Susan Vella

The moving parties (the Crosslinx Defendants) sought an order under Rule 49.09 to enforce a settlement reached with the plaintiff.

The parties disagreed on the scope and form of the release to be signed by the plaintiff.

The court held that without prejudice communications were admissible to determine the scope of the settlement.

The court further held that the parties bargained for a standard general release, which implicitly includes claims over and contribution/indemnity clauses, and ordered the plaintiff to execute the release with those terms included, subject to minor clarifying revisions.

The Crown moved to dismiss an appeal brought by 'Maxine Adwella' against a decision of the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal of abandoned pets.

The Crown argued that 'Maxine Adwella' was an alias for Althea Reyes, who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was prohibited from commencing proceedings without leave.

The court found that the appellant was indeed Althea Reyes using an alias to circumvent the vexatious litigant order.

The appeal was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.03(1) and as an abuse of process.

The defendant brought a motion to stay or dismiss the action on the basis that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction simpliciter.

The plaintiff, a UK national residing in Bahrain, had entered into an oral loan agreement with the defendant, who claimed to reside in Pakistan.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant was domiciled or resident in Ontario, or carried on business in Ontario.

The court found that while the defendant carried on business in Ontario, the presumption of jurisdiction was rebutted because there was no real and substantial connection between the loan agreement and the defendant's business activities in Ontario.

The action was stayed for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment in a simplified procedure wrongful dismissal action arising from a without-cause termination after less than one year of service.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and determined the matter on the written record.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court found the plaintiff was not a senior manager or executive despite his title, but his age and the limited availability of comparable employment justified a reasonable notice period of two months.

After crediting the termination payments already made, the court awarded damages of $11,359.98 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer of record, alleging an actual or perceived conflict of interest in her joint representation of all three defendants.

The plaintiff was never a client of the challenged lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of real mischief or that the proper administration of justice required the removal.

The court also found that the motion was brought for a tactical advantage, given the nearly two-year delay in bringing it after the issue was first raised.