Susan Pennypacker

The offenders were convicted of fraud over $5,000 in relation to a large-scale mortgage fraud scheme involving properties owned by the elderly father of one of the offenders.

The total loss to the title insurer was over $3.3 million.

The Crown sought three-year prison sentences and a restitution order against the son.

The court found that both offenders were suitable candidates for conditional sentences, imposing terms of two years less a day with house arrest and curfew conditions.

The court declined to order restitution against the son due to his destitution and subservient role, but imposed fines in lieu of forfeiture against both offenders based on the specific fraudulent funds they had possessed or controlled, giving them 20 years to pay.

Christopher Bryan was on trial for importing cocaine.

The Crown sought to admit Jennifer McGrath's passport application to corroborate her testimony and to show Bryan acted as guarantor in furtherance of a conspiracy.

The defence opposed, arguing hearsay, late notice under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), and prejudice.

The court ruled that Ms. McGrath's statements on the first page of the application were admissible as she adopted them in testimony.

However, the full passport application and affidavit were not admissible under s. 30 CEA due to late notice and resulting prejudice to the defence.

Section 2, the "Declaration of Guarantor" allegedly completed by Bryan, was admissible under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule, with concerns about the unsavoury witness (McGrath) going to weight, not admissibility.

The defence's request for a mistrial was denied.

Three accused were tried for drug trafficking and proceeds of crime offences following a police investigation that resulted in three distinct seizures of cocaine and marijuana.

The court found the first accused not guilty, accepting his testimony that he was a 'blind courier' without knowledge of the drugs in the box he delivered.

The court found the second accused guilty of possessing cocaine found in a 'stash house', rejecting his cousin's exculpatory testimony and relying on circumstantial evidence of his control over the premises.

The court found the third accused guilty of possessing drugs found in his apartment, rejecting his testimony that the drugs belonged to a houseguest.

The applicants, Everald Brissett and Courtney Benjamin, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The total delay was 36 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found five months of "defence delay" and four months of "exceptional circumstances" delay, reducing the relevant delay to 27 months, below the ceiling.

Additionally, the "transitional exceptional circumstance" from Jordan applied, as the parties reasonably relied on the pre-Jordan law.

The application was dismissed.

Arnold Thiessen was convicted of attempt murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

The court considered sentencing objectives under s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the egregious nature of the offence involving the recruitment of his children to attempt to drown their mother, and the profound impact on the victim and children.

The decision addressed credit for pretrial custody, applying principles from R. v. Summers and R. v. Rezaie regarding both quantitative and qualitative factors justifying enhanced credit.

Despite the severity of the crime and a continued lack of full remorse, the court imposed an effective sentence of one day in jail followed by three years' probation, reflecting significant credit for 11 years of pretrial custody already served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and assault with a weapon, as well as his sentence of 112 days in custody.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant intentionally drove his vehicle at a co-worker in an employee parking lot.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and reasons were sufficient.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge failed to articulate the mitigating factors and did not explain why a 90-day intermittent sentence, which was within the Crown's suggested range, was inappropriate.

The sentence was reduced to 90 days to be served intermittently, and probation was reduced to one year.

Sentencing decision for trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of proceeds of crime arising from the transfer of large quantities of steroid pills and cash between vehicles.

Police seized approximately 220,000 steroid pills and $14,000 in currency.

The court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, including denunciation and deterrence.

While the offence involved a substantial commercial quantity of drugs, the offender was a first-time offender with positive community support and no aggravating factors under the CDSA.

The court imposed a conditional sentence rather than incarceration.

The accused brought a pre‑trial Charter application seeking exclusion of cocaine discovered during a warrantless search following his arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He alleged violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him and that the resulting search was unlawful.

The court held that the arresting officer had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds based on a reliable confidential informant, corroborating police investigation, and surveillance consistent with drug trafficking activity.

Because the arrest was lawful, the subsequent search of the accused’s person was a valid search incident to arrest.

The court therefore found no Charter breaches and declined to exclude the evidence.

The applicants, charged with production of marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The case had a complex history spanning over five years, including two mistrials.

The court applied the Morin framework to assess the delay.

For one applicant, the court found the institutional delay exceeded the guidelines and he suffered significant prejudice, resulting in a stay of proceedings.

For the other applicant, the court found no violation due to his express waiver of a substantial period of delay, his counsel's scheduling conflicts, and lesser prejudice, dismissing his application.

In this drug trafficking trial arising from Project Wanipitee, the court applied the Carter test to determine whether intercepted communications could be admitted under the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found that a joint enterprise existed between the accused and others to traffic cocaine in the Durham Region.

The court identified the accused on intercepted communications through circumstantial evidence including surveillance, text message patterns, and physical movements.

The court convicted the accused of trafficking cocaine on two dates and possession of cocaine for trafficking purposes.

The court acquitted on charges related to marijuana possession and possession of cocaine at a separate location due to insufficient evidence of possession and control.

The accused applied to exclude a DNA sample obtained under a Criminal Code warrant in a first degree murder prosecution, arguing that the issuing justice acted unfairly by refusing to permit defence submissions before issuing the warrant.

The court held that s. 487.05 contemplates a presumptively ex parte process, while preserving judicial discretion to require notice in an appropriate case.

The issuing justice acted within jurisdiction, gave defence counsel an opportunity to explain why standing should be granted, and committed no breach of s. 8.

In any event, the court held that exclusion under s. 24(2) would not be warranted because any breach would have been minimal and technical, the authorities acted in good faith, and the evidence was important and inevitable.

In a criminal voir dire within a murder prosecution, the court considered whether the accused's recorded police statement was voluntary under the confessions rule.

The defence argued that delay in access to counsel, overnight detention, discomfort from being cold, youth, and police suggestions that an innocent person should speak created oppression and undermined voluntariness.

Applying the contextual voluntariness analysis from the governing confession cases, the court held there was no atmosphere of oppression, no improper quid pro quo, and no doubt that the accused had an operating mind and understood both the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

In a first degree murder prosecution arising from a fatal stabbing, the court considered whether the audiotape of the deceased's 911 call should be played for the jury where the defence conceded the contents were admissible for their truth but sought to limit the evidence to a transcript.

The court held that the audio itself had significant additional probative value because it allowed the jury to assess the declarant's physical and emotional state, bearing on credibility and reliability on the central issue of identity.

Although the recording carried some risk of emotional prejudice, that risk was limited and could be addressed by a limiting instruction.

The audiotape was admitted and could be played to the jury.

The accused brought an application for an order permitting him to sit at counsel table during a first degree murder trial.

The court held that seating and location of an accused is within the trial judge's discretion and must balance courtroom safety and security with dignity, the presumption of innocence, communication with counsel, solicitor-client privilege, and the ability to follow the proceedings.

Given the accused's significant youth record for violent offences and his institutional assault record while in custody, the court found a sufficient security risk to require that he remain in the prisoner’s dock.

The court further held that this placement would not impair trial fairness or the accused's participation.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit several categories of hearsay statements made by the deceased, including statements to a school friend and her sister, text messages to her mother, personal writings, and contextual evidence regarding discipline within the household.

The defence opposed portions of the evidence, arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay or impermissible prior discreditable conduct whose prejudicial effect outweighed probative value.

Applying the analytical framework for hearsay admissibility, including the state of mind exception and the principled exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability, the court held that most of the deceased’s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay evidence of state of mind or under the principled exception.

Evidence concerning family discipline and prior incidents was also admitted as relevant contextual evidence with probative value exceeding potential prejudice.

One diary entry dated more than a year prior to the death was excluded because its limited probative value was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a pretrial application to admit the videotaped police interviews of the eight-year-old brother of the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The child had returned to Jamaica and his mother refused to permit him to testify.

While the necessity requirement was met, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability due to material inconsistencies, the child's tendency to guess or make assumptions, and the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.

The Crown's application to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary motion in a homicide prosecution, the accused sought to exclude several items of proposed Crown evidence on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court applied the common law balancing test governing admissibility and considered whether the evidence would undermine trial fairness or invite improper jury reasoning.

Several graphic autopsy photographs and circumstantial forensic evidence were permitted where they illustrated the nature of the injuries or were relevant to the location and manner of the assault.

Evidence consisting of a written message on a pacifier package was excluded from the Crown’s case due to minimal probative value and risk of prejudice, though it could be used in cross‑examination if the accused testified.

A baseball bat potentially linked to the killing and a partial fingerprint found at the scene were admitted, with concerns about evidentiary weight left for the jury.

In a joint first‑degree murder prosecution, one accused brought a pretrial motion seeking to exclude the police statements of a co‑accused or, alternatively, to sever the trials.

The applicant argued that the statements implicated him in the killing and would be highly prejudicial because the jury might improperly use them as evidence against him despite limiting instructions.

The court held that the statements were highly probative against the co‑accused and formed an important part of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles governing severance under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the presumption favouring joint trials, the court concluded that any prejudice could be managed through editing of the recordings and strong jury instructions.

The motion to exclude the statements or order severance was dismissed.

In a pre‑trial voir dire in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude a police interview conducted the day the victim’s body was discovered.

The court considered whether the accused was detained during questioning at the police station and therefore entitled to rights to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the detention factors from R. v. Moran and the objective test for psychological detention articulated in R. v. Grant, the court found the accused was effectively detained when interviewed after being transported in a locked police cruiser and held in an interview room for hours without a caution.

Because the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, his Charter rights were breached.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2), and the court noted that it would also have had a reasonable doubt regarding voluntariness.

The appellant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for traffic violations.

During the stop, an officer directed the appellant to place his hands on the seat in front of him, asked for his name, and ran a background check.

The officer subsequently noticed a handgun protruding from a knapsack next to the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences and sentenced to nine years in prison.

On appeal, the appellant argued his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated and that his Aboriginal status was not properly considered in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appellant was psychologically detained, there was no breach of ss. 9 or 10(b).

Assuming a s. 8 breach occurred during the background check, the court held the firearm was still admissible under s. 24(2).

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately weighed the appellant's Aboriginal background against the mandatory minimum sentence and aggravating factors.