against Thomas Dylan Suitor, finding that the applicant, The Fuller Landau Group Inc. (as Receiver of The Lion’s Share Group Inc.), established the necessary statutory requirements under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that Mr. Suitor was personally liable under promissory notes as both borrower and guarantor, that he owed debts exceeding $1,000, and that he had ceased to meet his liabilities generally as they became due.

The court also found the existence of multiple creditors and/or special circumstances justifying the order, and declined to exercise its discretion to refuse the order.

The court considered cross-applications between Michelle Goldstein Zaldin and Seymour Goldstein regarding the enforcement of a shotgun clause in a shareholders’ agreement for their jointly owned insurance and investment businesses.

The court found that a binding agreement was reached for Ms. Zaldin to purchase Mr. Goldstein’s shares, and that Mr. Goldstein’s failure to obtain necessary regulatory approvals constituted a breach that prevented closing.

The court granted specific performance in favour of Ms. Zaldin, declined to imply additional terms into the agreement, and awarded her costs.

The court considered cross-applications between Michelle Goldstein Zaldin and Seymour Goldstein regarding the enforcement of a shotgun clause in a shareholders’ agreement for their jointly owned insurance and investment businesses.

The court found that a binding agreement was reached for Ms. Zaldin to purchase Mr. Goldstein’s shares, and that Mr. Goldstein’s failure to obtain necessary regulatory approvals constituted a breach that prevented closing.

The court granted specific performance in favour of Ms. Zaldin, declined to imply additional terms into the agreement, and awarded her costs.

The Receiver of The Lion's Share Group Inc. brought a motion to appoint an interim receiver over the property of the debtor pursuant to section 46 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Receiver argued that the debtor owed over $23 million under various promissory notes and personal guarantees, and that an interim receiver was necessary to prevent the dissipation of assets.

The debtor opposed the motion, arguing he was not personally liable under the guarantees and that the transactions in question were in the ordinary course of business.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Receiver was likely to succeed on the bankruptcy application and that there was an immediate need to protect the estate given the debtor's recent transactions and the complex web of related entities.

This is a costs endorsement following a decision where the appeal was allowed in part and the cross-appeal was also allowed.

The appellant Estate succeeded against one of three respondents, while respondent D.O. was completely successful on the cross-appeal, though one aspect was conceded and the other involved a lesser amount.

Given the divided success, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear their own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a matrimonial dispute concerning financial advances and child support.

The Estate of T.O. (husband) appealed the trial judge's dismissal of a claim for $341,000 in advances to Ridgeway (a corporation indirectly owned by D.O., the wife), arguing the limitation period was misapplied.

D.O. cross-appealed the finding of her liability for a $40,346 advance made by the husband's corporation and a child support calculation error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Estate's appeal against Ridgeway, finding the 2013 advances were demand loans and thus not statute-barred.

It dismissed the appeal against D.O. and 201.

The cross-appeal was allowed, setting aside D.O.'s liability for the $40,346 advance (as the creditor was a non-party corporation) and correcting the child support calculation.

This is a costs endorsement following an application decision that determined dog ownership.

The court addressed the proportionality of legal costs, noting that both parties incurred excessive fees (over $265,000 collectively) for a non-monetary issue.

Despite the applicant's success in the underlying application, the court found the requested costs disproportionate and awarded partial indemnity costs of $83,570, significantly less than the $129,345.90 partial indemnity sought by the applicant, and less than the respondent's offer to pay for the dog.

The proposed defendants in a medical malpractice action brought a motion to strike a supplementary affidavit sworn by the plaintiffs' lawyer.

The proposed defendants argued the affidavit was an abuse of process, violated rules of professional conduct regarding lawyers acting as witnesses, and constituted improper reply evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that disputes over whether the affidavit attempted to change or repudiate earlier evidence should be determined by the judge hearing the substantive leave motion.

The court also found that Rule 39.02(2) did not preclude the plaintiffs from delivering the supplementary affidavit because they had not cross-examined on an adverse party's affidavit.

The appellant, Aliesha Verma, brought a motion to stay an order of Stewart J. pending appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The underlying order declared that a dog, Rocco Jr., was owned by the deceased Leonard Carvalho and formed part of his estate, ordering Ms. Verma to return the dog to the estate trustee.

The motions judge applied the three-part test for a stay from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General): serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

The court found that the grounds of appeal had little prospect of success, that Ms. Verma failed to establish irreparable harm related to the denial of the stay, and that the balance of convenience favoured the estate trustee due to Ms. Verma's past conduct and social media campaign.

The motion for a stay was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the responding party.

The applicant, Arlete Carvalho, as estate trustee for the deceased Leonard Carvalho, sought a declaration that a dog, Rocco Jr., was owned by the deceased at the time of his death and should be returned to the estate.

The respondent, Aliesha Verma, argued she owned the dog, or it was gifted to her, or that promissory estoppel applied.

The court found that the deceased maintained ownership and control of the dog, and the elements of a valid gift (specifically delivery) were not met.

The promissory estoppel argument also failed due to lack of a clear promise.

The court declared the dog part of the estate and ordered its return to the applicant.

The appellant moved to amend the notice of appeal to clarify that relief is sought against two corporations added as parties below.

The respondent opposed due to late notice.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal and cross-appeal, ordering the motion to amend to be heard in writing with a set schedule for submissions.

Costs were reserved to the disposition of the motion, and the panel remained seized of the motion but not the main appeal.

The applicant, Link 427 General Partnership, sought to enforce an interim arbitral order compelling two non-parties, Fay Marzuq and Melissa Raffoul, to attend examinations for discovery.

The court dismissed the application, holding that an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction over non-parties to an arbitration agreement, and therefore the court would not enforce such an order.

The court also noted, as an alternative reason for dismissal, that the information sought from the non-parties had already been provided.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant, Felicia Vacaru, was unsuccessful in her appeal.

The respondent, Marmer Penner Inc., was awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $17,500, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant sued her former family lawyer for negligence, alleging the lawyer failed to properly advise her regarding spousal support and business valuations when negotiating a separation agreement.

The motion judge stayed the civil action as an abuse of process, ruling that the appellant must first attempt to set aside the separation agreement under the Family Law Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Family Law Act is a complete code for spousal support claims and the civil system should not be used to circumvent the statutory regime governing matrimonial disputes.

Felicia Vacaru appealed a trial judgment that found her liable to Marmer Penner Inc. for outstanding forensic accounting fees and dismissed her crossclaim against her former lawyers, Legge & Legge and John Legge, for negligence.

Vacaru also sought to adduce fresh evidence on appeal and leave to appeal costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it inadmissible hearsay or irrelevant, and dismissed both appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the fee agreement and the dismissal of the negligence crossclaim due to lack of breach of standard of care, causation, and limitation period issues.

Leave to appeal costs was also denied.