Susan Pennypacker

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit several categories of hearsay statements made by the deceased, including statements to a school friend and her sister, text messages to her mother, personal writings, and contextual evidence regarding discipline within the household.

The defence opposed portions of the evidence, arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay or impermissible prior discreditable conduct whose prejudicial effect outweighed probative value.

Applying the analytical framework for hearsay admissibility, including the state of mind exception and the principled exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability, the court held that most of the deceased’s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay evidence of state of mind or under the principled exception.

Evidence concerning family discipline and prior incidents was also admitted as relevant contextual evidence with probative value exceeding potential prejudice.

One diary entry dated more than a year prior to the death was excluded because its limited probative value was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary motion in a homicide prosecution, the accused sought to exclude several items of proposed Crown evidence on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court applied the common law balancing test governing admissibility and considered whether the evidence would undermine trial fairness or invite improper jury reasoning.

Several graphic autopsy photographs and circumstantial forensic evidence were permitted where they illustrated the nature of the injuries or were relevant to the location and manner of the assault.

Evidence consisting of a written message on a pacifier package was excluded from the Crown’s case due to minimal probative value and risk of prejudice, though it could be used in cross‑examination if the accused testified.

A baseball bat potentially linked to the killing and a partial fingerprint found at the scene were admitted, with concerns about evidentiary weight left for the jury.

In a joint first‑degree murder prosecution, one accused brought a pretrial motion seeking to exclude the police statements of a co‑accused or, alternatively, to sever the trials.

The applicant argued that the statements implicated him in the killing and would be highly prejudicial because the jury might improperly use them as evidence against him despite limiting instructions.

The court held that the statements were highly probative against the co‑accused and formed an important part of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles governing severance under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the presumption favouring joint trials, the court concluded that any prejudice could be managed through editing of the recordings and strong jury instructions.

The motion to exclude the statements or order severance was dismissed.

In a pre‑trial voir dire in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude a police interview conducted the day the victim’s body was discovered.

The court considered whether the accused was detained during questioning at the police station and therefore entitled to rights to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the detention factors from R. v. Moran and the objective test for psychological detention articulated in R. v. Grant, the court found the accused was effectively detained when interviewed after being transported in a locked police cruiser and held in an interview room for hours without a caution.

Because the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, his Charter rights were breached.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2), and the court noted that it would also have had a reasonable doubt regarding voluntariness.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and breaches of bail and probation conditions.

After being initially detained and then released on a Superior Court recognizance, the accused was arrested for alleged breaches of his no-alcohol and house arrest conditions.

The Crown sought detention on the secondary ground under section 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code, arguing that release posed a substantial likelihood of further criminal offences endangering public safety.

The court found the accused's breaches serious and his proposed release plan insufficient to address concerns regarding alcohol abuse and anger management issues.

The court ordered detention, finding the accused had failed to meet his onus on the balance of probabilities.